Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

MOTHERWELL AND WISHAW BURGH Ex-
TENSION, &C. ORDER CONFIRMATION BILL

Read the Third time and passed.

Oral Answers to Questions — ROYAL AIR FORCE

V-bombers (Low-Level Rôle)

Mr. Lubbock: asked the Secretary of State for Air what arrangements have been made for training the crews of V-bombers in their new low-level rôle.

The Secretary of State for Air (Mr. Hugh Fraser): Up to date, training has been carried out in this country but, as I said in my reply to a Question on 16th January, from the hon. Member for Sheffield, Park (Mr. Mulley) the Canadian Government have agreed in principle to the V-force using a low level training route in Canada as an extension of existing training facilities there. Route proving flights have since been flown in Canada and good progress is being made with the detailed arrangements.

Mr. Lubbock: Although this may be considered a minor point, will not some annoyance be caused to people in the areas underlying these flights if the V-bombers fly at near sonic speeds at a height of 500 ft.? What estimate has been made of the effect low-level training flights will have on the operational life of the V-bombers, and why is it thought that by flying at the height of 500 ft. they can avoid interception?

Mr. Fraser: We are carefully looking at the question of trouble being caused to individual civilians. There are

three general routes in this country and they are kept as far away as possible from any centres of population. We have had little trouble on this score in the past. I will be answering the wider question about the efficiency and efficacy of the V-force at low level in the debate later.

Mr. Mulley: Before the right hon. Gentleman makes his speech in the debate, which we are awaiting with great interest, can he not tell us whether in the training programmes any wear or excessive strain on the planes has been revealed?

Mr. Fraser: No, Sir. I will be dealing with that point in the debate. We have fatigue meters in all these aircraft, many of which are new and some of which are less than a year old. There have been no signs at all of the difficulty the hon. Member mentions.

Mr. Wigg: Can the right hon. Gentleman reassure the House that there is no danger of these planes flying at supersonic speeds?

Mr. Fraser: I have another Question to answer on that point.

Mr. Mulley: asked the Secretary of State for Air what is the estimated cost of modifications to the V-bomber aircraft and training of their crews involved by the proposed low-level strike rôle.

Mr. H. Fraser: It would not be in the public interest to reveal the cost of the aircraft modifications involved. But, in relation to the total capital cost of the V-force, it is very small. The cost of training V-bomber crews is not significantly affected by the altitudes at which this training is undertaken.

Mr. Mulley: The House will realise that this is a most unsatisfactory Answer. Is not the right hon. Gentleman aware that we are becoming increasingly concerned because we get no information whatever about any financial aspects of defence policy. Other Governments—the United States Government, for example—issue for public circulation the most detailed cost figures for missiles and planes, and almost all aspects of their finance. Surely, this cost can be given to the House, and if


the right hon. Gentleman will not give it now, will he justify his conduct in the debate that is to follow?

Mr. Fraser: I am afraid that I always find it difficult to justify my conduct to the hon. Gentleman, but I will endeavour to do so.

TSR2 Aircraft (Low-Flying Operations)

Mr. Dempsey: asked the Secretary of State for Air what instructions he proposes to give to pilots of TSR2 bombers in order to safeguard the civilian population, in view of the low-flying operations of these machines.

Mr. H. Fraser: Low-level flying by Royal Air Force aircraft is already most carefully controlled. Each flight has to be specifically authorised in writing; a minimum height is laid down and routes are chosen so as to cause the least possible disturbance to the public. In particular, pilots are briefed to avoid built-up areas. The same stringent precautions will apply to the TSR2.

Mr. Dempsey: Since there is nothing more terrifying than living in an area over which aircraft fly low, will the right hon. Gentleman consider acquiring some of the depopulated villages which have been designated by local town planning authorities as areas which are virtually dying and utilise them for this purpose and, as far as possible, minimise, if not eliminate, the necessity for pilots and crews to be trained in rooftop flying over centres of population?

Mr. Fraser: R.A.F. aircraft will not be required to fly supersonically at low level in this country.

Staff Memoranda (Security Classification)

Mr. Wigg: asked the Secretary of State for Air why a memorandum reference 44/64, giving information about the Royal Air Force Anniversary Concert, 1964, was circulated in the Air Ministry under a restricted security heading.

Mr. H. Fraser: Hitherto staff memoranda have been regarded as part of a restricted series. I think this practice

can be improved upon. In future each memorandum will be classified according to its content. I am grateful to the hon. Member for bringing this matter to my attention—and I almost feel like asking for the hon. Member to be invited to the concert.

Mr. Wigg: I would not mind coming to the concert if the right hon. Gentleman will get the Prime Minister to take the same action over the whole of the Civil Service and so get rid of this nonsense.

Mr. Fraser: This matter is always under review, and I can assure the hon. Gentleman that an improvement has been made.

Mr. Mulley: The whole House is indebted to my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) for his efforts, but can the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that he will not only look at this series but at restrictions on security generally because of the growing feeling that this House and the country generally have been denied essential but not security matter on which to form a real judgment of defence policies?

Mr. Fraser: I am aware of the point the hon. Member has in mind and he may know that I have had a look at the matter at a higher level to see if we can make some improvement.

Civilian Air Traffic Controllers

Mr. Lipton: asked the Secretary of State for Air why he is requiring civilian air traffic controllers to join the Royal Air Force or lose their jobs.

Mr. H. Fraser: About 80 civilians are employed on behalf of the United States Air Force for air traffic control duties at American bases in this country. They were recruited on a temporary basis specifically for this purpose. Because of a reduction in the number of U.S.A.F. bases, about 24 will be redundant by the end of June. I am not responsible, of course, for this reduction in the requirements of the U.S.A.F.
Since, however, many of these 80 controllers are potentially suitable for commissioning as air traffic controllers in the Royal Air Force, where there are vacancies, all have been invited to apply. Some 40 have already made enquiries.

Mr. Lipton: Does it not look a little like conscription by back-door methods to say to these men, who have done useful work in the past, "Join up, or be sacked"? Does the right hon. Gentleman agree, first, that there is a shortage of air traffic controllers and, secondly, that in the new national air traffic control organisation, which looks after civilian and Service aircraft, there is room for this kind of qualified person, who really should not be thrown on the scrap heap?

Mr. Fraser: I have made very special offers and terms for these people. All their training has been looked at, and if they come into the Royal Air Force they will be given seniority based on the work they have already done. Those young enough can compete for establishment in the Ministry of Aviation. As I have already said, some 40 of them have put in inquiries.

Mr. Rankin: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the air traffic controller, acting in the civilian capacity, has for long been dissatisfied with his salary position? Will that state of things be cured if these men are conscripted into the Royal Air Force, and what effect does he think that will have on civilians?

Mr. Fraser: There is no question of conscripting anyone into the Royal Air Force. These men are on short-term contract. We have made them an offer. If they want to come into the R.A.F. we shall be happy to have them, and training and skill will be taken into consideration as to seniority.

New Aircraft and Equipment

Mr. Mulley: asked the Secretary of State for Air what sum was expended on new aircraft and equipment for the Royal Air Force in the financial year 1959–64; what sum is proposed for this purpose for 1964–65; and what percentage of these sums has been allocated to Bomber Command, Fighter Command and Transport Command, respectively.

Mr. H. Fraser: Expenditure on new airframes, engines and major weapons for the years 1959–64, was approximately £510 million, of which some 43 per cent. was for Bomber Command, 28 per cent. for Fighter Command and 13 per cent.

for Transport Command. Expenditure for 1964–65 is estimated at £64 million, of which the corresponding percentages are 17 per cent., 35 per cent., and 5 per cent. respectively.

Mr. Mulley: Does not the Secretary of State consider, looking back, that it would have been much better had a greater amount of the new aircraft expenditure been on Transport Command and rather less on Bomber Command, in view of the great strains now being placed on the mobility of air forces?

Mr. Fraser: No, Sir. I think that we have recently met all our mobility requirements—and that is perfectly true —but next year, 1965–66, we shall have the Belfast and the VC10 putting a heavy load on Transport Command finance.

Mr. McMaster: Is my right hon. Friend satisfied that he is planning far enough in advance to meet the needs of Transport Command?

Mr. Fraser: I am planning quite a way ahead, yes.

Oral Answers to Questions — HOME DEPARTMENT

Betting Shops (Licences)

Captain W. Elliot: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will introduce legislation to empower persons other than the applicant to appeal against the decision of the licensing justices to grant a licence for a betting shop.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. C. M. Woodhouse): No, Sir.

Captain Elliot: Does not my hon. Friend agree that as the applicant for a betting licence has the right of appeal if his application is refused, those who oppose the application should also have this right of appeal? Is he aware that in the London areas, and in the fringes, a number of local authorities are getting concerned at the proliferation of betting shops? Is he also aware that, in Carshalton, the council has three times opposed the granting of a betting shop licence and, on each occasion, its opposition has been turned down? Does not my hon. Friend feel that the position should be looked at?

Mr. Woodhouse: We naturally looked at the position as soon as my hon. Friend put down his Question, but we cannot see any grounds for altering the present procedure for an appeal, which is in line with that for the grant of planning permission under the Act. The Franks Committee looked at the matter in connection with planning permission, and came to the conclusion that it would be impracticable to provide for third-party appeals in the case of licensing. It seems to me that there is certainly no stronger case here, because, as his constituency experience shows, it is possible to renew objections annually.

Mrs. Braddock: Is the Under-Secretary aware that although a planning authority may decide that there should not be a betting shop in a certain place, there is no need for the committee responsible for licensing to take notice of the planning authority's recommendation; and that in many cases licences have been granted when the local authority has refused planning permission?

Mr. Woodhouse: As the hon. Lady knows, the Home Office is not responsible for planning matters. The decision rests, and must be left to rest, with the licensing authority.

Judges' Rules

Mr. Abse: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether, in view of concern about the contents of the Home Office Circular 31/64, being the publication containing the new Judges' Rules and Administrative Directions to the police, he will introduce legislation to govern the rights and duties of police officers when questioning any person from whom they may believe useful information leading to discovery of offenders may be obtained.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Henry Brooke): No, Sir.

Mr. Abse: Is not the Home Secretary aware that there has been considerable criticism of these Rules by the police and by lawyers, who are concerned both as to their content and their practicability? Would it not be desirable to afford this House an opportunity for public debate of Rules that fundamentally alter the law on the admissi-

bility of evidence? Is not it desirable that we should not abdicate the responsibilities of this legislature in matters affecting the liberties of the subject to people whose job it is not to make the law of this land?

Mr. Brooke: I do not, of course, control the debates in this House, but the Judges' Rules give guidance on the circumstances in which evidence would be regarded by the judges as admissible or not admissible, and the judges can exercise their discretion to determine whether the evidence in a case should or should not be admissible. I doubt whether we could get the same flexibility with any statutory rules.

Mr. Fletcher: Does the right hon. Gentleman realise that these Rules do not merely affect the admissibility of evidence in court but also affect the whole question of how suspected persons should be dealt with while in custody? Does he now realise that these new Rules have been severely criticised—and I would emphasise this—by the police themselves, and by lawyers, the Law Society, and others concerned with the administration of justice? Does he not agree that a matter of this kind, which is in the nature of legislation, should be fully ventilated by this House at an early opportunity?

Mr. Brooke: I saw criticism from both sides when the Rules were first promulgated, but, surely, the right course is to see how they work in practice, and then consider the matter.

Mr. Abse: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department why notices describing the rights and facilities available to persons in custody in police stations in the Metropolitan area were not on display by 27th January, 1964, as required by the administrative directions circulated by him; and whether such notices are now on display at all police stations in the Metropolitan area.

Mr. Brooke: As soon as it was known that the new Judges' Rules were to come into operation on 27th January, immediate steps were taken by the Metropolitan Police to have the new notices printed and displayed. The notices were distributed on 31st January, and have since then been on display in all Metropolitan Police stations.

Mr. Abse: Is the Home Secretary aware that, whatever may be occurring in London, there seems to be good ground to believe that these notices are not being widely distributed throughout the country? Would he be prepared to give administrative instructions to make sure that the notices—which it is suggested within the administrative regulations should be in every police station—are there, so that there should be no appearance of oppressiveness against anybody now in custody?

Mr. Brooke: The Rules should appear everywhere. I do not think that I have power to give directions to the provincial police forces in these matters, but I shall certainly bring what the hon. Gentleman says to the attention of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Constabulary.

Mr. Fletcher: To take a specific case, can the right hon. Gentleman give an assurance that all persons in custody are informed that one of his own Rules—Item No. 7—is to the effect that any person in custody should be allowed to speak on the telephone to his solicitor or to his friends, and that that notice is brought home to anybody in custody?

Mr. Brooke: Yes, sir. That is one of the objects of these Rules. The notices are on display throughout the Metropolitan police stations, and I have every reason to believe that they are also displayed throughout the provincial forces.

Husbands (Payment of Maintenance)

Mr. Montgomery: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what plans he has for improving the law relating to the payment of maintenance by husbands who desert their families.

Mr. Woodhouse: The law relating to matrimonial proceedings in magistrates' courts was consolidated, with amendments, in the Matrimonial Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) Act, 1960. This Act was based on the recommendations of a Departmental Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Arthian Davies which reported in 1959. My right hon. Friend has no proposals for further amendments of this branch of the law at present.

Mr. Montgomery: Despite his Answer, is my hon. Friend aware that the law still does not seem to work and that there are many of these deserted wives living in Newcastle and there must be many thousands of them in the country generally and that all they seek is the right to maintain themselves and their children? Does not my hon. Friend agree that it is totally wrong that they have to go through this terrible paraphernalia to chase their husbands and obtain their money? I ask my hon. Friend to look at the matter again.

Mr. Woodhouse: This, of course, is a matter at which we are very willing to look, but the only innovation contained in my hon. Friend's Question is that the State should take over this responsibility, and take over the responsibility of extracting the money from defaulting husbands. But the power to extract money from defaulting husbands already lies with the courts and there is no new instrument that we could produce for the purpose.

Miss Bacon: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the difficulty is that the court grants an order but it is afterwards very difficult to trace where a husband has gone? Could not his Department do more to ensure that a husband is found and that he pays his wife?

Mr. Woodhouse: I am sorry to have to tell the hon Lady that our means of obtaining information about the location of missing persons are no greater than those of the courts.

Mrs. Slater: That does not satisfy the situation. Does the hon. Gentleman not realise that because of the present situation many of these women are forced on to National Assistance very much against their will, the husband goes scot-free and the State has to look after the women? It is absolutely impossible in some cases for these women to have the resources to go about chasing their husbands. Will not the hon. Gentleman therefore look at the situation again?

Mr. Woodhouse: The hon. Lady is qiute right in saying that in such circumstances the State has to look after the matter. This is precisely what the suggestion in my hon. Friend's Question amounted to. [HON. MEMBERS: "No."] The problem is to extract the money


from the defaulting husband. If in the last resort a man is prepared to go to prison for several weeks, which is the present law, there is no power to extract the money from him.

Mr. Montgomery: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment at the earliest opportunity.

Motoring Offences (Driving Tests)

Mr. John Hall: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department in how many cases courts have ordered drivers, who have previously passed their driving test, and who have been convicted of the more serious driving offences listed in Parts 1 and 2 of Schedule 1 of the Road Traffic Act, 1962, to take the driving test again.

Mr. Woodhouse: The relevant part of the Road Traffic Act, 1962, came into force on 29th May, 1963, and statistics of the number of drivers—including those who have previously passed their driving test—who have been disqualified until they take the test, after conviction of offences listed in Parts 1 and 2 of Schedule 1 to the Act, will be available only after the end of 1964.

Mr. Hall: If it is a fact that in many cases the courts are reluctant to use their powers under the Act, should it not now be made obligatory on the courts to take away the licence of any motorist involved in a serious offence under the Act and not allow him to regain it until he has passed another and severe driving test?

Mr. Woodhouse: I have no evidence of the reluctance to which my hon. Friend refers, but I will look at the point he raises.

Easter Act, 1928

Mr. David James: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if, in view of the recent Vatican Council's recommendation that the date of Easter should be fixed, he will now initiate discussions with the Christian churches in this country with a view to reaching agreement on bringing into operation the Easter Act 1928.

Mr. Brooke: If the Easter Act, 1928, were now brought into operation, the effect would be that, at any rate for a period, Easter would be celebrated on a different date in the United Kingdom from the rest of the world. I believe that this would not be acceptable to the Christian Churches in this country. A new situation would arise if a worldwide agreement among Churches on a fixed Easter seemed to be attainable, and I think that I should now institute consultations with the Churches in this country as to the possibility of that happening.

Mr. James: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for that Answer. Is he aware that if he were to attempt to interpolate a year-day to rationalise the calendar he would meet objections from Christians, Jews, and I believe Mohammedans? Is he aware that the proposals of the 1928 Act—that Easter be the first Sunday after the second Saturday—would meet no religious objections and that among the national institutions that would benefit would be the financial year, school holidays and Parliamentary Recesses.

Mr. Brooke: I deduce from my hon. Friend's supplementary question that he approves the terms of my Anwer.

Mr. Wade: In the meantime, is it the Government's intention to make any statement on altering the dates of Bank Holidays?

Mr. Brooke: That is not a question for me.

Justices of the Peace (Allowances)

Mr. Wainwright: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will now introduce legislation to enable justices of the peace to claim reasonable allowances in lieu of loss of wages.

Mr. Brooke: This matter was raised on the Second Reading of the Administration of Justice Bill on 29th January, and it may well be discussed further by the Standing Committee which will shortly be starting its consideration of that Bill.

Mr. Wainwright: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for that information. Will he take into account the fact that many justices of the peace who attend to their duties are now sufferiing because of loss of income? Is he also aware that


there are many who cannot attend to their duties because of loss of wages and that there are also many people who would make very capable justices but who are reluctant to allow their names to go forward because they cannot afford to lose wages while attending court?

Mr. Brooke: Representations of that character were made on Second Reading of the Administration of Justice Bill, which, of course, provides for the first time subsistence allowances for justices. It would not surprise me if some hon. Member moved an Amendment to the Bill and if that happened I would consider all that would be said. The hon. Member would not like me to reach a decision until I have heard the arguments.

Home Office (Recording of Messages)

Mr. A. Lewis: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what is the practice of his Department with regard to the recording of messages from outside bodies, and particularly of telephone messages from newspapers.

Mr. Brooke: Messages from outside bodies received in the Home Office are noted in the relevant official papers. Details of an inquiry made by telephone on a routine matter are not necessarily recorded, but a note is kept of any inquiry involving a matter of importance, and of the answer given. In addition, questions asked by newspapers are recorded if they necessitate inquiry within the Department.

Mr. Lewis: Will the Home Secretary look at this matter again? Evidently his present procedure has gone astray. The right hon. Gentleman will know that I have had correspondence with his Department about a certain prisoner and that my local newspaper telephoned his office on two separate occasions and on both occasions a Home Office representative said that there was no knowledge, record or information whatsoever about the case. Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that on both occasions the newspaper claimed that that was the reply given to it? Surely there must be something wrong, because for months past there has been this correspondence.

Mr. Brooke: I have seen the correspondence. The hon. Member is not quite right. On 1st January the paper concerned telephoned the Home Office and was told that a letter sent to the

Home Office was being considered and that a reply would be sent in due course. There is, however, no trace whatever of any subsequent telephone inquiry by the newspaper.

Mr. Lewis: Even accepting what the Home Secretary had said, may I ask why the newspaper was told on the first occasion that there was no information about this matter and the newspaper published that reply on two separate occasions? There must be something wrong somewhere.

Mr. Brooke: The hon. Member has got it wrong. I have explained what happened and I have indicated the information which was given in reply to the first inquiry. There is no trace whatever of the second inquiry having been made.

Taxi Fares, London

Mr. Rankin: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he consulted consumer interests before agreeing to the recent increases in London taxi fares.

Mr. Woodhouse: My right hon. Friend, naturally, regards it as incumbent upon him, when considering an application for an increase of taxi fares, to take into account the interest of the travelling public as well as to see that the taxi trade receives a fair return.

Mr. Rankin: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the 2s. fare now becomes 2s. 6d. and the 8s. 6d. fare becomes 11s., and that those changes represent increases of 25 to 30 per cent.? How can he defend such increases to a particular section of the community when the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer are urging industrial, professional and commercial workers not to make demands for increases beyond 4 per cent.?

Mr. Woodhouse: The increase was an average of 25 per cent. over the whole range of fares—

Mr. Rankin: That is still no excuse.

Mr. Woodhouse: —and it was the first such increase made for seven years. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will agree that one of the primary interests


of the travelling public is that there should be a taxi service and that taxis should not disappear from the streets.

Sir H. Lucas-Tooth: Is my hon. Friend aware that this increase is, in fact, at a rate lower than that recommended for industry generally and that, it an increase at least as large as this had not been made, there would have been no taxis for people to use in London?

Mr. Rankin: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, and because it does not give the true facts, I beg to give notice that I shall raise the matter on the Adjournment at the earliest opportunity.

Indictable Offences (Commonwealth and Irish Republic Citizens)

Mr. Pounder: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many citizens of the Irish Republic have been convicted of indictable offences in Great Britain since the introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act; and what were the corresponding figures relating to citizens of Commonwealth countries who are covered by the provisions of the Act.

Mr. Brooke: I regret that this information is not available.

Mr. Pounder: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many citizens of the Irish Republic, and how many citizens from Commonwealth countries, have been recommended for deportation since the introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act.

Mr. Brooke: Up to 31st January, 540 and 422 respectively.

Mr. Pounder: I thank my right hon. Friend for those illuminating but disturbing figures. Does he consider that the time has now come, or is fast approaching, when he should study the possibility of controlling the hitherto unrestricted flow of Irish immigrants into this country?

Mr. Brooke: That would require either control at the British ports or control along the land frontier between Northern Ireland and the Republic.

Mr. Brockway: Will the right hon. Gentleman agree that these figures are

a very small proportion of the number of immigrants?

Mr. Brooke: Yes, I certainly agree.

Commonwealth Immigrants (Welfare)

Mr. Fletcher: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether he will take steps, as recommended by the Second Report of the Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council, to appoint a full-time officer to co-operate with local authorities and voluntary bodies interested in the welfare of Commonwealth immigrants, and to collect and circulate information.

Mr. Brooke: The Advisory Council recommended that a Government grant should be made to finance the appointment of such an officer by a voluntary committee. As I announced in answer to a Question by my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Miss Vickers) on 6th February, the Government accept this recommendation, and the necessary provision is being made in Estimates.

Mr. Fletcher: Will the right hon. Gentleman take it that that reply will be very generally welcomed?

Approved Schools

Mr. C. Johnson: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what is the strength of the inspectorate concerned with approved schools; how frequently such schools are inspected; and, in particular, when were the last two occasions upon which inspections were carried out at Greenacres, Calne, Wiltshire.

Mr. Brooke: The number of children's department inspectors who are normally concerned with approved schools is 36. The aim is that each approved school shall be visited by an inspector at least six times a year. Apart from a visit on 30th January, 1964, in connection with the hon. Member's recent letter to me, Greenacres School was last visited on 21st November, 1963, and 6th January, 1964.

Mr. Johnson: Is the Home Secretary satisfied, from the reports made by inspectors as a result of their inspections, that comparable conditions apply in all


schools as regards the treatment of pupils and, particularly, the imposition of punishments?

Mr. Brooke: Yes, Sir; but I should like to give a fuller answer in reply to the hon. Gentleman's next Question.

Miss Bacon: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that most of the trouble is due to the fact that many approved schools are run by self-appointed local committees which are responsible to nobody? Is it not the case that the managers of this particular approved school are a local committee not under any form of democratic control whatever? When will the right hon. Gentleman take action with regard to the whole of the approved school system?

Mr. Brooke: I cannot accept the argument about "most of the trouble" as though there were constant trouble regarding the management of approved schools. In fact, there are very few complaints about it, and I should hesitate to say that local authority schools were better run than voluntary approved schools, or vice versa.

Mr. C. Johnson: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department to what extent his Department controls punishments imposed at approved schools; and what are the conditions governing the use of detention rooms at such schools.

Mr. Brooke: The range of punishments is prescribed in the approved school rules. Within the permitted range, the punishment imposed in a particular case is a matter for the school, but all punishments are reported quarterly to the Home Office. The rules also prescribe conditions for the use of detention rooms, the most important of which are that there shall be means of communication with a member of the staff and that detention shall not be continued for more than 24 hours without the written consent of one of the school managers.

Mr. Johnson: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that, as a result of the publicity arising from the recent case on which I have had correspondence with his Department, it appears that the particular school concerned has a rather bad record in this respect and that correspondence I have received suggests that there is a great disparity in the imposition

of punishments? Is it not most desirable, therefore, that his inspectorate should see that punishments approximate to one another from school to school and are not dependent, as they seem to be in this case, upon the enterprise of the local managers?

Mr. Brooke: As I think the hon. Gentleman knows, I am deeply concerned about a particular matter which occurred at this school. At the same time, I am informed that it is the first serious complaint regarding a punishment in this school for 10 years. I am extremely anxious to get the matter thoroughly cleared up, and I should be pleased to have a talk with the hon. Gentleman about it, if he would like that.

Mr. Johnson: May we assume from that reply that it is the desire and intention of the right hon. Gentleman that it should not matter to anyone sent to an approved school whether he or she goes to one or another school, and that there should be comparable standards in regard to punishments and detention rooms throughout the whole system?

Mr. Brooke: It must matter whether they go to one or another because some approved schools are for Roman Catholic children and some are not. But I am in process of revising the approved school rules, and all approved schools must see that the rules are adhered to.

Public Prosecutions (Cost)

Sir W. Teeling: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether, in view of the recent recommendation, a copy of which has been sent to him, made by the Law Committee and the General Purposes Committee of the Association of Municipal Corporations that the costs of prosecutions undertaken by the Director of Public Prosecutions, either directly or using a local agent, should be borne by the Exchequer, he will now reconsider his decision not to seek to alter the law as it stands at present on this matter.

Mr. Brooke: I received the recommendation of the Association of Municipal Corporations the day before yesterday. I am considering it.

Sir W. Teeling: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that the old law


dates back to days long before there were motor cars, aeroplanes or railways and that it is grossly unfair, for instance, to a place like Brighton which has been landed with the charges for the horse doping case in which there was no one from Brighton involved at all and to a place which faces a still worse case arising from the railway robbery in Buckinghamshire?

Mr. Brooke: I have answered Questions about the mail train robbery, and I have said in reply to my hon. Friend that I am considering the letter which has come from the Association of Municipal Corporations which raises rather wider issues than those which have hitherto been put put to me in the House.

Betting Offices, Liverpool

Sir K. Thompson: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many betting offices are now licensed to operate in the City of Liverpool; and how many applications are pending.

Mr. Woodhouse: The numbers are 475 and 14 respectively.

Sir K. Thompson: Is my hon. Friend aware that there is some concern in Liverpool about the continuing growth of the number of betting shops in the city, and does he know that many magistrates are not satisfied that the powers they have to refuse an application are enough to see that the application does not succeed as it goes through further stages of appeal and application higher up?

Mr. Woodhouse: I have no evidence of the disquiet among magistrates to which my hon. Friend refers. If he will communicate their anxieties to me, or if they will communicate them to the Home Office, we shall certainly consider them.

Mr. Mellish: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that in London also there are far too many betting shops and that this complaint could be applied to all our major cities? Is it not time that the local authorities had far more say than they have now? Cannot they be brought into the picture more and their objections be taken into account? We have

more betting shops than grocer's shops in my constituency.

Mr. Woodhouse: These are matters for the licensing committees.

Prisoners (Appeals)

Mr. Awbery: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he is aware that a prisoner who appeals against his sentence, and is retained in custody during the period of waiting, has to serve up to 42 days in addition to his sentence, as the period of waiting in prison is not calculated as part of the sentence; and if he will take steps to ensure that any prisoner who appeals against his sentence will not in future be penalised in this way.

Mr. H. Brooke: The law on this subject, which is contained in Section 38(2) of the Criminal Justice Act, 1948 and is not exactly as stated in the Question, will be among the matters open to review by the Committee on the Court of Criminal Appeal, of whose appointment I informed the House yesterday.

Mr. Awbery: Is the Home Secretary aware that a prisoner who is aggrieved at the severity of his sentence is told that he can appeal, but it is said, in effect, that during the period of his appeal he will remain in prison and this will not be part of his sentence? Does not this place a penalty upon a man for exercising the right to appeal against his sentence which the law gives him?

Mr. Brooke: The prisoner does not lose time it he has received leave to appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeal or if he is given a certificate for appeal by the judge who tried him. I think that it is important to have some discouragement to wildly irresponsible appealing, but, as I have said, the law will be under review by this new Committee.

Titles (Abolition) Bill

Mr. Emrys Hughes: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will reconsider his decision not to advise Her Majesty to consent to place her interest in so far as it is affected by the Titles (Abolition) Bill at the disposal of Parliament for the purpose of the Bill.

Mr. Brooke: I wrote to the hon. Member that it appeared most unlikely that an opportunity would arise for this Bill to be debated on Second Reading, and that I did not have in mind to make a recommendation to Her Majesty. That remains the position.

Mr. Hughes: Does not the Home Secretary realise that, when the House unanimously gives leave to introduce a Bill, it is his constitutional duty to get the Queen's consent, according to precedent? Why is he going on strike in this matter?

Mr. Brooke: It is not my constitutional duty. If the hon. Member wishes to have his Bill debated, I wonder why he has put it down for a date in the middle of the Whitsun Recess.

Mr. Hughes: Is the Home Secretary aware that the Leader of the House has not yet announced the date of the Whitsun Recess? Is he further aware that I postponed my Bill out of chivalry because of certain events in connection with Her Majesty, and this is the reward I get?

Mr. S. Silverman: Does not the right hon. Gentleman's decision not to recommend Her Majesty to consent depend upon his judgment about the likelihood of time being found to debate the Bill in the House of Commons? Was it because he thought that this would arise in the Whitsuntide Recess that he decided not to make the recommendation, or has he some other reason? If he has some other reason, would he indicate it to the House, because it seems to many of us that the purpose of Parliament would be frustrated and defeated if, when it gives unanimous leave for a Bill to be introduced, the Home Secretary can frustrate that purpose by not getting the necessary recommendation?

Mr. Brooke: The question of whether I should make a recommendation or not is one on which I must act in my own discretion. As I said, at present I see no likelihood of time being found for this Bill.

Mr. Hughes: In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the reply, I beg to give notice that I will raise the matter on the Adjournment before the Whitsun Recess.

Commercial Vehicles (Journey Times)

Mr. Mapp: asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department what co-operative action is taken between the Metropolitan and other police authorities in order to check overall journey times of vehicles subject to vehicle speed limits.

Mr. Woodhouse: All police forces cooperate closely when making inquiries into possible offences against the law and collaboration arrangements operate between forces policing a number of main trunk routes, but any general check on the lines suggested by the hon. Member would be impracticable.

Mr. Mapp: The hon. Gentleman says that it is impracticable, but is he aware that that is not so in the case of speed limit vehicles and that overall checks of journey times involving cooperative action by the police are factual? He should ask the forces to think of the possibility of doing this. Will he look at the article in The Times of 11th February and ask his right hon. Friend to do something about this matter?

Mr. Woodhouse: We have consulted the police on this matter, but if the hon. Member will reflect on the practical difficulties here, such as the fact that speed limits vary at different points on different roads and that on the motorways there is no speed limit at all except for towed vehicles, he will realise that it would be an impracticable procedure for the police to operate.

NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAMME (REPORT)

Mr. Wingfield Digby: asked the Prime Minister when he expects to receive the Powell Report on the Nuclear Power Programme.

The Prime Minister (Sir Alec Douglas-Home): The Committee has now submitted a Report to the Government and this is being studied.

Mr. Digby: In considering the Report, will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that there are those who are disappointed with the development of marine reactors and with the nuclear


power stations, which are still uneconomic? Will he issue a White Paper for the information of the House?

The Prime Minister: I will consider the points which my hon. Friend has raised. I have said that I will consider in what form the information can be given to the House.

Dame Irene Ward: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that when I asked a question on the all-important matter of nuclear power the other day I was given the answer which I was given seven years ago? Does this indicate the speed of action on the modernisation of Britain for which, apparently, the Government are supposed to stand?

The Prime Minister: Whoever answered my hon. Friend was at least consistent. However, I will look into the matter.

Mr. Albu: Will the Prime Minister bear in mind that, since the last contract has now been placed for the generating stations of the current nuclear programme, there is extreme anxiety about the long delay in producing this Report and the great secrecy surrounding, it?

The Prime Minister: I think that I have explained to the hon. Member a number of times why the Report took so long to produce, namely, because certain prototypes of power reactors had to work for a time before the Committee could make up its mind and report.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDUSTRY, TRADE AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT (SPEECH)

Mr. Wyatt: asked the Prime Minister whether the public speech of the Secretary of State for Industry, Trade and Regional Development, at the Guildhall on Tuesday, 10th February, on economic matters, represents the policy of Her Majesty's Government.

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Wyatt: While the Prime Minister may agree with the Secretary of State on resale price maintenance, may I ask him whether he is not rather

worried that 14 of his otherwise well behaved supporters have already put down a Motion to reject the Bill out of hand and that this means that if 14 of them are prepared to kick over the traces they must be supported by at least 150 more? Is not the right hon. Gentleman anxious at being faced with a very grave revolt just before the General Election? In view of the dangerous situation in which he finds himself, will he say whether he is prepared to proceed with the Bill or not?

The Prime Minister: I think that the hon. Gentleman might have looked at unity in his own party before lecturing me on it in mine.

Mr. Grimond: Would the Prime Minister ask the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether he will make a considered and comprehensive statement on the economy and the Government's view of it, because there seems to be some discrepancy between many statements made by members of the Government lately and the events which are taking place?

The Prime Minister: No doubt my right hon. Friend will oblige with a speech soon.

ENGLISH LANGUAGE

Mr. Woodburn: asked the Prime Minister whether, in view of the progress of English as a universal language, he will advise the setting up of a Royal Commission to report on the best method of assisting this development and on the possibility, in conjunction with broadcasting, Eurovision, and other educational media, of recommending standards of pronunciation and some reconciliation of the written and the spoken word.

The Prime Minister: No. Sir. It would not be appropriate to establish a Royal Commission for this purpose. Existing national and international organisations to assist the development of English are already active, and conferences of national experts on the subject have been held in recent years.

Mr. Woodburn: Is the Prime Minister aware that to develop English as a universal language and to make it possible for people to communicate


more easily with each other would be a less expensive and more satisfactory way of achieving peace and good will than perhaps even disarmament conferences?

The Prime Minister: As I think the right hon. Gentleman knows, a number of bodies are very active in this matter, including the British Council and the International Advisory Group, on which the Americans serve with us and other Commonwealth countries. Therefore, quite a lot is going on in this matter. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will not get too enthusiastic; I might not be able to understand him.

Sir J. Pitman: Would my right hon. Friend consider the possibility of setting up, if not a Royal Commission, at any rate an inter-Departmental Committee to go into the question, which has not been answered, in respect of the reconciliation of writing with pronunciation? As an alphabet is already being very widely used in the English speaking world which brings about an acceptable reconciliation, will my right hon. Friend consider setting up an interdepartmental Committee, seeing that possibly this is an epochal development in the future of the English language?

The Prime Minister: This matter of reconciliation of the written and spoken word has been considered very often by a number of bodies. I will consider what my hon. Friend says. I am rather doubtful whether I should set up a special committee for this.

Sir G. Nicholson: Will my right hon. Friend resist to the uttermost any attempt to standardise the English language? One of the beauties of the English tongue and life in this country is that we have such wide local variations.

CIGARETTES

Mr. Driberg: asked the Prime Minister if, in view of recent scientific reports on the causal connection between cigarette-smoking and lung cancer, he will arrange for consultations between the Board of Trade, the Ministry of Health and the Treasury on the probable results of reductions in the

price of cigarettes made possible by the abolition of resale price maintenance, and on the extent to which any consequent increase in the consumption of cigarettes can be offset by inducements to smokers to smoke cigars and pipes instead.

The Prime Minister: All the implications of these reports for Government policy are considered by the Departments concerned and I am satisfied that the arrangements for inter-departmental consultations are adequate.

Mr. Driberg: Are the Prime Minister and his colleagues serious in their intention to abolish resale price maintenance? Are they also serious in their intention to tackle the dangers to health from cigarette smoking? Does the Prime Minister realise that, in the context of this aspect of the abolition of R.P.M., they cannot very well be serious about both?

The Prime Minister: I should have thought that we could certainly be serious about both. I cannot tell, I cannot judge at this stage what the effect of abolition of R.P.M. might be on the price of cigarettes, but I cannot think that anybody would feel that the Government are encouraging smoking when 3s. 4d. out of the cost of a 4s. 6d. packet is tax.

Mr. Marsh: Since the Government have, apparently, embarked on a Measure to abolish R.P.M., and as this will affect tobacconists to a considerable extent, does he not think that he should have some idea of its possible effects?

The Prime Minister: I said that I would not judge in advance. I may have an idea, but I will not judge it in advance.

FOREIGN SECRETARY (SPEECH)

Mr. Zilliacus: asked the Prime Minister whether the public speech made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen on 5th February, regarding non-involvement by the great Powers in South-East Asia, represents the policy of Her Majesty's Government.

The Prime Minister: My right hon. Friend's speech, the full text of which is in the Library, did indeed represent the policy of Her Majesty's Government.

Mr. Zilliacus: Does the Prime Minister recollect that in that speech his right hon. Friend proposed that East and West should enter into an agreement to leave South-East Asia alone? Does not that mean neutralisation on the lines proposed by General de Gaulle? How can the Prime Minister reconcile that proposal with the support which he pledged to President Johnson for the American policy of intervention in Vietnam to support a tyranny imposed upon the South Vietnam people by the United States and in violation both of the 1954 Treaty and of the United Nations Charter, to which this country is a party?

The Prime Minister: In answer to the second part of the hon. Member's supplementary question, the American troops are there by invitation of the South Vietnam Government. With regard to the first part of the question, my right hon. Friend said "If East and West would leave South-East Asia alone", but if the hon. Member has seen the papers today he will have seen what is happening in Laos and in North Vietnam.

Mr. Warbey: Is the Prime Minister aware that the declared policy of the new revolutionary Government in South Vietnam is the extermination of all Communists and neutralists? As this is in direct conflict with the Geneva agreements of 1954, will the Prime Minister explain whether, in signing with President Johnson the agreement to support American policy in South Vietnam, he has himself torn up the Geneva Agreements as a scrap of paper?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir. But the whole foundation of the Geneva Agreements was that the integrity and independence of South Vietnam should be recognised.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SCOTLAND (SPEECH)

Mr. W. Hamilton: asked the Prime Minister whether the public speech made by the Secretary of State

for Scotland on Saturday, 15th February, in Glasgow, about railway closures in Scotland, represents the policy of Her Majesty's Government.

Mr. G. M. Thomson: asked the Prime Minister whether the public speech by the Secretary of State for Scotland at Glasgow on Saturday, 15th February, regarding Scottish rail closures, represents the policy of Her Majesty's Government.

Mr. Willis: asked the Prime Minister whether the public speech of the Secretary of State for Scotland concerning rail closures, delivered to the women's conference of the Western Divisional Council of the Scottish Unionist Association on Saturday, 15th February, represents the policy of Her Majesty's Government.

Mr. Millan: asked the Prime Minister whether the public speech of the Secretary of State for Scotland on rail closures in Glasgow on Saturday, 15th February, 1964, represents the policy of Her Majesty's Government.

The Prime. Minister: My right hon. Friend's speech did not contain any new statement of policy. He described some of the possible implications of the Government's policy on the closure of railways.

Mr. Hamilton: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in that speech the Secretary of State said that despite what Dr. Beeching had said, some lines that were scheduled for closure would remain open for several years and some for one, two or three years? Does he recollect that he himself, in this House on 6th February, denied at least twice in answer to questions that that impression that was gained by the members of the Scottish Council when they saw him privately was incorrect? May we please have the truth on this matter and can the Government say whether they accept Beeching and whether the Minister of Transport agrees with the speech made by the Secretary of State for Scotland?

The Prime Minister: Dr. Beeching made proposals that certain railways might be closed. The responsibility for the decision lies with my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport. Time and again, ho and the Secretary of State


have said that each case will be considered on its merits.

Mr. Thomson: Is the Prime Minister aware that we have now had at least four different Ministerial statements about the Government's intentions regarding rail closures and that two of those different statements have come from the Prime Minister himself? Will he, therefore, clear up the confusion that exists by assuring the House that it is the Government's intention that a number of Scottish railway lines scheduled for closure shall not be closed, as the Secretary of State said? Will he also give a commitment that these concessions made to Scotland, if they are real, will be extended to other parts of the United Kingdom?

The Prime Minister: The confusion lies in hon. Members' minds. I have said time and again, and I repeat, that every case will be considered on its merits and decisions will be announced as soon as my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport has made up his mind.

Mr. Willis: Does not the right hon. Gentleman think that an announcement such as was made by the Secretary of State for Scotland makes nonsense of the proposals of the Transport Users' Consultative Committee? Would he not serve Scotland better if, knowing that some of the lines are not to be closed, he were to stop the closure notices and save people's time, energy and tempers?

The Prime Minister: Certain procedures have to be gone through. One is the Transport Users'—[Laughter.]—the hon. Member for Southwark (Mr. Gunter) laughs; I cannot understand why. Does he not want the hardship of users to be considered? It has to be considered, as have all the economic implications. Therefore the Minister of Transport, having considered all these matters, will then make his announcement.

Mr. Millan: Is the Prime Minister aware that, despite what he has said, there is considerable confusion in Scotland about the Government's policy? May we take it that despite what the Prime Minister said on 6th February, following the speech of the Secretary of State for Scotland in Glasgow and following the Prime Minister's announce-

ment this afternoon, important railway lines in Scotland like those north and west of Inverness will not be closed for up to three years? Is that now Government policy? Can we have a straight "Yes" or "No" to that question?

The Prime Minister: No one has ever said that that was Government policy. What we have said is that every case will be considered on its merits. [Interruption.] If the hon. Member for Edinburgh, East (Mr. Willis) does not want to listen, I need not answer, but I was doing him the courtesy of answering. If the economic conditions are such that my right hon. Friend the Minister of Transport wants longer to decide and he feels that a gap is necessary, he will say so.

Sir John MacLeod: Will my right hon. Friend make sure that after the hearings in Inverness on 9th and 10th March, a decision will be come to as quickly as possible, because the uncertainty in the area is causing a great deal of concern?

The Prime Minister: Yes, as soon as the Minister has the facts and has studied them. We want to get the answer right, but certainly as soon as possible.

PRIME MINISTER OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA (TALKS)

Mr. Wall: asked the Prime Minister if he will now make a statement about the result of his recent talks with the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia.

The Prime Minister: I have nothing to add to what I told the House in reply to the hon. Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stonehouse) on 20th February.

Mr. Wall: In view of the statement made in Salisbury, can my right hon. Friend assure the House that the talks are continuing and will continue? Will he do his best to reach a compromise which, while giving Africa further political advance, will lead to the independence to which Southern Rhodesia is so manifestly entitled?

The Prime Minister: This matter can only be settled by negotiation and conversations between our country and the Southern Rhodesian Government.

Mr. Bottomley: As the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia has accepted the principle of African majority rule, would the Prime Minister urge him to consider speeding up the process so that harmony and good will may exist among all maces?

The Prime Minister: I think that I, like the right hon. Gentleman, would wish to see a negotiated settlement of this matter. The present constitution contains the principle of majority rule. It is a matter of timing.

Mr. Brockway: As the right hon. Gentleman, in the reply to which he referred, said that it would be best to leave this matter to negotiation by himself and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, and as the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia stated yesterday that he did not consider any further negotiations would be useful, what is to be the policy of Her Majesty's Government now?

The Prime Minister: I think that the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia said that he did not feel that he should initiate any more conversations. There are two opinions as to whether further conversations can be useful. I hope he will agree that they will be.

HER MAJESTY'S DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

The following Questions stood upon the Order Paper:

Mr. MAYHEW: To ask the Prime Minister when he proposes to publish the Plowden Committee's Report; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. WALL: To ask the Prime Minister if he will now make a statement on the report of the Plowden Committee.

The Prime Minister (Sir Alec Douglas-Home): With permission, I will answer Questions Nos. Q10 and Q15 together.
The Government are very grateful to Lord Plowden and the members of his Committee for their Report and for the great amount of effort and thought which they put into it.
The Report concludes that the division of the world for representational purposes into Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth countries has obvious

practical disadvantages and that the logic of events points towards the amalgamation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Relations Offices. It recognises, however, the special nature of the Commonwealth relationship. It therefore recommends that the Foreign and Commonwealth Relations Offices should remain separate, but that a unified overseas representational service to be known as "H.M. Diplomatic Service", should be created. Her Majesty's Government accepts the views of the Plowden Committee and have decided that the unified Service proposed should be formed on 1st January, 1965.
The Queen has graciously agreed that it should be called Her Majesty's Diplomatic Service.
One of thee main purposes of the 1943 reforms was to enable the Foreign Service to seek recruits from the widest possible field; and to this end its conditions of service were designed to ensure that officers had no need of private incomes. The Plowden Committee has, however, been much impressed by the financial difficulties of members of the Foreign Service and of the Commonwealth Service, especially those with several children who must, because of their parents' peripatetic career, be sent to boarding schools in the United Kingdom. Its Report recommends improved conditions of service for the Overseas Services designed particularly for those with children. It also recommends a common system of foreign allowances for members of the Representational Overseas Services and members of the Home Civil Service when serving abroad. Her Majesty's Government have accepted these recommendations subject to a few minor modifications and propose to put them into effect as soon as is practicable after 1st April, 1564.
As membership of the Diplomatic Service will alter in important respects the conditions of service of Commonwealth Relations Office staff, the latter will be able to opt for transfer to Home Civil Service Departments. Members of the Trade Commission Service will be able to apply to enter the Diplomatic Service.
Though the future of the Colonial Office did not fall within the terms of reference of the Plowden Committee, the


Government have had it under review and have decided that as soon as possible after the new Diplomatic Service is brought into being—which must be the first step—the Colonial Office should be merged with the Commonwealth Relations Office. It will take some months after vesting date to put into full effect the arrangements for the new Diplomatic Service, so that the merger of the Colonial Office with the Commonwealth Relations Office could not take place until the latter half of 1965, although it will be effected on the earliest possible date in that period and if practicable on 1st July, 1965.
This change in our arrangements for discharging our Commonwealth responsibilities continues the process of integration which my predecessor my right hon. Friend the Member for Bromley (Mr. H. Macmillan) began in July, 1962, by the appointment of my right hon. Friend to fill the office of Secretary of State for the Colonies in addition to that of Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.
In the implementation of the decisions announced in this statement, the staff problems involved will be worked out in detail in consultation with the staff associations concerned.

Mr. Mayhew: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that in studying his long statement and the Report we shall want to be very much convinced that the administrative advantages of integrating these two Services, which I think are fairly obvious and are becoming increasingly obvious, are not outweighed by the possible weakening of the Commonwealth connection involved in what he has said? It is, after all, is it not, a very serious thing to lose an entire body of officials who have a specialised interest in the success of the Commonwealth? Therefore, the Report and the right hon. Gentleman's statement will need very careful study from this point of view.
May I also ask the right hon. Gentleman to say something about the Department of Technical Co-operation? I do not think that he said anything about it.

The Prime Minister: I am not quite sure what the hon. Gentleman wants me to say about the Department of Tech-

nical Co-operation, except that I would say that we hope that a number of the officers from the Colonial Service will be able to be absorbed by the Department of Technical Co-operation.
With regard to the hon. Gentleman's first supplementary question, this is a matter for debate between us and the balance of advantage and disadvantage, but the number of persons in the Colonial Service has varied so rapidly and the number of Colonial Territories has been decreasing so rapidly that there is a very strong case for transfer.

Mr. Wall: Is my right hon. Friend aware how much we welcome the Government's acceptance of this historic Report, which will bring up to date the machinery of external relations'? May I also ask what has been the reaction of Commonwealth Governments and whether any Commonwealth Government has objected to any of the main proposals?

The Prime Minister: No, Sir; no Commonwealth Government has objected.

Mr. Gordon Walker: While we must wait until we have seen the Report, may I say that we welcome the general idea of a single Service, but that it is extremely important, as my hon. Friend has said, to preserve the distinction between Commonwealth relations and foreign relations? There is a distinction there which must be preserved. We are very glad to hear about the better conditions, which are long overdue. Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether legislation will be needed to effect these changes, and also whether, after a while, when we have studied these things, we might have a debate on the subject, because I agree that a very historic change is being made?

The Prime Minister: I should like notice on the subject of legislation. Meanwhile, I would say that these are proper matters for debate. I think that they should be debated.

Sir J. Duncan: Would my right hon. Friend consider renaming the new Service the "Ministry of External Affairs" rather than "Foreign Office" to avoid giving offence to certain members of the Commonwealth?

The Prime Minister: The members of the Commonwealth have been consulted, and there have been no objections to our proposals. "Her Majesty's Diplomatic Service" will cover both.

Mr. G. M. Thomson: Can the right hon. Gentleman say whether the Department of Technical Co-operation will be involved in the reorganisation of overseas departments that he has mentioned? Is he aware that the Department of Technical Co-operation is, at the moment, manned by an administrative staff which is to a very large extent on secondment from the other overseas departments, and that this is a very unsatisfactory state of affairs? Will he, therefore, bear this in mind in connection with the organisation which is being put forward?

The Prime Minister: We will certainly keep an eye on the organisation of these Government Departments all the time. If the hon. Gentleman would like any specific information about the Department of Technical Co-operation, perhaps he would table a Question.

Sir H. Legge-Bourke: Would my right hon. Friend say how he visualises the working of the machinery which is responsible for advising him on the higher appointments in this new Service? Will he bear in mind that after the 1944 reform, whereby the Foreign Service was separated from the Home Civil Service, the procedure to be followed in the case of the Foreign Service was different from that of the Home Civil Service and the Commonwealth Service? Would he say whether he visualises it on the old Commonwealth basis or on the new Foreign Service basis?

The Prime Minister: I should like to see that Question on the Order Paper.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. We cannot debate this now.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. G. Brown: May I ask the Leader of the House whether he will state the business of the House for next week?

The Lord Privy Seal (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd): Yes, Sir. The business for next week will be as follows:

MONDAY, 2ND MARCH—Supply [8th Allotted Day]: Committee.

Navy Estimates, 1964–65—Vote A.

TUESDAY, 3RD MARCH—Supply [9th Allotted Day]: Commitee.

Air Estimates, 1964–65—vote A.

WEDNESDAY, 4TH MARCH—sProgress on the remaining stages of the Harbours Bill.

Lords Amendments to the Defence (Transfer of Functions) Bill.

Motions on the Local Government Orders.

THURSDAY, 5TH MARCH—Supply [10th Allotted Day]: Committee.

Army Estimates, 1964–65—Vote A.

FRIDAY, 6TH MARCH—Private Members' Motions.

MONDAY, 9TH MARCH—The proposed business will be: Supply [11th Allotted Day]: Committee.

Service Money Votes.

Mr. G. Brown: Does not the right hon. and learned Gentleman think that the business put down for Wednesday, each item of which contains quite a number of serious matters for consideration, is too much for one day? Does he propose, on the Supply days, to put down the customary extension of time Motions?

Mr. Lloyd: On Monday, Tuesday and Thursday we will put down Motions to suspend the Standing Orders for two hours, in accordance with recent precedent. There is something in what the right hon. Gentleman says about the business for Wednesday. That is why I said that we would make progress on the remaining stages of the Harbours Bill.

Mr. Stonehouse: When does the right hon. and learned Gentleman expect us to be debating the Resale Price Maintenance Bill and when does he expect it to be passed into law?

Mr. Lloyd: It will not be debated next week, or on the Monday of the following week, but, I hope, very soon thereafter. The other matter referred to by the hon. Gentleman is for the House and not for me.

Mr. C. Johnson: Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman recall that both he and the Home Secretary have frequently assured us that the Government proposal for a scheme of compensation for victims of crimes of violence would be introduced? In view of the clear impression created at the last Conservative Party conference that the scheme was ready and would be introduced, have we any hope of seeing the White Paper next week or the week after?

Mr. Lloyd: Not next week.

Mr. Zilliacus: In view of the pledge given by the Prime Minister to support American intervention in South Vietnam, the fact that that policy is now being defeated, and that there is now talk in Washington of invading North Vietnam, which might bring on world war, can we have an early opportunity to discuss the situation?

Mr. Lloyd: I take note of what the hon. Gentleman says. I have already outlined the business for next week.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman explain the mystery of the Whitsun Recess? Is he aware that the Home Secretary has told me that my Titles (Abolition) Bill has been placed on the Order Paper for 28th May, which is during the normal Whitsun Recess? Does that mean that the House will be resuming, after the Recess, during June?

Mr. Lloyd: The hon. Gentleman must wait and see.

Mr. S. Silverman: Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman assure the House that, in the lifetime of this Parliament, there will be a Whitsun Recess?

Mr. Lloyd: The hon. Gentleman, also, must wait and see.

Mr. Warbey: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman bear in mind that some of us will want an opportunity of debating the new pledge that the Prime Minister has given to President Johnson on South Vietnam, as this represents a major departure in British foreign policy? Will he also say what opportunity we shall have next week to debate the collapse of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's policy of achieving expansion without inflation?

Mr. Lloyd: I will take note of what the hon. Gentleman has said about South Vietnam, but without accepting his premises. There are opportunities for debate between now and the Easter Recess, which are known to the House.
As for the hon. Gentleman's second question, my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer will make a statement to the House shortly.

Mr. Wilkins: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman explain a little more fully what he has in mind for next Wednesday? The Harbours Bill will take considerable time. Is it the intention that it should go on until ten o'clock and that the House should take the consideration of Lords Amendments to the Defence (Transfer of Functions) Bill afterwards?

Mr. Lloyd: Broadly speaking, yes.

Mr. Lipton: Are we to assume from the reply to the question put by my hon. Friend the Member for Wednesbury (Mr. Stonehouse) about the Resale Price Maintenance Bill that it is still the intention of the Government to have a Second Reading debate on the Bill sometime?

Mr. Cole: Can my right hon. and learned Friend confirm that the White Paper on Monopolies and Restrictive Practices will be available before we debate the Second Reading of the Bill?

Mr. Lloyd: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Shinwell: Did I understand the right hon. and learned Gentleman to say that, if the Harbours Bill occupies all the time until ten o'clock next Wednesday, the Defence (Transfer of Functions) Bill will then be considered? Is he aware of the little trouble in another place about a certain item in the Bill? Is this not likely to cause some embarrassment to the Government? What action do the Government propose? Do they propose to test the issue with the other place on the question whether the Navy should be ruled by an Admiralty or a Navy Board? Is it appropriate to take a controversy of that kind involving, indeed, a constitutional crisis, at ten o'clock at night?

Mr. Lloyd: I do not seek to be too rigid in saying that we should stop the Harbours Bill at a precise moment, but


I do not think that it would be inappropriate to take the discussion of the Defence (Transfer of Functions) Bill at ten o'clock.

Mr. M. Stewart: The right hon. and learned Gentleman has also put down for Wednesday certain local government Orders. Would he bear in mind that it is possible that discussion on them might be neither brief nor unanimous?

Mr. Lloyd: In these matters I am very much in the hands of the House. We have to see what progress we make. If it appears unreasonable to take the Orders that night, we will not take them.

BANK RATE

The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Reginald Maudling): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement.
As the House is aware, the Bank of England has today, with my approval, raised Bank Rate from 4 per cent. to 5 per cent. Since Bank Rate was fixed at 4 per cent. on 3rd January, 1963, there has been a fairly widespread increase in short-term interest rates overseas. Today's change brings rates in this country more in line with what has happened in other countries.
The domestic situation is one of vigorous expansion, rising production and rising employment. Our object this year is to achieve a smooth transition from the present growth rate of 6 per cent., which is possible while we are taking up slack in the economy, to a long-term growth rate of 4 per cent. The increase in Bank Rate will make its contribution to this transition and help to strengthen the prospects of future progress.

Mr. Callaghan: The House will find it all the more difficult now to understand the relevance of the Prime Minister's speeches to the facts of the situation. Do I understand that the purpose of the Chancellor's move is to prevent an outflow of funds from this country? If that is so, since it is bound to result in increased charges for housing and will put handicaps in the way of public authorities and industries which are modernising themselves, has the Chancellor any proposals at all for

insulating the domestic economy from the effects of the Bank Rate?
If he has not, how does the right hon. Gentleman proposes to carry on what he says he wants, namely, expansion of the economy? Is he aware that, to put in the way he does the contrast between the domestic economy and the foreign situation, which has been deteriorating, is a classic recipe for disaster in the long run and, therefore, that he must take steps on the other side? Is it not astonishing that, after 12 years of Conservative Government, an eight-month boom can produce a situation in which we have the worst trade gap on record and an increase in Bank Rate?

Mr. Maudling: My right hon. Friend said the economy was strong, and the purpose of this move is to keep it so. The hon. Gentleman will understand that it is not the direct effect of the Bank Rate which determines the cost of borrowing for houses, but movements in the gilt-edged market, which, I am happy to say, has received this news very well. I think that it is well known to the hon. Gentleman that the best way to produce a stop in the economy is to try to go too fast. As he was criticising my Budget for being too cautious perhaps he will think again.

Sir H. d'Avigdor-Goldsmid: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the great majority of thinking people in this country—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]—I repeat, thinking people, and quite irrespective of political considerations, will welcome my right hon. Friend's reaffirmation of the Government's determination to prevent dislocation of the economy through inflation? Is he also aware that the statement from the Bank of England that this move was not intended to attract funds from other countries has the merit that it does not involve us in a competitive race for "hot" money which none of us wishes to sec?

Mr. Maudling: I agree that this move will be appreciated and understood by those who wish to understand it.

Mr. Grimond: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that on this side of the House there appears to be a growing similarity between him and his colleague the Leader of the House, except that today the Leader of the. House has appeared to be rather rosier?
Does not this move of checking the economy fall particularly hard on investment, which is not what the Chancellor wishes to check? Secondly, has he any remedy to suggest for this dilemma —that the rate of expansion which takes up unemployment in some regions of Britain leads to such a demand for employment in others as to lead to inflation? Has he any suggestions for righting this inbalance?

Mr. Maudling: Experience shows that it is not short-term interest rates which affect industry. The Radcliffe Committee showed that quite clearly.
In reply to the right hon. Gentleman's second question, we have taken massive measures—increasing public investment and giving increased capital grants and free depreciation for industry—to assist in ironing out this imbalance which, I agree, is a very important problem.

Mr. W. Clark: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the nation would be better served if Opposition speakers ceased trying to talk as though the country were in a financial crisis? Does he not agree that we could talk ourselves into a financial crisis, and that if the Opposition were more responsible, particularly about our overseas economy, they would not talk as though we were in a crisis?

Mr. Speaker: Order. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has many duties, but one of them is not to express in answer to questions views about the responsibility of the Opposition.

Mr. M. Stewart: What does the Chancellor expect to be the effect of his announcement on the finances of local authorities? Are the Government considering giving any help to local authorities for what will be an added burden?

Mr. Maudling: There are several factors. First, short-term money depends on how the bill rate moves and I do not expect it to rise by anything like the full 1 per cent. Medium and long-term money, which is the bulk of local authority borrowing, depends not on the Bank Rate, but on the level of the gilt-edged market. This had discounted a great deal of the change and, I am told, responded well. In the meantime, the

new measures coming into force on April will be a good deal of help local authorities.

Sir C. Osborne: Was not a higher Bank Rate necessary because of a greater demand for capital than is in ready supply, which is due to the unusual expansion of the economy over the last six months? If that is so, what rate of internal savings will have to be achieved in order to supply the capital and allow the Bank Rate to come down again?

Mr. Maudling: The financing of the enormous programme of public expenditure in which we are now engrossed, and which the House welcomes, involves very large resources. The higher the amount of saving, the less that has to be collected in taxation.

Mr. Ross: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware of the dilemma that there are areas where, far from having gone too fast, expansion has hardly got off the ground? Is it right that he should suggest that this general remedy should be applied, affecting those areas before they have even started to share in the boom? What is he prepared to do about it?

Mr. Maudling: I have already explained the massive measures which we have taken in the last year, on top of others, to help in these areas. No part of the country will benefit from trying to run the economy on interest rates which are too low.

Mr. Gresham Cooke: Would my right hon. Friend agree that in a time of a rapidly expanding economy and rising prosperity it is better to make a small application of the brake now than to leave the matter completely uncontrolled when much more drastic meansures may have to be taken?

Mr. Maudling: That is precisely the point. Everyone knows that we cannot expect an expansion rate of 6 per cent. to continue indefinitely after we have taken up the slack in the economy. We want to change smoothly from this 6 per cent. to the long-term rate of 4 per cent., which is what N.E.D.C. agreed. That is what I am trying to do.

Mr. Jay: Does the right hon. Gentleman recall that the Bank Rate was


raised by 1 per cent. on 25th February, 1955, when he was Economic Secretary to the Treasury? In view of the sequel that year, can he assure us that the economy is under better control now than it was then?

Mr. Maudling: History never repeats itself in quite the same way.

Several Hon. Members: rose—

Mr. Speaker: Order. No doubt we shall have an opportunity to debate these matters.

Orders of the Day — DEFENCE

Order read for resuming adjourned debate on Amendment to Question [26th February]:
That this House approves the Statement on Defence, 1964, contained in Command Paper No. 2270.—[Mr. Thorneycrof.]

Which Amendment was, to leave out from "House" to the end of the Question and to add instead thereof:
declines to approve the Statement on Defence, 1964, which reveals that Her Majesty's Government, in asking the taxpayer for the largest military budget in Great Britain's peace time history, bringing its total defence expenditure over twelve years to more than £20,000 million, has still failed to produce an adequate defence policy and provide forces to meet the nation's needs".

3.58 p.m.

Mr. George Brown: The purpose of our modern practice of an extended debate on the defence White Paper was so that we could get rather more information about policies and provisions for defence, so that we could usefully have a discussion about defence strategy and policy as well as the details of the Services. The whole business is becoming reduced year by year to almost a farce because of the Government's exercises in the art of gamesmanship. We are told less and less in the White Papers year by year and the whole purpose, certainly of the present Minister of Defence, seems to be to conceal as much as possible without actually telling lies.
Between the White Paper and the debate we have a period when the newspapers are obviously being inspired with stories which they can print. A little twist is given to the gamesmanship by the Minister of Defence who allegedly tells us what was not in the White Paper, but was in the newspapers, doing it not in his opening speech, but hinting that if he is pressed hard enough he will do so in his winding-up speech.
By conducting these matters in this way there is less and less purpose in what we are doing. I make this gentle protest about it at this time. To put the House of Commons into a position where it can usefully discuss figures on these two days would be a more helpful exercise than to give the Minister


an opportunity for gamesmanship of the kind which he displayed yesterday.
The right hon. Gentleman's performance yesterday was a good Parliamentary performance, enjoyed by all of us —indeed, enjoyed by most of us as much as by himself—but there were no answers in it to the questions and the problems that have been canvassed just as hard as the idea that he was trying to put over yesterday that he was giving us answers. For the most part there was no real discussion of the policy that is informing us of the actions of our defence organisation while he is there.
We still do not know how relevant is the figure of £1,998·54 million to the policy that the right hon. Gentleman is pursuing and to the provisions that we should be making, and we do not know how real the figure is. Yesterday, he implied that it was untrue to suggest that he had been guilty of a little clever gamesmanship over that figure, and had got it down to just under a sacred £2,000 million. I stand on my view. I have not the slightest doubt that had decisions—even the ones that he talked of yesterday—been taken at any time during the past 12 months, when they could have been taken, a larger amount would have had to fall into the Estimates this year than is now the case.
Therefore, to that extent, whoever he was misleading, he certainly was guilty of a little sleight of hand at the expense of the Services—at the expense of the Army, in respect of some items of equipment, and certainly at the expense of the defence of our country.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) said in his first-class speech yesterday, the so-called announcements on aircraft which the Minister made were no announcements at all, with possibly two exceptions. The only real announcement that he made was to buy two items overseas. He gave us nothing new in respect of aircraft being provided here. He told us that on the P1154 a decision had now been made to go into development. But in paragraph 14 of the Air Estimates of last year we were told the same thing, in almost precisely the same language. We were told that it had now been decided that the P1154 was

to be the successor. How has it come about that for a whole year nothing further has been decided than that? If he had decided then that it was to be the successor he must have decided that it should go into development. So we have been told nothing about that. All this build-up led to nothing.
We had the same thing in connection with the HS681 freighter. We were told that a Rolls-Royce engine has been selected, and after all the struggles that I had with the Minister of Aviation, speaking as a Derbyshire Member I am at least grateful for that much. But there is not much in being told that an engine has been selected unless we know that the aircraft will be ordered. We were not told if we were to have the aircraft, or how soon they would be in service. This has been hanging round for a long time. For the most part we have been talking about things which began to be born many years ago. We ought to be much further on now, if that aircraft is essential and we are to have it within a reasonable period.
We were told nothing about any other kind of replacements, although I would have thought we ought to have been told. Then we heard about the helicopter. There has been a lot of real anxiety and unhappiness about the way in which this matter has been handled recently. Up to a very short while ago —a matter of days—it was thought that without any question the Hiller was the preferred machine. Certainly, there was a preference for the Hiller unless the Bell had an overwhelming superiority. The preference for the Hiller was very convenient in terms of our aircraft manufacturing industry. But in the last week, apparently, the decision has been made to switch to the Bell, and that decision is worrying a lot of people—not politicians but people in the Ministry and people who ought to know about things that are going on.
Many assertions are being made, which I cannot check, about the level at which this decision was taken, and the suggestion is that the main factors considered at this stage had little to do either with the likely or known performance of the helicopter or with our industrial needs. There is now another week's delay in this matter. I ask the Minister of Defence to see that we are told openly


and clearly what are the reasons for this change, if indeed the change is to be maintained, in order that we may know what is happening. Unless there is a real and unquestioned performance superiority on the part of the Bell helicopter the Minister ought to fall back on the considerations which led to the Hiller previously being favoured. I should be glad if the Minister would tell us a little more tonight, because this situation is worrying good people who are in no way politically involved.
The Minister gave us no answers on the question of the manpower situation, and especially about the allegations made concerning certain Army units. It is no use his saying—as he said, quite humanly—that, of course, there is a shortage in units; how can there be anything else when we have a 5 per cent. shortage overall? That is a fair point, but it is not the one that he has to meet. The question is: how much of a problem to the units themselves is the shortage which they are being asked to endure? How far can those units be expected to discharge their obligations, not at a moment like the present but when conditions become more active, as they well might, with the present shortage of numbers in units in Cyprus and other places?
Not so long ago the then Secretary of State for War made it clear—and he used two figures—that in his view 635 was the minimum size of a battalion, but that in conditions like those that we have experienced in Cyprus it should be not less than 700, because it had been found that 635 was too tight. Without going any further than I ought to in connection with these figures, it has not been denied that hardly a battalion in Cyprus today—there might be one—is even up to the lower of those two figures. Some are substantially short of the lower of those two figures. If this is so, we ought to be told how the Government see the position, and what they feel would be the problem that we would have to face if conditions in Cyprus became more active than they are now.
Do the Government admit the gravity of the situation? Or do they intend to start—some people believe that they have already done so—letting the Press and public relations officers of the

Services put out figures in a very vague and off-the-record way—figures which overstate the situation and do not bear any relationship to the realities of the situation in Cyprus? If they have started that, will they stop it? Will they admit the gravity of the situation and accept their responsibility for producing remedies?—because it is the Government's business to produce remedies.
If conscription is out—and I accept the Secretary of State's case about that —and if selective service only adds to our problems, because men who are already heavily stretched must be taken off to train people who are coming in for only a short time and then going out again, what remedy do the Government propose? Shall we just have to wait and hope that nothing serious happens? If we have to wait and hope, let the Minister tell us. We should be hearing a good deal more from the Government on these issues.
There are other matters that I would like to raise, but I do not want to take as long as I usually do. It would be convenient if I left the rest of the "nuts and bolts" side of the argument to my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Park (Mr. Mulley), who will he winding up the dente for us, and dealt only with that part of the Minister's speech which has also played a prominent part in speeches by the Prime Minister, and which figures, in a way, in newspaper reports—the attention given to the question of the strategic nuclear deterrent and the independent British nuclear capability.
It is clear what part the so-called independent British strategic deterrent plays in the electoral strategy of the party opposite. If I have been less than gracious to the Tory Party, and suggested that it is not always forthcoming, at least I can compliment it on the fact that it has not kept this one dark. But I still find it impossible to see what part it plays in the Government's defence strategy. The aim which the Ministers are engaged in pursuing seems simple and can be stated in this way. They seek to identify the bomb—I will use the word "bomb" as a generic term—with British prestige, with British influence and with British power. They attach it to those three words.
Those who then raise awkward issues, like its credibility; or the strength or the validity of the claim that it is independent at all; or the effect on proliferation among other countries; become straight away, by definition, "little Englanders", who can be accused of not really caring for the greatness of Britain. Hence their arguments can and do change from speech to speech. What peg the argument is hung on does not affect the broad aim.
At Bury, the Prime Minister gave us the top chair at the high table, or the high chair at the top table—I do not know which it is, but it was the chair at the table argument. That has been met. We have debated that argument, and we can do it again. On the television programme "Panorama" and in this House, yesterday, the chair at the table argument had no place at all. Yesterday, the argument was totally different. Yesterday, and on "Panorama", the argument was that, because we did not trust the alliance—or only silly people like us would trust the alliance—we must have the power to go it alone in some circumstances. That is a totally different argument from the other one, and I must say that it is not an argument which was ever used by the previous Prime Minister.
I accept, as must everyone who gets involved in this, that there is an inbuilt disadvantage for those of us who put our side of the case. The patriotic or would-be patriotic opinion—the other day I called it the jingoistic nationalist substitute for patriotism—although crude, is a very simple appeal. Against it we have to use fairly complex and detailed arguments. Nevertheless, I believe that the Government here are going wrong and the impression I gain outside the House is that with every fresh "confrontation"—to use the fashionable word—between us on this issue the complex, rational arguments get through and the cheap jingoism is seen for what it really is, and not as patriotism.
That is why I am quite willing, every time the Government wish, to argue it again; although it has the disadvantage for some of us that we have to try to find some way of saying in different words what we said last time. I do not think that that matters much to some listeners in the House, because I get the impression that hon. Members opposite

never listen to my words. But I listen to them and I have to listen to the same thing each time. I shall try to accept the challenge, as I did in November when I followed the Prime Minister, and as my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition did in January; and as many of us have done on innumerable occasions since.
First, may we establish some basic principles? Perhaps we have not done that sufficiently in the past. A Labour Government will see that Britain is defended. A Labour Government will accept the responsibility for the provision of forces, arms and equipment to fit a defence strategy, which, in turn, fits the foreign policy on which we should operate as a Government. Unlike what is occurring today, we shall not claim a strategy and policy approach for which, year by year, we fail to find provision or put into effect, as is the case with the present Government.
A Labour Government will not be neutralist and will be loyal to the Western Alliance and—if I may specifically state it—to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The opposite is a suggestion which, like others, Ministers are always slipping, in a half-hidden sort of way, into their speeches.
I reject it formally not only for myself, but for my party, and I say—as this has so often been shown to be part of our policy—that it is discreditable that such suggestions should go on being made. Just because, as came out plainly yesterday—I will go into the details in a moment—we see the alliance so much more strongly than do the Government in present world conditions, we shall be much more likely to be more powerful partners in that alliance than they are able to be.
Listening to a lengthy passage in the speech made yesterday by the right hon. Gentleman, I could not help thinking that he was speaking as though we were not in any alliance at all; that there was not to be an alliance. He spoke of a situation which we might have to meet when we could not defend these islands except by the threat of, if not the use of, strategic nuclear weapons; and the advantage of having them ourselves in order to do it. I wondered whether the right hon. Gentleman was giving notice of the break-up of N.A.T.O. If


we are framing our policy on the assumption that the alliance no longer remains, we are serving an awful notice on our colleagues in the alliance about our real motives and thoughts.
A Labour Government will seek for Britain a rôle of greater influence in the councils within the alliance and in world councils. I would remind the House that world councils does not mean direct East-West councils. There are other places where there is world influence and we have not been able to play a sufficiently positive rôle. We do not believe —this is the nub of the difference—that pretending to have a nuclear capacity which we have not got, and are known not to have, advances any of these basic principles. The argument is really about that, whether it is a good thing to go on with what we believe to be a pretence; it is about that which we are having a debate, and not about principles. But we on this side of the House are firmly attached to the principles.
Let me try to disentangle one or two very confused suggestions. Let us put it this way. I accept, I think incontrovertibly, that the possession by the Western Alliance of a substantial nuclear capacity and capability has been one of the things that has brought about the kind of pseudo condition of stability that we have had over the last year or two, the uneasy peace. I accept firmly that that is so. But the Prime Minister seems to think—and yesterday it seemed that the Minister of Defence thinks—that when we have proved the part which the possession by the West of nuclear weapons has played, then, ipso facto, we have proved the case for Britain having her own independent deterrent, and we have not at all.
A debate about whether Britain could have, or if she could she should have, an independent deterrent; a debate about what we do if she cannot have it, or if she cannot have it at a certain time, is a debate which can go on without affecting the broad view that the West, nevertheless, in present conditions must continue to have a substantial nuclear capability.
The Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence have never met this argument. They have taken the second always as having been proved once they had proved the first. It is the second I want

to look at, the question of the British nuclear deterrent, not the Western one. I ask the House to note the change in circumstances. We must look at our defence position, and certainly strategy, against a world stage in which conditions and circumstances change in the space of four or five years in an enormous fashion.
There was a time when, I think, Britain had, and the West needed, a capacity on our part to contribute substantially and significantly to the Western deterrent. That time was at its peak when the bombers were the major delivery system. That time began to pass as the bombers began to become not only less than the major delivery system, but almost an invalid delivery system. It was at its peak when missile defence was non-existent. It got less and less strong as that grew against us. It was at its peak when American capacity to guarantee the delivery of an effective retaliation by herself alone did not exist, when she needed other people's facilities, other people's capacity to fill in the spectrum a round the West.
When those three things existed, as they did not so long ago, the case the right hon. Gentleman now seeks to make could be made by reference to those circumstances, but every single one of those three situations has changed out of all knowledge. The bombers are not yet out, but, clearly, they are virtually out.

Mr. Julian Critchley: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Brown: I shall certainly give way, but every time I try to put forward connected arguments there are interventions which not only make it difficult to make those arguments, but they also take the time of the House. I shall give way, but it must be clearly understood that that will mean that I shall be speaking for longer than I intended.

Mr. Critchley: Is it not a fact that Mr. McNamara said in the week before last that the B52, whether strategic or not, would be held until 1969? If that is so, it would make nonsense of the argument of the right hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Brown: I was just coming to that. That shows the reason for not being too


quick in interrupting, for then one does not hear what is being said.
I said that the bombers are virtually out, but that does not mean they are totally out and that we cannot extend the life of bombers to a degree by re-equipping some of them for low flying.
Mr. McNamara said that the B52 could be re-equipped for that purpose at a cost of £1 million apiece and he gave figures of the number of the bombers and missiles. But we have to see the feasibility of doing that with these numbers and these resources. We could say that we should try to do the same with some of our V-bombers. Our V-bombers make up a relatively very small force and not all of them can be given low-level capacity.
There has been a great argument about what we can do about aerodynamics even if we did modify them for this rôle. A question which has not been answered is what would happen to the black boxes they have to carry when flying at about 500 miles an hour and getting the enormous buffeting for which they have not been made. The black boxes were made to function at about 45,000 feet and one cannot put a black box right merely by reinforcing it. Therefore, while we can attempt to spread this out, the extent to which we would be able to do so is very much exaggerated. Subject to what it is worth and for such a period as there is, there is a movement forward in the year when they go out, but it is not far away.
The need for bases and the rôle of bases for missiles, unless they are hardened and subterranean, has disappeared as a factor in this. I am talking about land-fixed point bases. Second-strike retaliatory missiles now exist in vast numbers wholly in American hands. They are more than enough if we are to believe the numbers given to cover all the targets which, a few years ago, had to be covered from a number of different areas and in different ways.
Whatever the case was for a British nuclear contribution in the 'fifties—and I admit that I saw it differently then, although I was in conflict with my colleagues and must be allowed still to think that my reasons for changing my views were right—it does not exist in

these totally changed circumstances of the 'sixties and 'seventies. To make a case for an independent British deterrent today in the 'sixties Ministers have to prove it against a whole different set of circumstances. The view taken in 1954, in 1956 or at any time up to 1960 is totally irrelevant to the issue today.
One of the major charges against Conservative Ministers in their present reactionary and complaining political mood on this subject is that they will not, or cannot, re-examine this vital issue in the light of these changes. They have never admitted and, even now, do not want to admit to themselves, the consequences of having ended the Blue Streak missile and having decided not to continue with the development of a delivery system for strategic weapons. With that went all genuine independence. Once they took that decision, right or wrong, forced on them or voluntary, and took us out of the independent development of missile delivery systems for strategic weapons, they took us away from a position where we could have genuine independence.
No amount of playing around with it, no amount of appeals—whether to patriotism or jingoism I leave them to decide—can get round this issue. This is the question which, I frankly believe, the right hon. Gentleman The Minister of Defence understood during that period when he was out of office and made his much-quoted speech from below the Gangway, to which I listened. During that period his mood and approach, if not his actual words, were much nearer to those of the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones) yesterday than with his mood today.
We became dependent on the grace and favour—let us choose harsh words to get it clear—of somebody from thereon not only to give us a supply, but to keep us up to date with "know-how", keep us up to date with development and to see that we got new marks as the old marks went out. We put ourselves totally on their grace and favour. That we paid hard-earned money for it does not alter the fact that whether they gave it or not and kept us up to date with continuing developments, was their decision. We can say that Polaris is a mark of dependence. We can say that


it is a mark in inter-dependence if used for other circumstances. But one thing we cannot say is that it is a mark of independence.
I think that the issue is this. Is a separate British nuclear capability—let us call it "separate"; let us lose the word "independent", because independent is what it is not—required in the name of inter-dependence and of a greater alliance capacity? This is the issue that we are trying to get the country to debate. In my view, it is the only case that can now be made. A case can be made—I am not sure that it is wholly proved and I am not sure that I can see all the circumstances in which it might operate—and circumstances can be described in which it might be required as part of some inter-dependent activity in the alliance. I can see that that case exists. I would take a lot more persuading before I accept that it is made out. In my view, a case cannot he made out that we need a separate delivery capability in order to bring the alliance's total capacity up to the desired strength. The alliance has the capacity.
There are other problems which have to be solved, problems which affect the question of responsibility within the alliance, problems which affect sharing of policy decisions and sharing of powers. These are very real problems. I am sorry that the Prime Minister did not stay. I would rather have said this while he was here. Problems like this are not solved—their solution is not even contributed to—by describing them in a distorted fashion and then saying that it is puerile to say they can be solved. That is not merely an argument. It is nowhere near the standard required of a Parliamentary Private Secretary, let alone of a Prime Minister.
The problems do exist and a solution must be found. It may or may not be helped by the rest of the case we on this side are putting, but it is not puerile. It may be very difficult. It is no use saying that the problems never will be solved because the American Congress and the great American people will never permit them to be solved. The facts of life are facts of life, even in America. The break-up of the alliance, which I believe seriously is one of the possible

consequences of not solving this, is a very great matter for America, too, and there are people in America who understand that.
To all this the Conservatives pose two answers. I will try to put them fairly. I said just now that they put the top table argument that, even if someone has to provide us with them and even though we are totally and for all time dependent upon them for "know-how" and development, nevertheless possession gets us to international conferences where otherwise we would not be allowed. That is the top table argument.
Does it get us there? What is the case for this? Where are the examples? The only example ever quotod is that we were at the conference which ended, at any rate temporarily, I hope permanently, nuclear tests by the Americans, the Russians and ourselves. We were certainly there. I think that it is fair to the right hon. Member for Bromley (Mr. H. Macmillan), whose greatest fan I have never been, to say that he played a very distinguished part in the debate and the arguments that led up to that conference. I do not accept that we could not have played that part if we had not had nuclear weapons. The right hon. Gentleman played that part as a world statesman. He played it as a politician. He played it because of certain associations with the United States and the United States Administration.
I put this in its bluntest and perhaps least acceptable form. Whether we had physically been at the test ban conference or had not been at the conference, there would have been a Test Ban Agreement and we should have been left to decide whether, like France, we would refuse to honour it. That is all. Even that conference, which is the only one we have got to as a result of possessing the weapon, did not require us for its successful outcome.
What otter conferences would Ministers like to select and say, "We would not have been there but for the nuclear weapon"? Are there only three of us in Geneva at this moment? On the contrary, there are 17 of us. All the rest are non-nuclear Powers. They got there without the ticket. Why is the assumption made that they can all get there without a ticket, but that we cannot?
Yesterday, the Minister of Defence talked about sharing inside N.A.T.O.—planning, staffing, command sharing, and all that. He mentioned Italians, French and Germans taking part in that. Which of them has the ticket? This assertion is made. There is no evidence to back it up. Therefore, I believe that there is nothing in the argument at all.
The case that the Government advance is the one the Minister advanced yesterday, that we cannot trust the alliance or our allies in all and necessarily unforeseen circumstances. They do not say that they cannot trust them now. I do not accuse them of that. I do not want to overstate the case. They are not saying that they cannot trust our allies now. They are not saying that they cannot trust them in foreseeable circumstances, although they sometimes get near to saying that. They say, in fact, that it would be unwise to trust the alliance, or our closest allies, in circumstances ahead, which, at the moment, we cannot foresee.
Let us leave aside the fact that, if all members of N.A.T.O. are to hold that view and base their policies and actions on it, we will all be acting like de Gaulle, we will all be acting like France, and there will be no N.A.T.O. Let us suppose that the unforeseeable arose. We now have the missiles. We have retained for ourselves the independent right to threaten their use, to use them, in circumstances where our allies, or the alliance, were not prepared to threaten their deterrents either in our defence or with us. Let us get it quite clear that that is the circumstance, one where the alliance, particularly a major ally, has refused to allow the main strategic deterrent to be threatened on some issue which we regarded as important.
The assumption is that we would then threaten it ourselves. How sensible, how credible, how valid, is this assumption that is made so largely and so freely? Some considerations are left out of account here. First, the size of the force which we would be threatening is then a very relevant issue. When the bombers have gone, what is the size of our force to be? It was to have been four Polaris submarines. It is now to be five Polaris submarines. We do not at

the moment know whether we shall have any other aeroplanes with a bonus nuclear carrying capacity, but there is a possibility. I would have to amend my argument to take account of that, if it happened. There is no certainty that it will happen.
Why were the four submarines put up to five yesterday? I hazard a guess, I suspect that it was because, with four submarines, we cannot guarantee to have two or more on station at any one time. When refitting is allowed for, when going out and coming in is allowed for, and when accidents are allowed for, it might be that only one would be on station. If only one was on station, vulnerability becomes a possibility, even with a Polaris submarine, because there is the whole question of routes out and home. I suspect that it was, therefore, decided that it would be better to have five.
Whether we have one submarine on station or two submarines on station, how, having been refused the use of the major deterrent, are we then going to bring about a great decision that nobody else is interested in by the threatened use of that force? The Minister is right in saying that it can do substantial damage. Even 16 Polarises fired off could do damage. It is an altogether different matter whether they would do the thing that the deterrent has to be able to do—to inflict such damage that it is unacceptable, because that is what gives it credibility, that is what gives its deterrent effect.
There is no point in the deterrence because we believe that it is strong. The power of deterrence is not obtained because of what we believe. The power of deterrence is in the other man's mind. He has to believe it. Faced with a force of that size, I believe that it is totally incredible that there would be a situation in which the other man would say, "I back down in face of the threat of this force".
Even if that were so, which I do not believe, the effect of us threatening its use would be to put at risk the cities of our allies which had just refused to put them at risk themselves. When Ministers make this case, do they ask themselves what they think would happen, what they think our allies would be doing while we were doing the very


thing for them and all the rest of the world which they had refused to do themselves? Do Ministers believe that our allies, even the major one, having provided us with the missiles and being still in the process of providing us with other things, would say, "We will not place our towns at risk, but if you do so the best of luck"?
It will not happen that way at all. Our allies will take steps, never mind about the man we are trying to deter, to see that the deterrent effect is reduced, if not cancelled altogether. What persuasion does the Minister think the allies would be putting on us? Has the Minister forgotten all about Suez? Mr. Robert Murphy can write a book now saying that nobody except Lord Avon took Marshal Bulganin seriously. He may or may not be right. But someone in America took something very seriously and reacted very strongly. We would not find the right hon. Member for Bromley, I am sure, willing to join the ranks of those who believe that American reactions had nothing to do with our change of course during the Suez operation.
If those pressures were substantial enough to cause us great humiliation and a change of course, then what pressure does he think would be applied on us if we were threatening to plunge their cities into nuclear disaster? Of course, it would not be allowed to happen in the way the Minister says it is to happen. It seems to me that the consequences for us of doing it would be that we would be the ones that would be deterred and not the ones that we were trying to deter. It certainly could not be more than a once-for-all threat. Let us be clear about that. If we ever once use these missiles with this power in the face of the committed opposition of the nation from which we got them, that would be the end of getting missiles. There could not be a second time. There could be only a first time, if there could be even that. I do not believe that there could be even that. In the meantime, on the two arguments as unsubstantial as this, the country is forced to spend vast sums of money, often at the expense of other urgently needed defence requirements.
Although we say that all we are spending on this is 10 per cent. of the total

bill and that it may get less, as someone said in one of the papers the other day, there were many ways of calculating this figure and a lot depends on whether TSR 2 is put into the conventional rôle. The 10 per cent. figure does not really take in anybody.
We spend vast sums of money or this sector at the expense of other sectors of defence. We encourage greater proliferation among other countries, because the case the Minister made yesterday can be made by every single one of them. We are forced to run a defence policy in total conflict with our foreign policy, instead of the defence policy being an extension of foreign policy. We cannot just shake off the total absurdity of the Minister being forced as his only defence for this policy to say to the House, as he did yesterday, the exact opposite of what the Foreign Secretary was saying in Geneva the day before.
The Foreign Secretary, I am quite sure, expected to be believed and to be regarded as sincere and committed when he urged at Geneva that we should have immediately—as quickly as we could get it a freeze on missile delivery systems both in type and the present number. He did not say that that should apply to everybody except Britain. If he had said that there would haw been such a laugh that that would have been the end of it. He expected them to believe that he meant —I expect he did mean—all of us, and that if we can get it here and now let us get it here and now.
If the Minister of Defence had admitted that yesterday, bang would have gone his claim. He said that it applies to everybody but us and that in no circumstances will Britain not insist upon having its five submarines and its 80 missiles. I do not think we shall get them until 1970, but he says that whatever we do between 1964 and 1970 we in Britain will not join in until after 1970. What is the difference between that and de Gaulle's refusal to join in the Test Ban Treaty? This not only torpedoed the Foreign Secretary, publicly and openly, but this is the ridiculous situation we get forced into when we are trying to defend this kind of policy or those kinds of arguments.
It seems to me quite clear that, first, the possibility of an independent use of the British deterrent is as illusory as the pretence that we have it. Secondly, that the maintenance of more than one nuclear centre of power in the alliance with each retaining independence of action must destroy the alliance in the end and defeat any idea of interdependence. Thirdly, that the Conservatives who seriously hold this view cannot have projected their examination of it beyond the aeroplane age or they would have been bound to see the logic of what I have been saying. Fourthly, that while a decision to change policy by Britain would not of itself stop others—I give the Minister that point—nevertheless, unless we make such a change we are in no position to try to get others to agree to it and to put it into effect. That is the side of it that the Minister does not see.
When, then, would Labour do? I face this as frankly as I have done the rest, but I say to the Minister and to back bench Members opposite that merely shouting at us, "What would you cancel?", and "What would you do about a given weapon?", which is not here yet, and which will not be here for five years—some not for 10 years—is asking questions that we cannot answer, and I do not intend to try to answer them. The Minister will not even tell us about the things that are supposed to be coming in this year. When he spoke yesterday he was talking about this year and next year. I am being asked to say what we would do about things five or 10 years hence. Hon. Members opposite need to know the arguments behind our approach. As I have said clearly, the general principles on which we would work will depend on any particular weapons system applying at the time.

Captain Walter Elliot: rose—

Mr. Brown: I cannot give way, I have been speaking for a long time.
First, Labour does not say throw weapon delivery sytems that exist, even if they have a dying credibility or capacity, into the sea. We have never said that. But we do say, "Stop continuing to provide these large sums in

an effort to project our independent nuclear stature, our separate independent nuclear stature"—as I prefer to put it—"beyond its present stage".
We must stop trying to project this separate, though not independent, nuclear capacity and instead use what currently exists, what we have already planned to do, in negotiations which should be initiated with our allies to prevent further nuclear proliferation within the alliance and also to obtain better arrangements, acceptable arrangements, for consultation, participation and sharing within the alliance. I believe that that is the right and only genuine posture that we can take and that it is the only posture related to the circumstances.
I now come, for I do not intend to dodge the issue, to the Nassau Agreement. This mesmerised the Minister yesterday, when he was led into the trap in regard to the Foreign Secretary. He was thinking too much about this point to see what else was going on. We are frequently asked by hon. Members opposite what we would do about the Nassau Agreement. The answer is that we would reopen negotiations on it in the light of the stage which the whole concept has reached; that is, when we come into power. We will reopen negotiations with the ally with whom the agreement was made and that, in turn, forms a part of our negotiations with the other partners in the alliance. That will have to be done in the light of the situation as it then exists.
We laid the keel of the first Polaris submarine yesterday. We will not lay another one for, I believe, another year. Not even the first one will be very far advanced if we have an early General Election and we come into power, and even with the longest possibly delayed General Election the second one cannot have been started. Will those submarines have another rôle to play? Will they be able to be used as part of the negotiations to bring about a better situation within the alliance? The answers to these questions depend not only on the rôle the submarines can play, but on what our partners in the alliance consider can be their use and the part they can play.
The question whether the submarines can be changed in some way and used to fit in with our concept of national defence will have to be considered. When people talk about cancelling Polaris I trust that they understand that the submarines are built by us in Britain. They may not have to be tied to American missiles. As I understand, they consist of two British ends and an American centre slotted in. I suppose that we would not want the American centrepiece if we did not have the missiles, but that does not mean that we would not want the submarines, or that they could not be modified for our purpose. It also does not mean that there will necessarily be less work in the shipyard. As I say, the whole question is what rôle the submarines can play and, having answered that, a decision must be taken at the operative time.
What we seek is clear. We want some real and genuine partnership in the alliance through better political institutions—institutions that do not now exist —for that would meet a great deal of the criticism of the others in the alliance about the absence of sharing. We want to limit nuclear provision within the alliance and thereby, I hope, in the opposing bloc to the very minimum possible—and the minimum from our point of view is provision by one. We must aim for provision by one along with effective sharing among the others. That is a much better situation than provision by any number, all being provided independently. The fewer the providers within the alliance the better. Equally, we must do what we can to prevent any extension of nuclear provision outside the alliance.
If we are to make early progress on this score, as we want to, we must make as early progress as we can towards an international police force and following that, some agreed limitations on national bloc armaments. We ourselves must make some progress in this sphere. We must also make better provision for the fulfilment of the defence rôle which people want us to perform, which we are capable of performing, which the Comonwealth requires us to do and which others in the alliance want us to do. We must make better provision for that than we have made.
It is clear that a decision to the effect that we will not try to have, in name or in aim, a separate national nuclear capability and that we wish urgently to discuss with our allies the consequences of that decision by us could only help in reaching forward towards some success with the four basic issues, the four main aims of policy, I have set out. A determination by this Government to ignore all the factors involved and to take refuge in an obstinate declaration that black is white and that illusory is reality is not only costly, dangerous and ineffective, but encourages proliferation and obstructs such chance as there may be of progress in the international sphere.
The views I have expressed can be discussed at length. It is obviously right and essential that the electors of this country should know the pros and cons of the argument and where each party stands on this issue because in due course it will be one of the factors —never the only one, not by a long chalk—on which they will make up their minds as to who should represent the country after the next General Election.
I urge all hon. Members, particularly hon. Members opposite, to discuss the argument on its merits. We commend the Amendment because we strongly believe, on the merits of the case, that the Government have failed the nation in the provision of our defences and that this is largely because they have obstinately refused to face the facts of the realities of the nuclear age.

4.56 p.m.

The Secretary of State for Air (Mr. Hugh Fraser): I am sure that all hon. Members will join with me in congratulating the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) on his speech, although he has left us entirely obfuscated as to what the Labour Party would be doing in these circumstances. We somewhat anticipated that that would happen, and now we have seen our expectations fulfilled, even after having listened to the right hon. Gentleman for about 58 minutes.
The hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) tried in his speech yesterday to denigrate what my right hon. Friend announced in the House and in his Defence White Paper. The decisions


here are clear as to the aircraft, the fifth Polaris submarine and the various forms of equipment. For hon. Members opposite to attempt to denigrate this policy ill behoves them, looking back on their past military achievements and management. We must look back on these things when an Amendment such as this has the scope of reviewing our progress over the past 12 years. We must look back, when hon. Members opposite, such as the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), now throw doubt on our ability, military management and military forces. We must recall that when we took office we found 249,000 soldiers in depots and training depots, ill-equipped to take part in any form of conflict.

Mr. George Wigg: What nonsense.

Mr. Fraser: We must look back at these things. We must look back at the 1951 White Paper on Defence which was put forward by the then Prime Minister, now Lord Attlee. I appreciate that these things are different, but we were faced then with having to undertake a crash programme which upset far more than anything what we proposed to do. It is against this background that hon. Members opposite inevitably evade the issue by tabling their Amendment. We believe that what we have succeeded in doing in the last 12 years is to adapt our policy to the realities of the situation and, in my view, they are different from those put forward by the right hon. Member for Belper. When we came into power, we were faced with the twin tasks of continuing the process of the evolution from empire to Commonwealth, and of modernising our military approach so as to enable us to fulfil a rôle that we have always held to be not only a European, but a world rôle.
Hon. Members opposite have rather come round to this point of view in the last few days. In the defence debate a year ago, the right hon. Member for Belper said that there were few places in the world where those in authority locally would dare call on British national forces for protection and support. Twelve months later, events in Kenya, in Uganda, in British Guiana, in Borneo, and even in Cyprus, have prob-

ably made the right hon. Gentleman look at these matters again. His prediction was too sweeping, and in a year's time he may find, again, that he was wrong in what he said this afternoon. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition has also come round to this view. He suggested last month that 1,000 men East of Suez, with the fullest provision for mobility, might be preferable to another thousand in Germany. We had the same tune yesterday from the hon. Member for Leeds. East
What I think we have to face in the next few years is the possibility that our political commitments will force on us a military responsibility that is neither that of the colossi—Russia and the United States—nor that of the purely European Power. Our defence policy must reflect these world commitments; with it, we can make a unique contribution in areas where the main points of friction and potential escalation have been occurring. That point was brought out by my hon. Friend the Member for Renfrew, East (Miss Harvie Anderson) yesterday afternoon. The House and the country should bear such considerations as these in mind when turning to the wider issue, raised this afternoon by the right hon. Gentleman, of how these commitments are to be fulfilled.
There is an argument if one wants to cut back on our power, there is an argument if one wishes to economise by cutting our armaments—there is an argument in this direction, but I believe that no one on either side of the House is today prepared to envisage the abandonment of this rôle, because that is the greatest contribution we, as a country, can, and do make. We believe, however, that it is necessary to have balanced forces, equipped with both conventional and nuclear weapons and, in the last resort, with the nuclear deterrent under our control. Until quite recently, this was the view of hon. Members opposite, but they have now firmly declared that they are against a British deterrent —I hope that I do not derogate from what they have been saying—and, as far as I can see, against the nuclear part of our defences.
The TSR2 is obviously a case in point. We have on occasion asked hon. Members opposite across the floor of the House whether or not they wish to see


this aircraft equipped with a nuclear tactical weapon. If there is an election coming soon, this is a matter on which they must concentrate their minds—

Mr. Wigg: Hear, hear.

Mr. Fraser: —but, quite understandably, horror is naturally evoked by the Hiroshima bomb, and even more by the possibilities of the destructive power of modern hydrogen weapons—

Mr. G. Brown: Is there a TSR2?

Mr. Fraser: An aircraft will actually be flying this year—

Mr. Brown: The question was about equipping the TSR2 with tactical nuclear weapons. There is no such weapon at the moment. We are told that an aeroplane will fly later this year. Will the right hon. Gentleman first tell us in what year he thinks that the question of equipping the TSR2 with a tactical atomic weapon is likely to become an active consideration?

Mr. Fraser: It became an active consideration for us last year, when we started building the necessary weapons, and from that point of view the weapon is actually building today.

Mr. Wigg: Will the right hon. Gentleman tell us why this was a main feature a year ago, while there is not one single word about it in the Defence White Paper this year?

Mr. Fraser: For the very simple reason that once we say we shall do a thing, we do it.

Mr. Frederick Mulley: The Minister has asked us about arming the TSR2. Am I right in thinking that this machine is a Canberra replacement? If so, can he tell us how our Canberras in Germany are now armed? Are they armed with British weapons?

Mr. Fraser: As my hon. Friend the Member for Renfrew, East pointed out yesterday, although she was constantly interrupted by the hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg), outside Europe, our Canberras are armed with British weapons. That is a point that must be remembered.
We appreciate that this question of nuclear weapons fills every right-

minded person with horror and awe. I quite see that if there were to be world disarmament, including disarmament of Communist China, or if there were to be a European or North Atlantic Federation, or if there were to be created the new political institutions to which my right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones) referred yesterday—if these things were to be brought about, there would be arguments for abolition, or for waiving national responsibility for the deterrent, and merging it in some higher sovereign power.
On this, I am absolutely open to argument. If we analyse the sort of policy preached by the Opposition we see that it is, over the next six or seven years, one either of absolute or graduated unilateralism. It means getting right out. Whatever name we give it, that is the policy now advocated by the right hon. Gentleman, and the politer name is graduated unilateralism—

Mr. E. Shinwell: Is the right hon. Gentleman forgetting the existence of N.A.T.O., and the Western Alliance?

Mr. Fraser: That is the precise point I am making; that N.A.T.O., unfortunately, is not a political entity. It is not a sovereign Power. It is the best and most efficient form of treaty organisation we have ever seen, and to it we are absolutely loyal—[Interruption.]—What of the way we have given our bombers and soldiers, and so on? No one can deny this. This is the point I was making.
But there is a world of difference between a treaty organisation and a sovereign political institution—a point made by my right hon. Friend yesterday, and one that I shall continue to make—and I say that the policy put forward by the right hon. Gentleman this afternoon is unlikely to have any effect on General de Gaulle or on Mao Tse-tung. In fact, it is unlikely to have any effect on anyone in this business of the wider dissemination of weapons.
The arguments for and against the retention of the British deterrent have been gone over many times in this House, and we have had arguments again this afternoon. I should like to recapitulate a few of these arguments


after the right hon. Gentleman's speech before turning to the new and interesting arguments that he has put forward about the time-factor, about ownership and about the capacity of our bombers or our submarines to penetrate. I should like to make clear the purpose of the deterrent. We must not just look at the situation as we see it today. We must endeavour to look at it as it may be in ten to fifteen years' time. The function of our nuclear striking force is, first, to contribute to the overall Western deterrent and that is why we have assigned our bombers to N.A.T.O. We wish to make N.A.T.O. stronger and this is why we are going into the experiment on the multilateral force which has been condemned absolutely by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. We wish to improve it. It is hon. and right hon. Members opposite, despite saying that they are more loyal to N.A.T.O. than we are, who in this instance are wrong.
The function of our nuclear striking force is, first, to contribute to the overall Western deterrent, second to guarantee the protection of the homeland in the last resort, and finally, as an integrated part of our world-wide commitments. Here we must remember that the next ten or fifteen years may see great changes in the distribution of military power throughout the world and perhaps even the spread of nuclear weapons.
I would remind the House that defence to be effective in a world-wide rôle must cover the whole spectrum of deterrence. Defence must be, as it were, a seamless robe. To destroy the atomic nucleus of that strategic design by renouncing the bomb would neither strengthen our friends nor reduce our garrisons. This is absolutely true. Let hon. Members ask any of our friends in Malaysia and other parts of the world. We in this separate and distinct category of world power must ultimately have behind our soldiers overseas the sanction of the great military and nuclear power that we have.

Mr. Denis Healey: This is a most important point. Does the right hon. Gentleman not accept the view expressed by the Prime Minister in his

"Panorama" television broadcast that it is absolutely unthinkable that this country should ever use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear Power? If so, how can the right hon. Gentleman maintain that our nuclear capacity is relevant to our peace-keeping rôle in non-nuclear parts of the world?

Mr. Fraser: For the simple reason, and I should have thought that the hon. Member would have seen it without the need to spell it out word by word, that this would prevent our being blackmailed by another nuclear Power.
Yesterday my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence made clear that, even when expenditure on Polaris reaches its peak, the total cost of the deterrent will still be well under 9 per cent. of the defence budget and in the 1970s will fall to about 5 per cent. The sum of money involved was attacked by some hon. Members yesterday when they suggested that it was far too great. I believe that this 5 per cent. is comparatively small and is well worth spending.
The other point raised by the right hon. Member for Belper this afternoon, and by a variety of hon. Members elsewhere, is the question of the credibility of the V-force and of Polaris. This afternoon the right hon. Gentleman said that this is only for a matter of a few years. I say that in the matter of credibility it is clear from research that we have done in Bomber Command that there will be no gap whatsoever between the credibility of Bomber Command and the coming of Polaris.
Our striking force is small, of course, by comparison with that of the United States, but I do not think that it can be disputed that we make a valuable contribution to the defence of the West. I deny what the right hon. Member for Belper said today—that it is the opinion at Omaha or elsewhere in the United States that our contribution is of no importance. Even today, with the enormous massive surplus which the United States possess, I believe that for political reasons and because of our proximity to the Soviet and for other reasons ours is a valuable contribution even if it be only some 2 per cent. of the whole.
Presumably, the Leader of the Opposition admits that it is of some importance when he welcomes the assigning of the V-force to N.A.T.O., but this is only part of the problem. The real issue is whether we should retain the final control of this deterrent in our own hands. I believe that we should, and I believe that hon. and right hon. Members opposite should study slightly more what the effect of a deterrent can be. The right hon. Member for Belper seemed today almost to speak as though he were envisaging a period during which these weapons would be discharged. If they are discharged the whole object of the exercise has failed. The real value of the deterrent, and the reason for retaining this strategic nuclear potential, is to prevent an attack or threat of attack against this country or our interests. It is to influence the policies and the actions of others by the knowledge that, in the last resort, they cannot raise the stakes beyond a certain level without running the risk of a degree of damage which they must find unacceptable.
In this sense the deterrent is in use every day as a potent force for peace, at every conference table and in the mind of every political and military planner even if engaged only with conventional operations. But is the V-force, and will the Polaris force be credible? This question was raised today at Question Time and it was also raised in yesterday's debate. Some hon. Members opposite seemed to be positively horrified by the new flexibility and power which the Royal Air Force Bomber Command has displayed. I should have thought that throughout the country there ought to be rejoicing.
The V-force, of course, is constantly practising the techniques of dispersal and rapid take-off on radar warning which would ensure that it could survive a missile attack. Hon. Members opposite have visited Bomber Command and I should like them to visit it again. The second-strike capacity of Polaris is indisputable. Would the British warheads reach their targets? I believe that they would. The V-bombers can launch Blue Steel from high and low altitudes. The lone bomber, flying fast at low level presents enormous problems to the defence. No missile system has yet been

developed which provides an effective counter to it. Even when the technical problems of knocking down a bomber flying below the present level of radar cover are overcome, the development of an effective defensive missile system to cover at low as well as high level the vast areas of Russia involved would be a fantastically expensive business in manpower and equipment.
We have gone into the questions of the range, of fatigue life, of crew training, of possible developments in enemy defences, and of probable loss rates, with great care. I am convinced, as are the commanders, that with the low-level option the V-force will be able to fulfil its rôle at least until Polaris comes into action and possibly for at least a year or two beyond.
Yesterday, the hon. Member for Leeds, East referred to the expert criticism in Flight magazine. It is a pity that he chose to read from only one issue. In the next edition there was a fairly considerable change of tone.

Mr. Wigg: The right hon. Gentleman twisted their arm.

Mr. Fraser: I did not twist their arm at all. These are the facts which I am trying to give the House. Extensive experience with fatigue meters on both Canberras and V-bombers has proved that the V-bomber force can be used for training and operation at low-level until 1970 and beyond. Hon. Members have referred to the very high cost which the Americans are incurring in converting their B 52s for low level bombing. This was touched on by my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey), who rightly pointed out that this is a quite different matter with their type of aircraft as opposed to the V-bomber. On the other hand, the modifications to the V-bombers which are necessary purely for their low level rôle are quite minor.
The hon. Member for Leeds, East referred to the growing vulnerability of even low-level aircraft to new forms of defence such as the American Redeye and the Aramis. The fact is that projects such as Redeye and Aramis are still very much is the development stage—

Mr. Wigg: No.

Mr. Fraser: —and will take some years to get into production. Even so, these weapons have their drawbacks and limitations, and we are convinced that, in the time scale we are talking about, they would not affect significantly the invulnerability of our V-bombers at very low level.
The hon. Member for Leeds, East mentioned the possible danger of attack from missiles launched from enemy submarines. I do not believe that such attacks on our shores are likely in the next few years, but, if further intelligence led us to change our view, we could, we believe, combat this danger by altering our tactics, possibly even by mounting a limited airborne alert in a time of tension. I point out here that, far from this being appallingly expensive, as the hon. Gentleman alleged yesterday, we should be able to mount a limited airborne alert and still keep the total cost of the V-bomber force well within the figure of 2 per cent. of the defence budget. There is, in fact, no requirement for the V-bombers to improve their penetration capability, to improve their speed of reaction or to raise their effectiveness in any other way which is likely to raise the cost of the V-force above the 2 per cent. figure during the next decade.
To sum up, I believe that it is sufficient insurance to be able to deal a retaliatory blow so damaging as to outweigh any advantage which might be offered by the destruction or coercion of this country. This capability the V-force will have until the capability of the Polaris submarine comes into effect.
Indeed, far from weakening over the next few years, the credibility of our nuclear force will increase. Its retention gives the Government the maximum number of options. In the last resort, it ensures the protection of this country from attack or from nuclear blackmail, and it gives us the shield necessary for the most effective use of our conventional forces in their world-wide rôle, whatever political or military developments the next decade may bring. If we come to successful negotiations on disarmament or at any time to a wider political integration, we have not a nebulous but a strong hand to play, but this, apparently, hon. and right hon. Members opposite would be prepared to throw away.
What is the position of the Opposition? What is their plan for the focus of our military power? It might be described, as I have ventured to describe it, as a Fabian approach, a policy of graduated unilateralism. The timetable, of course, has been a little put out by the fact that the V-bomber force will remain viable until 1970.
Briefly put, their proposals are to give Bomber Command unequivocally to N.A.T.O., to denegotiate the Nassau Agreement about Polaris, and, with the money saved, to strengthen our conventional contributions especially to N.A.T.O. Then, as a result of the goodwill which would be won from the Americans by this course of action, they argue, the Americans will give us not just a say about guide-lines, targeting and so on but a real measure of control over American nuclear weapons.
This is the general proposition. Of course, there are variations on it. The right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) has hinted at some sort of European-American multilateral force, but the Leader of the Opposition has stoutly declared that only Russia and the United States should have nuclear weapons. He did this on 16th January when he referred to the memorandum on this subject which he had forwarded to the British Foreign Office.
Whether N.A.T.O. or even the Labour Party—especially N.A.T.O.—can hold together under the impact of two such powerful contradictory statements of policy is difficult to forecast. According to the hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Zilliacus)—who, I regret to say, is not here to give such useful advice to his hon. and right hon. Friends—and according to Mr. Walter Lippman, it could not. But the general thesis of the Opposition is clear. It is that by giving up our strategic nuclear capability we shall be handsomely rewarded. We shall save money, our world-wide influence will be greatly increased, and we shall gain control of the nuclear weapons of others.
But will this be so? The Leader of the Opposition has suggested that we should commit Bomber Command unequivocally to N.A.T.O. I hoped that we should this afternon hear more from the Deputy Leader of the Opposition about this unequivocal commitment.
Does he mean that we should deny ourselves the right to withdraw bombers from N.A.T.O. if they were required for use in a conventional rôle, say, in the Far East? Does he intend to rely on the Canberra as our only conventional bomber until the TSR2 comes in? This seems an odd way of sustaining our conventional forces. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman meant "unequivocally" in some different sense.
What will the saving be? What will be involved, and what will be the cost of the measures necessary to enable the right hon. Gentleman to cut his proposed dash in N.A.T.O.? He will not be saving any money on the V-bomber force. It is to be committed to N.A.T.O. The Polaris submarine he would convert to the hunter-killer class. What objective would this achieve in economic terms? What about manpower for the increase in strength necessary? Where is it to come from?
All these questions have remained totally unanswered in the speeches of right hon. and hon. Members opposite during the past two days. But let us suppose that all these difficulties could be overcome, that the weakening of our position at home and overseas could be accepted, and even that the right hon. Gentleman were to become Prime Minister of this country and persona gratissima with the President of the United States, I notice that, last Saturday, he felt it necessary to go out of his way to deny to the Associated Press that, under a Labour Government, Britain would become neutralist between the United States and Russia, and this was repeated again by the right hon. Member for Belper today.
Even if the Leader of the Opposition were to become Prime Minister, if he were to be the idol of N.A.T.O., the hero of Wall Street, the "whiz-kid" of the West, the successful denegotiator of Nassau, and if he were to ask the boys at Omaha for some control over the use of America's deterrent, it would not only be the hon. Member for Gorton and Mr. Walter Lippman who would tell him to go and jump in the lake.
To hold any of the ideas put forward by hon. and right hon. Members opposite so far in this two-day debate is to believe an illusion, to deceive the people of this country, to undermine Europe's

steady advance to greater security and to weaken our capacity for meritorious action overseas. Of course, the problems before us in defence and foreign policy are great and many.
We are not alone in these problems. In the lifetime of five British Parliaments, new currents in the world's aspirations have eroded much and have changed world history at an unprecedented rate. In this new world this country has not played an ignoble rôle. It has not shirked or evaded its responsibilities. The future may be uncertain, but if we diminish our power now, if now we throw it away for no clear purpose—and no clear purpose has been laid down by the Opposition this afternoon or yesterday—we can never regain it.
This is clearly what hon. Members opposite will propose at the next election. Whether they call it, depending on what wing of the party they come from, straight unilateralism, or graduated unilateralism, or a modified form of giving up the deterrent, the fact is that they will throw away our own nuclear power.

Mr. Wigg: Jingoism.

Mr. Fraser: This is not jingoism. This is the belief that only with this power can we carry out the rôles which our position in the world demands. We could never accept a surrender of sovereignty to an unknown purpose, which is what hon. Members opposite are asking. We could never abandon our friends to a fate unknown, and we and many of their ex-supporters throughout the country will continue this fight. And we will win.

5.31 p.m.

Mr. E. Shinwell: Comparing the speech of the right hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones), with its modern outlook —although one might take exception to the conclusions which he reached at the end of that remarkable speech—with the speech of one of our historical monuments, I wonder how it is possible for the two same right hon. Members to remain in the Conservative Party.
The Secretary of State for Air had the impudence just now to suggest that there was disunity on this side of the House. I make a suggestion to him.
Let him indulge in some introspection and examination and make an analysis of the speeches made by some of his hon. Friends, not only on defence, but on the Common Market and resale price maintenance, to mention only one or two examples.
The Secretary of State for Air is mistaken. When it comes to the defence of this country, there are occasional differences of opinion on both sides of the House, particularly about the method of approach and the technique that we should employ related to the circumstances which confront us. What amazed me almost beyond tolerance and endurance was the amazing, grotesque and almost fantastic statement of the right hon. Gentleman that at the next General Election the electors will concern themselves with whether the TSR2 is to carry a nuclear device. There is an important, almost a major, topic for debate at the next General Election. Surely the right hon. Gentleman was not serious in advancing such a proposition.
I would accept without protest 75 per cent. of the speech of the Minister of Defence yesterday. Its delivery was impeccable. Its technique amounted almost to perfection. The conclusions were objectionable. But that was a speech to which one could listen. Today, the Secretary of State for Air advanced pretty much the broad propositions advanced yesterday by the Minister of Defence.
Let me tell the Secretary of State for Air what they amount to. The Government cannot go into the next election with any hope of success on the basis of their economic and social policy: there have been too many disasters throughout the country—in the North-East, Scotland, and so on. After all the bragging, boasting and ballyhoo about affluence and expansion and the like, the Chancellor of the Exchequer this afternoon informed the House and the country about an increase in the Bank Rate. The Government cannot hope for any measure of success at the next election on social and economic issues.
However, the Government must have some weapon which they regard as formidable. What is it? It is an attack on the lack of patriotism in the Labour Party. That is what it amounts to. At

the next election, the Prime Minister, with the claque and clique behind him, will say, "Look at these Labour people". He may even describe us as "Socialists", as if that were an opprobrious and offensive term. He will declare, "They are ready to give up the nuclear bomb in face of the fact"—and undoubtedly it is a fact—" that Soviet Russia intends to retain it." The imputation behind it is that the Labour Party is not concerned about the security of the country and has no intention of maintaining a measure of defence in order to promote the interests and security of our people.
Unfortunately for the Secretary of State for Air and the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence yesterday exploded that myth. He may have done so unwittingly. When there was some criticism made about the vast expenditure which the country must accept because of our defence organisation and defence propositions for the future, the right hon. Gentleman ventured to point to me, as an ex-Minister of Defence and an ex-Secretary of State for War, and assert that I had spent much more money in proportion to the gross national product than he proposes to spend. I made no protest at the time, although several of my colleagues sought to come to my assistance. I required no assistance. I accepted what the right hon. Gentleman said without protest or demur. He was perfectly correct.
That was at the time of Korea, of high tension in Europe and of the Berlin airlift. That was a time when there was the possibility—I will not put it higher, but it may have been a probability—of war breaking out on a vast scale, leading to a world war. We decided to spend the money on defence.
May I narrate the "crimes" of the Labour Government? I know how unpopular some of us were because of our alleged crimes. We decided to promote National Service and increased the period from 18 months to two years. That was unpopular in certain quarters, but how patriotic it was and how essential for our security at the time. No one can complain about our activities during the Korean War. Of course we spent money, and, what is more, we suggested a three-year plan, for which I was responsible, after consultation with my


Cabinet colleagues. We did not believe in the annual plan, for many reasons well known to the Minister of Defence. A three-year plan involved the expenditure of about £5,000 million.
What about our patriotism? What about our desire to protect the interests of our country? I say this with great respect, and meaning no offence, but the Secretary of State for Air is just a small fish in the Government pond. When his right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence, a somewhat bigger fish, or even the biggest fish of all, the Prime Minister, comes along and indulges in poppycock about a lack of patriotism in the ranks of the Labour Party, they will get their answer; there will be a vigorous one from me. So much for that. That, however, is what the party opposite is leading up to for the next election, because I have already remarked it has nothing else to say.
The right hon. Member for Hall Green, although I differ from him fundamentally in his conclusion yesterday, because he was leading up to the Common Market—I know that he is a devotee of the Common Market and is sincere about it; no one disputes that—demolished completely, in the most devastating fashion, the concept of a British independent nuclear deterrent. The Secretary of State for Air had no reply to make to his right hon. Friend. Why not? He made a most ineffective reply to my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown), but, at least, he should have dealt with his own side. We cannot allow him to get away with that.
If the right hon. Member for Hall Green goes about the country and argues with that remarkable intellectual force which, undoubtedly, he possesses that the British nuclear deterrent is simply a piece of military nonsense—which, of course, it is—that would not be to the advantage of the Conservative Party at the next election. So he ought to have been dealt with this afternoon. Where is the Chief Whip? Why does he not reprimand him? I insist upon it.
Although I do not like using this sort of material, I have been gathering information and doing what sometimes my colleagues suggest I should do—a

bit of homework. The right hon. Member for Hall Green was not far wrong. There are other people, not in the Labour Party, who hold the views expressed by him. No less a person—one would hardly believe it—than Lord Gladwyn, formerly ambassador to France, a Member of the other place, who occupies a high position in the European movement, and who is a man of some substance, has expressed himself in this fashion.
Perhaps the House will allow me to read what he is reported to have said:
Lord Gladwyn, former British Ambassador in Paris, said here today that efforts of States like Britain and France to perfect their own nuclear deterrents were doomed to failure.
Speaking at a luncheon of the French Atlantic Treaty Association, he said:,'Such forces could obviously never be used on a first strike and nobody in their senses could believe that they would ever be used in a second strike either, that is to say after the entire country, together in all probability with a large number of the limited bases of the deterrent, had been removed from the surface of the earth'.
How right he is.
It reminds me of what the Secretary of State for Air said about the rôle of the V-bombers. He talked as if they would be used sometime. Surely, he did not really mean that. They are, or are alleged to be, a deterrent, not for use, just ornamental. He talked about their credibility and their increasing credibility. I ask the sensible Members of the House, on both sides, how is it possible to determine the credibility of V-bombers which have not yet been used in war? I do not know. I cannot understand it. One can only tell when they have been used. And so they must be regarded merely as a deterrent to prevent war happening. That is their purpose.
Do not let the right hon. Gentleman or anybody else talk about their rôle as if they could be used. The day the V-bombers are used in a second strike there will be very few of us here to know anything about it, and the right hon. Gentleman knows this. Indeed, that is the argument that is adduced by the other sice—that this is the deterrent. The right hon. Gentleman used it himself. He contradicted himself. He said that we must not allow ourselves to be blackmailed I should like to address myself to that for a moment.
During the course of this review of defence, there has been some debate about what is the valid reason why the Government insist on going on with this concept. On one occasion, I think, it was the Prime Minister, or certainly the right hon. Member for Bromley (Mr. H. Macmillan), who argued that there was a possibility, in certain circumstances, that the United States might default on its treaty arrangements with us and that we might be subjected to an attack, presumably by Russia. Let us not be mealy-mouthed about it. The potential enemy is supposed to be the Soviet Union.
I ventured to put a Written Question to the Foreign Secretary. I wanted to know whether there was any arrangement which made it essential for the N.A.T.O. countries to stand together, to work together, to promote something as tangible as an effective alliance. Let us not forget that the United States of America is a partner in that alliance.
I asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
what treaty exists between the United States Government and Her Majesty's Government for military action by the United States in the event of nuclear aggression against the United Kingdom in the European zone.
This was the reply of the right hon. Gentleman, and I ask the House to note it:
Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides that an armed attack against one or more of the parties in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and that, if such an attack occurs, each of them will assist the party attacked by taking such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." —[OFFICIAL REPORT, 20th February, 1964; Vol. 689. c. 241.]
That is firm language.
That is a treaty the terms of which we can understand. What does it mean? Does it mean that default might take place? Suppose that it did. Suppose that the United States defaulted on the treaty arrangement which I have just described. What chance would this country have in the event of an aggression by the Soviet Union? That is the answer to those who say that there is a possibility that some day we may

have to operate on our own in the nuclear sphere. Let us dismiss such nonsense. It has nothing to do with whether this country remains great. It will remain great. Let us not indulge in a lot of hyperbole about that, as some people do. The country has quality, integrity and a sense of purpose. The country will remain great. I leave it there.
I now come, shortly, to the question of defence itself about which the right hon. Gentleman challenged us. He talked about our rôle and asked what we had to face in the future. He said that we have world commitments and talked about how to fulfil them. He said something about the need for a balance and equipoise—although that is not the word he used—as between nuclear and conventional forces. I leave that out because I have dealt with it.
What about defence? Let us look at it. What have we? Let us leave the V-bombers aside. They may have to be assigned to N.A.T.O. in some form. Here I will reply to the right hon. Gentleman's question. He asked whether the Labour Party or a Labour Government, in assigning the V-bombers to the Western Alliance, to N.A.T.O., would claim the right to have some return for the purpose of engaging in a conventional war. Of course they would. That is precisely our position in relation to our troops in Germany. Indeed, there is some talk just now of withdrawing some of our troops—I am sorry to say that it is a rather small number, smaller than was intended originally—in order to operate elsewhere. Of course, there would be the right to claim them back if it were necessary, and N.A.T.O. would understand it.
Then we have Polaris; but this is in the by and by. There is to be one in the course of a year, and then in the course of two or three years there will be two, three or four. If the Labour Government are to be asked what they would do, I think that the reply that we had from my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper is a very good one. Let us put it this way. If I were Minister of Defence and faced with a situation of that kind, what


would I do? I am not going to be the Minister of Defence, but let us suppose that I were. I should not go into a Department of that kind as an amateur. I should know something about the ropes. I would know how to deal with some of the people who were trying to subordinate the political chiefs. But I leave that aside. That will do for some other occasion.
What should I do? Here I am faced with a legacy. I have inherited something. I accept no responsibility for that. I have protested against it, but in spite of that, I am in the will. The legacy is three, four or five Polaris submarines. I am told that they will be very useful in a second strike. Then I reflect. After all, a second strike may never happen, because I may go out in the first strike. So may the submarines. There is, of course, a certain amount of conjecture in what I am saying, but it is just a possibility.
What do I do? I say, "Let us wait and see what happens. We have spent a great deal of money on these things. If we are not going any further with them, we shall have to try to compensate for them and pay the contractors and designers. I would much rather do that and spend more money on conventional forces."
We have been challenged about that, and I come to it now. How should one spend the money? The Secretary of State for War said last night that he would like to provide more married quarters, because that would retain men longer in the Service. These are the men he needs. When we are talking about recruitment for the Army we are thinking not so much about the men coming in for three or four years, but about the men who come in and want to stay in. We must find the money for that and also the money for conventional weapons.
I do not object to that. Why? It is because I agree 100 per cent. with my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper. A Labour Government must, in the very nature of the case—whatever feelings are expressed in certain quarters, even in our own party, by people who have genuine convictions about pacifism and the rest—provide some measure of defence within the

capacity of the Government and the capacity of the country to maintain our security. We have no intention of throwing it overboard. I would say the same, if a Labour Government came into power, about the V-bombers, the bomb and the missiles.
I hope that one day the right hon. Gentleman will do as Mr. McNamara does in the United States, and give us more information about what we have. I must say, with all my past Service Department experience, that I do not know what the country has got. I do not know how many bombers or missiles we have. I do not know anything about it. I have a suspicion that there are some members of the Cabinet who do not even know. I should not be at all surprised if that were so; but that is by the way.
I give the right hon. Gentleman this assurance. If we come into power with this concept of defence that we hold, and by which we stand, of conventional defence as strong as we can make it, holding up our heads in the world with that, we shall not scatter all our nuclear weapons, not throw them overboard, not dump them in the sea. Of course not. We are not as stupid as all that. Perhaps that is the answer to those who question our patriotism and who are getting ready for their aggression against us at the next General Election. Indeed, I do not know that there is much more that can be said about this.
I began with this point, and I end with it. I think that this is all a very fine tactical manoeuvre. For example, I doubt whether the Minister of Defence, because he is intelligent—I say that quite respectfully and sincerely—really believes in the credibility of this independent nuclear deterrent. On the other hand, he might be prepared to accept the concept of an association with the Western Alliance with General de Gaulle in it.
I end with a suggestion. If the right hon. Gentleman does not do this before the Labour Party comes in as the Government, he will not have much chance; he had better take my advice. The right hon. Gentleman should get the N.A.T.O. people together—the United States, Germany, France, Belgium,


Holland, even Luxembourg, Turkey and Greece. There is a very strong reason why we should retain N.A.T.O., because of the antagonism between those last two countries, which, I hope, will never flare up into a conflagration. Let the right hon. Gentleman get these countries together again and ascertain whether it is possible to integrate some measure of our actual defence weapons and organisation into the Western Alliance. I do not believe that it is impossible to bring even General de Gaulle and the French into it. Anyway, the effort should be made.
If we are asked about the Labour Party policy, I would say that my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper explained and enunciated it in a most able fashion. I would add only one point. I think that it depends on what happens to the Western Alliance in the next few years. If anything goes wrong there, N.A.T.O. may not have the sovereignty we should like it to have, but if anything goes wrong there we can dismiss all idea of not only nuclear defence but conventional defence. We must ensure that we retain something. It is the only thing we can hold on to.
Therefore, I beg right hon. and hon. Gentlemens opposite not to cherish the illusion that by retaining this concept of an independent British nuclear deterrent they can dismiss the Labour Party at the next General Election. It may be an issue, but we shall stand up to it, and I think that we shall win.

5.58 p.m.

Sir Arthur Vere Harvey: The House always enjoys listening to the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell). I well remember when he was Minister of Defence, and I think that I am on record at that time as admitting that he was a pretty good one.
The right hon. Gentleman said how my right hon. Friend ought to deal with the chiefs. My recollection is that the right hon. Gentleman got on pretty well with the "top brass" when he was Minister of Defence. He may not admit that now, but he certainly did so. He took some credit today for the percent-

age of the gross national product which he spent at that time. He certainly stepped up the orders during the Korean war, but if he will cast his mind back he may remember that about 50 per cent. of the aircraft orders had to be cancelled because they had been handed out in such a haphazard way to the aircraft industry that the aircraft could not be made, or if made, would not have been of much use to the Service.
The Conservative Government had to deal with the problem in 1951 and 1952 after they had come into power. I see the right hon. Gentleman nodding in agreement. I am very glad that he admits it. I am sure that he is the type of man who would. When the right hon. Gentleman talks about patriotism I should feel happier if a great many of his colleagues had the same patriotism that he has. A great many of us on this side of the House feel that way.
Having listened to every speech in this debate, I find that I have heard very few constructive suggestions about what should be done to defend Britain. It is all very well for the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) to say, "We do not know; we shall have to review the situation. What we do depends on circumstances". The General Election is only a few months away. The keel of the first Polaris submarine has already been laid and the centre section, we understand, is being bought from the United States. The right hon. Gentleman talks about having to renegotiate the deal. But if the Labour Party is not to have Polaris with nuclear capability, what is there to negotiate except cancellation fees for the work already done in the United States? I do not understand what renegotiating there is to be done.
The hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) made a very long speech, and again, I did not hear any constructive suggestions by him as to how the country is to be defended. There are many ways in which we can approach this problem. We are told that we seek to keep nuclear weapons for their own sake. I know that there are sincere feelings among people who want to get rid of these weapons. This is a complicated matter to decide.

Orders of the Day — ROYAL ASSENT

6.2 p.m.

Message to attend the Lords Commissioners;

The House went:—and, having returned;

Mr. SPEAKER reported the Royal Assent to:

1. Trustee Savings Banks Act, 1964.
2. International Headquarters and Defence Organisations Act, 1964.
3. Export Guarantees Act, 1964.
4. Shipbuilding Credit Act, 1964.
5. New Towns Act, 1964.
6. Public Works Loans Act, 1964.
7. Family Allowances and National insurance Act, 1964.
8. Navy, Army and Air Force Reserves Act, 1964.
9. Episcopal Church (Scotland) Act, 1964.

And to the following Measures, passed under the provisions of the Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act, 1919:—

Church Commissioners (Loans for Theological Colleges and Training Houses) Measure, 1964.
Incumbents and Churchwardens (Trusts) Measure, 1964.
Churchwardens (Appointment and Resignation) Measure, 1964.

Orders of the Day — DEFENCE

Question again proposed, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question.

6.15 p.m.

Sir A. V. Harvey: As I was saying just before we were summoned to another place, I am certain that the Ministers who are taking part in the debate are putting forward views based on the best advice obtainable in their respective Services and the Ministry of Defence, adding their own views, but mainly on that advice.
I was disappointed by the very long speech of the right hon. Member for Belper. He said that a Labour Govern-

ment would see that Britain was defended, but he did not say how. Whether this is an election year or not —and I agree with the right hon. Member for Easington that whether we have the TSR2 or something else will not be a major issue—the British people will be concerned about the broader aspect of affairs and will want to know how Britain is to be defended.
We were not told a word about that by the right hon. Member for Belper. He said that Britain would be loyal to N.A.T.O. Have not the Government been loyal to N.A.T.O.? We have handed over our V-bomber force almost in its entirety. He said that a Labour Government would be even more loyal to the Western Alliance than the present Government, but I do not see how that could be done.
On the other hand, the speech of my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence yesterday was of a very high order. He set out the case for the Government very well. During the last year we have had speeches from hon. Members opposite saying that if in an emergency we were called upon to carry out a local operation, our Regular forms would not be able to do so, because they would be too stretched. But, in fact, since Christmas, our forces have operated in Cyprus and East Africa and Indonesia and, so far, our forces in Germany have not been touched. Even if they were transferred, I would have no objection, for I believe that we have every right to draw upon British forces in Germany if they can play a more important rôle elsewhere.
This is where mobility comes in. The troops and their officers have done an exceptionally fine job and everybody in the country is proud of them. In Cyprus, not a shot has been fired by them in anger. What they have achieved has been remarkable. I should like to know how long it will take the United Nations to make a decision. We were told that should go to the United Nations and ask to be relieved of our burden in Cyprus. The issue has been discussed there for days and it looks as though Britain will be saddled with this burden for some time to come. We must expect some help from the alliance in this Cyprus problem, which is costly, apart from anything else.
The troops have been moved exceptionally expeditiously, but I should like mobility to be still further improved. Transport Command has done well, but it has much old equipment and has to use aircraft which need to make intermediate landings. Greater mobility means a saving in numbers and costs. With proper mobility, troops in Germany can be reinforced from Salisbury Plain, and the average soldier is better living at home than in Germany. When will Transport Command get the new types of aircraft, the VC10 and the Belfast? When will these aircraft be in squadron use?
It would be a brave man who would underestimate the usefulness of the manned aircraft. There has been considerable rethinking on this issue both in the United States and this country during the last year or two. I foresee many years of useful life for the manned aircraft. The TSR2 is an important piece of equipment for the Royal Air Force. It was designed as a tactical strike reconnaissance bomber.
In debate after debate the Opposition have made speeches which seem to show that they do not like it. I do not know why. I know that it is costly, and nobody likes heavy expenditure. Nevertheless, a lot is going into this aircraft. There is nothing of a similar type, which is so far advanced, anywhere else in the world. I understand that it has had its engine and resonance tests, and will be undertaking its first flight in the next few weeks. It is able to fly at 200 ft., at a fantastic speed, without the pilot having to operate the controls. The pilots will have to be very brave men, and I am sure that they will be. The black boxes used by the TSR2 have already been tried in the Canberra bombers. This is not something new. All the forms of control have been tried out.
There is a bonus in this aircraft, in that it has a strategic rôle, since it can carry a nuclear weapon. This will give new life to the Royal Air Force, and will add to the deterrent when Polaris comes into being.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Air spoke at some length about the capability of our V-bombers. I ask hon. Members opposite not to belittle

these aircraft and their crews. They are undoubtedly the best bombers in the world today, and they are probably manned by the best crews. Our friends in Omaha are willing to admit that these aircraft are far superior to theirs. They are capable of flying very low. Their engines are built in, whereas the engines of the American aircraft are underslung. These aircraft will cost £1 million each, but it will be impossible for any country to put up a defence against them. No. country could scatter its air defences all over its territory without bankrupting itself. It just is not on. While that is so our V-bomber force has a real capability as a deterrent.
I would ask hon. Members opposite to visit Bomber Command, and the bomber squadrons. I am sure that they would be able to obtain permission to go there and talk to the crews. Much can be learnt without infringing the Official Secrets Acts. While I am on that point, I suggest that the House should be told considerably more than it is at present. Yesterday, my right hon. Friend made some announcements about the new types of Phantom aircraft for the Navy. I see why, on this occasion, it is right for us to order an American aircraft, and the aircraft do have British engines. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that the Americans never order British aircraft. I would like to see a certain amount of "horse trading" in this respect. British equipment might even be sold to the N.A.T.O. countries, for once.
I should like to know how many Phantom aircraft have been ordered. Or is it a secret? I have no doubt that we shall read it next week in detail in the American aviation magazines. We do not expect to be told the exact numbers, or the exact details of performance, but even much of that information is obtainable. I ask my right hon. Friend to be more forthcoming and to take the House into his confidence. The Russians will know all about this before the House of Commons does. We should be given more of this preliminary information.
We have been told that the British Polaris programme is to be increased, to the extent of five submarines. I welcome that announcement. Speaking in the defence debate of a year ago, I said that to be effective the force would need six or eight submarines. However,


I understand that these submarines carry 16 weapons each, and if they have the degree of accuracy that we are told they have, even three of them at sea would be a formidable force.
Mr. David Devine, writing in the Sunday Times, said:
The only opponents of Polaris today appear to be the Labour Party, who have yet to declare without equivocation what they would do with it".
We have been told that a Labour Government would renegotiate the Polaris agreement. That is not good enough. The Opposition must be more forthcoming if they are to convince the electorate that they are sincere in this matter. At the moment, the detection of the Polaris weapon seems remote, but in time detection of these submarines may be brought about by the laser light, or similar means. In the unlikely event of that taking place, the TSR2 might be an insurance.
If we are to have the Polaris submarine as part of our deterrent, I should like to know what is being done about oceanic research. I question whether we can do much to discover what is at the bottom of the oceans. Like the Russians, our American friends are spending vast sums on this form of research, and I should like to know whether they are informing us of their discoveries. I feel that at present the interchange of information is a one-way traffic. I should like to be assured that we are getting this information from the United States.
We are told that the French are building a Polaris type of submarine, and are also adapting the Mirage bomber to carry a nuclear weapon. If General de Gaulle lives long enough to build his submarines and bombers it will be a serious matter if the British have then not got a deterrent. It is important that we should have it. If we give it up tomorrow it will not make an iota of difference to General de Gaulle or the Chinese. All that would happen is that we would be placed in an inferior position.
It is no good hon. Members opposite talking about "the chair at the top of the table." This problem goes much deeper than that. I am concerned about the future. What we must achieve is real disarmament, and to do that we shall

have to proceed by negotiation, step by step. I am sure that Britain can play a bigger part in these negotiations if she has a deterrent. I have on many occasions seen Britain bring her influence to bear. In Indo-China, a year or two ago, she virtually prevented the spread of war. Britain can bring a tremendous influence to bear. While we have a negotiations liaison with the Strategic Air Force, although we are not equals we are considered by the Americans to be worth-while partners. At least, the Americans to whom I have spoken think so.
Our five Polaris submarines will take considerable manning and maintenance. Are we satisfied that sufficient is being done to get the right men and to train them, even in the five or six years available, to the high degree of efficiency that is required? Recruitment is not good. There are so many industrial openings available for our young men that a special reason is needed before any of them wants to join the Services. It may be a desire to travel. In any event, it will probably become increasingly difficult to recruit young men. Today the pay in the Armed Forces is almost comparable to that in industry. Nevertheless, this problem will continue to confront us. It was suggested yesterday that it would help if we had more married quarters for our young men. I should like to know whether the Government think that we shall have the men available to man the submarines when they come into operation.
I read somewhere that the right hon. Member for Belper was of the opinion that the Polaris weapon was 2,500 times more powerful than the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima. If that is true, five submarines will probably be sufficient to do the job that we have in mind. The whole purpose of the deterrent is not to use it; if it were to be used both sides would be finished. The right hon. Gentleman has said that our V-bombers have not yet gone to war, or been involved in the threat of war. Neither have the American Polaris submarines, but the Americans are satisfied that they are effective.
Hon. Members opposite are now trying to persuade the country that they


are fairly well together on questions relating to defence, and that they would be quite happy to leave the defence of this country to the Americans. That is all right as far as it goes, but in that case they should remember that the Americans would wish to retain their aircraft bases in Britain and also their nuclear submarine base in Holy Loch. I should like to know whether hon. Members opposite are united in the view that the Americans should be allowed to retain their submarine base in Holy Loch. I question whether they are. Those hon. Members who sit on the back benches opposite are not in their places at the moment, but I should like to hear from them how they feel about this matter. They should let the country know what they think.
I know that hon. Members on this side of the House have their differences, but we are nothing like as divided on important matters involving the defence of our country as are the members of the Labour Party. I see that the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) has just entered the Chamber. I should like to know whether, in the unlikely event of his party coming to power, he would he happy to see the Americans continuing to operate their nuclear submarines from Holy Loch. Would the hon. Member welcome that, if the Labour Party were in power? The hon. Gentleman does not seem to understand my question.

Mr. R. T. Paget: The hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey) should not "pull that gag" after the speech yesterday of his right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones).

Sir A. V. Harvey: My right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones) comes to the House—I wish that he were present this afternoon—every six or eight weeks and makes a speech against the Government—

Mr. Paget: And a very good one, too.

Sir A. V. Harvey: —but it is interesting to note that when my right hon. Friend was Minister of Supply he ordered the very weapons which he now wishes to get rid of.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: rose—

Sir A. V. Harvey: I shall be interested to see how my right hon. Friend votes tonight and what he will put in his election address if he stands again for Hall Green.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: I merely wanted to ask the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey) whether he would be quite so enthusiastic about Polaris bases if he had them in his constituency, in view of the increase in the illegitimate birth rate and in the incidence of venereal disease?

Sir A. V. Harvey: I understand what the hon. Member for South Ayrshire (Mr. Emrys Hughes) is doing. He is evading my real question. Unfortunately, at Macclesfield we have only a canal. The hon. Gentleman is evading the question.
Reference has been made to helicopters. I hope that when my right hon. Friend considers this matter he will try to give a break to Short Bros. and Harland. The Government own 25 per cent. of that company. I have no axe to grind regarding the type of helicopter to be ordered, but I hope that Northern Ireland will get a break, all things being equal. More trouble has occurred in Indonesia this week. Things seem to be "brewing up" there again, and in that area men are useless without helicopters. They are almost as important as guns. It would be of no avail to send out 9,000 men to strengthen the forces there without providing helicopters. It has been said that we shall be short of helicopter pilots. I suggest that more use be made of Royal Marines as pilots. It is a job which they could do very well.
Unified control is something which will have to be considered by my right hon. Friend. With the new set-up at the Ministry of Defence, weapons are becoming more costly and complex. Today, it is impossible to estimate the cost of some of the more complicated weapons before the start of a project. The Government should make more use of civilian accountants to act as overseers of production. They would not be able to watch every detail, but they might succeed in preventing some problems from arising. Highly qualified


accountants could act in liaison with the technical men.
Better arrangements for formulating requirements for future weapons are necessary. I hope that my right hon. Friend will bring this about for the three Services. There must be financial control. We have been told what has happened recently, but, as an inquiry is being held, I cannot go into that now. There must be rigid financial control right down to a comparatively low level in the Ministry. I doubt whether my right hon. Friend has that control at present. If not, he should do everything possible to obtain it.
We talk about the enormous defence expenditure, amounting to £2,000 million. But nearly £650 million is spent on pay and I am glad that it is because, it is right that men should be paid the proper rate. A sum of £56 million goes in moving units and families and individual stores. But if my right hon. Friend really wishes to encourage recruitment, he should do something about pensions. After great pressure from hon. Members an improvement has been made in the pensions awarded to widows. But the whole question of pensions reviewing. A captain or a sergeant who retired in the 1930s would today be old men and would find it extremely difficult to live on their meagre pensions.
I am sure that it is right that we should have a professional fighting force even though there may be a small deficiency in its numbers. I am not belittling the part which was played by the National Service men, but it took a great many professionals to teach them during the short period of service which they did. I should like to know from the Leader of the Opposition what is the "form" regarding a multi-national force. We read that the right hon. Member for Smethwick (Mr. Gordon Walker) denied statements which he was said to have made in America. He said that the door should be left open and we should like to know what he meant by that.
We are told the same thing about nationalisation. May we be told a little more of what is meant by right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite and whether they are for or against a multi-national force?

Mr. Mulley: Perhaps I can help the hon. Gentleman. if the Government have been unable to make up their mind, they having access to all the information and having participated in the talks which have taken place, it is a little hard to expect the Opposition to come down hard and fast on this matter. Although my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition has made it clear from such information as we have, we think that a multi-national force is not a good idea.

Sir A. V. Harvey: All the same, it would appear that the Leader of the Opposition and the Shadow Foreign Secretary do not seem to be in step on this matter. It will be interesting to see how it progresses.
This debate arises from a Motion of censure by the Opposition. I noticed last night that when the debate was being wound up from the Opposition Front Bench by the hon. and learned Member ror Northampton (Mr. Paget) there were only three or four other hon. Members on the benches opposite. If the Labour Party is concerned about the defence of Britain it is deplorable that only three or four hon. Members of the Opposition should have been present. The fact is that hon. Members opposite are trying to drag up every little hit of "dirt" against the Government as a build-up before the General Election. But I am convinced that the people of Britain have seen throne, this; they realise that there is a "one-man-band" which is doing everything for hon. Members opposite. The debate has revealed the fallacy of what they are trying to put over to the country.

6.36 p.m.

Mr. Roy Jenkins: The hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey) is a considerable expert on detailed questions of weapons and we listen to him on those subjects with interest. But when he comes to deal with the wider issue of the British deterrent—which attracts us all like a magnet at some stage in our speeches in these debates—I think that the logical structure of his argument was a great deal looser even than that of the arguments which we have heard from some other hon. Members opposite.
I noticed particularly that when the hon. Member was trying to deal with his right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones) he made no attempt to answer the powerful argument which was advanced by the right hon. Member for Hall Green. He merely denounced him for bad attendance and referred to what his right hon. Friend might put in his next election address. I should have been more convinced by a solid argument put against his right hon. Friend.
I wish to refer to the question of the deterrent and the rôle of Britain. I hope that it is not too late to try to do this in non-electoral terms. I do not think that the Minister of Defence did that in his speech yesterday, or that it is something many other Members opposite have done. The right hon. Member for Hall Green was an exception.
It is essential that we should look a little further ahead and decide what should be our aim in the defence sphere. This issue is clouded, if we try to decide too much in terms of catch questions, or questions of any sort, relating to exactly what someone is going to do about a particular weapon in a set of circumstances which have not yet arisen and which cannot be wholly foreseen.
As I see it, the aim of the Government is for all time, and almost at all costs, to retain the façade of the British nuclear independence. That is the long-term aim. I shall come to the practicabilities and possibilities in a moment, but I am quite clear in my mind that the aim I should rather see is a more integrated alliance than ours playing a rôle more geared to deterring possible enemies than competing with our principal allies.
It is important to notice about Government statements on defence policy at present that they are to a most extraordinary extent related not so much to deterrence of possible enemies which, I should have thought, should be the aim of a rational defence policy, but to arguments about what our allies are doing or may do in future. They are more related to whether and the extent to which we can trust the United States; about the refinement of this argument of the extent to which we can appear in the

eyes of other countries to be trusting the United States; about the question of preserving or having a ticket of entry to the top table; and about whether we can contract out if de Gaulle is contracting in.
No doubt de Gaulle will get his bomb, but it is a great fallacy to assume that he will be very much luckier than we have been in the past four or five years about modern, independent means of delivery. I should have thought one would soon come to the position in which de Gaulle and the French would begin to face some of the difficulties we had with Blue Streak and other weapons. I do not think that his will can automatically be equated with his achievement. He may still find great difficulties in the way of making France a fully independent nuclear Power. All the arguments we hear from the Government are related to what our allies are or are not doing and not to any concept of common defence against possible enemy. They are related to a status symbol competition with allies.
There can be no question even in the mind of the Minister of Defence that if we in the West and in the N.A.T.O. area were fully integrated, whether it was a federation or not, no one would suggest that we, as part of the alliance, should assume a separate nuclear rôle and duplicate what is done in those circumstances. The argument looked at from that point of view is a purely political one related to the degree of integration in the alliance and not a military argument.
Looking at it from this point of view, I am impressed by two considerations. I take the view that if this could be achieved by two nuclear Powers only in the expansive sense of the word that would be a safer position. By this means we would avoid the dangers of proliferation and two highly-developed nuclear Powers using nuclear weapons with great sophistication would be safer than other nuclear Powers using simpler, cheaper and, therefore, in a way more dangerous nuclear weapons.
The hon. Member for Macclesfield told us a lot about the V-bomber force, but he did not try in any way to contest that it is a first-strike weapon and is, therefore, more dangerous than something which can be used as a second


strike. Polaris would clearly be an improvement, but even that is only an anti-city weapon. The second consideration we have to have in mind is what effect the nuclear policy on which we in this country decide is likely to have on the world situation and the proliferation of weapons. I should be extremely sceptical of a view that a single gesture of renunciation by this country would automatically bring every one in step behind us. It seems to be a fallacy, based on the view which some of us, on both sides of this House hold, perhaps for historical reasons, that to do so would have influence and that a moral influence could be exercised.

Mr. John Hynd: That probably is a fallacy, but can my hon. Friend tell us whether anyone has expressed this fallacy?

Mr. Jenkins: I agree with my hon. Friend on most things and I am not sure that it is necessary for him to interrupt me on that because I was saying that I regard it as an exaggerated point of view to think that if we made a single gesture of renunciation that would automatically be followed. People have expressed their views on the general unilateralist position, but I do not think that it can help the debate if he and I get into an argument on this particular point.
Although I would not take that extreme view, it seems even less acceptable to take the view which, as I understood, the Minister of Defence put forward quite firmly yesterday that our deciding that our long-term rôle is not as a nuclear Power would have absolutely no effect on what anyone else decided to do. That seems a much more exaggerated view than the one expressed in the other direction and it fits very oddly with the view that with or without nuclear weapons we are a great centre of things in the world. Can it really be argued that what we decide to do in this field we have no influence on what Germany does in nuclear policy looking over the next ten years or so?
I should like to see Germany kept non-nuclear, but I do not think that there can be any future in believing that we can indefinitely keep her so on the basis of being different from others of equal power in the alliance. If one starts

from those two propositions it seems rash indeed to say that what we do will have no effect at all on what happens in Germany and a number of other countries. This ties in with the particular dangers of the way in which the Prime Minister has been putting the argument recently. This applies from two points of view. First, there is the point of view of the ticket of admission argument, whether it is the ticket of admission to a conference table or to a top table. This is an argument which by its very nature is bound to be a standing invitation to every other country which can possibly get a nuclear weapon to get it.
I rather regret the argument that it decides whether we are in this situation, but if the Prime Minister convinces people in this country that we are in this situation, does it not occur to him that it will convince Germany as well? If one is talking of high-level East-West talks the conference is most likely to be about Germany and in those circumstances is it not inevitable that we should be encouraging every country which could lay hands on a nuclear weapon and develop one of its own perhaps through the Paris-Bonn axis to do so?
The second aspect, if I correctly understood the Minister of Defence yesterday, is that he shrugs his shoulders and says that nothing we do can have any influence on other nations in going ahead with nuclear deterrents. Because it is technically possible for a number of other countries to do that, presumably his view of the nuclear position is that a few years ahead there will be a substantial number of additional countries which have, at any rate, some sort of deterrent which to some extent they can call their own. What happens to the ticket of admission to the top table when we get into that position? Will the top table be ex tended indefinitely, or is the ticket of admission to apply only to those countries which have nuclear weapons by a particular date which this country chooses to fix?
If one accepts this position, as I understood the Minister of Defence to do yesterday, as something which is bound to arise, as something which it is no good blinking at, as a situation


which is inevitable, the ticket of admission to the top table argument collapses completely, because the ticket of admission is valid only if it is exclusive. If the tickets get into rather general circulation, it is not all that worth while being at the top table.
Therefore, in considering this question, we must have clearly in our minds the sort of world, and the sort of defence structure in the West, which we want to achieve if we can a few years from now. My view is that it should be more integrated, based as little as possible on national nuclear weapons, or, indeed, on national weapons of other sorts.
To propound an aim is not automatically to achieve it. However, it is the case that, if the aim which is propounded is the opposite of the direction in which we really want to go, we shall certainly not get there. The point is not so much what is to be done about particular weapons, but what aim we have in mind in the defence policy and where we would like to go in that direction. I wonder whether it does not disturb the Minister of Defence and the Secretary of State for Air, who this afternoon banged the Dispatch Box and made rather high-sounding chauvinistic remarks about our defence position, our defence aims, and our service to the world in this respect, that most independent commentators outside and most hon. Members opposite, not only the right hon. Member for Hall Green, who try to think seriously and independently on these questions, are not with him on this issue. I therefore think that the Minister of Defence should think a little more carefully.
In my view, what we do about pariticular weapons at a particular time depends on what the world looks like when this decision has to be made, on what sort of response we get to the aims we would like to achieve. In these circumstances we should not rush the decision about what we should do. None of us would rush decisions about the V-bombers. I would not rush decisions about Polaris. Not only the sensible but the courageous answer to the question what is to be done is that one honestly cannot give an absolutely certain answer at present. Many hon. Members know in their own minds, if they think,

not in terms of the hustings, but in terms of the deeper interests of our defence policy and the national interest, that that is a perfectly sensible answer.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown), in his extremely effective and convincing speech, pointed out the dangers of the Government being in a position in which their defence policy seemed to contradict their foreign policy, where in their foreign policy they were standing, to some extent at any rate, for co-operation and for respect for the alliance, whereas in their defence policy they were moving in the other direction towards nationalism, independence, towards a chauvinistic approach to these matters.
It is important that we on this side of the House do not get into the reverse position in which our defence policy points towards integration and our political attitude and our foreign policy point in a different direction. We cannot have an integrated defence policy without accepting the corollary of an integrated foreign policy. We cannot be too attached to national sovereignty. I hope that we shall accept that. Provided that we do so, I think that the attitude of my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper and others of my hon. Friends who have spoken, although people who want to play politics on the issue can go on throwing party points across the Floor of the House, is, in terms of the national interest, a perfectly sensible and defensible attitude.

6.54 p.m.

Sir Thomas Moore: In his long, interesting but somewhat muddled speech, the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. Brown) made a rather curious remark. He said that the Labour Party, if it ever got in, would have greater influence in the councils of the world than the present Government. However, after making that statement, all the rest of his speech was devoted to contradicting that very assertion. I do not think that the length of the right hon. Gentleman's speech was quite justified.
Yesterday, in a most admirable speech, my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence indicated that one of the many problems facing any Minister of Defence today was to preserve the


right balance between traditional, or conventional, forces and nuclear forces. In view of what we all pray is the improbability of a nuclear war and of the growing and increasing demands on our conventional forces, the ratio of 90 per cent. to 10 per cent. seems to me to be reasonable, though I think—my right hon. Friend stressed this fact yesterday and devoted a good deal of his speech to it—that it is important to consider the purpose for which these two forces are required and the rôle that they must play.
As I see it—some may not agree with me—traditional forces are for defence, including police work, while nuclear forces are for attack when that defence fails. Most of us on this side of the House believe, as several speakers have asserted, that there is another and vital purpose for our nuclear forces, and that is simply and plainly to deter any other nuclear power from attacking us. It is obvious from the many speeches made yesterday and today by members of the Opposition that they would prefer to shelter behind the skirts of the United States and, like a subsidiary company in industry, have no voice in framing policy. If the special relationship which we all value so highly continues, that might well be able to work. However, I remind those who draw comfort from this thought that, as was pointed out by my hon. Friend the Member for Louth (Sir C. Osborne), yesterday, Aneurin Bevan did not think that. We all remember his famous description of Britain without her nuclear deterrent going naked into the council chambers of the world.
If the assumptions I have made are correct, I should like to examine how they correspond with the facts as given us and with the proposals made in the White Paper. In passing, I commend the reluctance of Her Majesty's Government to participate in this fantastic, objectionable project of a mixed-manned force. I was very pleased to hear my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister confirming this reluctance the other day. Of all the ideas that have ever emanated from the Pentagon, I think that this is the least well considered. We all appreciate the good intentions behind it, but we all know where good intentions can lead us sometimes.
As Freddie Grisewood would say, let us pass on. I have mentioned, as my right hon. Friend did yesterday, the growing demand on our conventional forces. We are told in the White Paper that we are 95 per cent. up to the target. Does the target quite agree with our needs? This is the problem which worries a number of us. I do not think that it does. After our experience in the last few months, in Kenya, Tanganyika, Cyprus, South-East Asia and elsewhere, I have growing doubts about our ability to discharge all these commitments. I feel that, reluctantly or not, we are approaching the time with this strain going on when we shall have to resort once again to some form of national service.
Someone to whom I mentioned this the other day said, "The Ever-readies are always ready to be used". I cannot agree that they are a good substitute. A young National Service man starts his Service career between times, so to speak, before he has adopted a permanent career and while he is still more or less free and not committed to any definite rôle in life. The "Ever-ready" is probably of fairly substantial age and in a fairly substantial position. It will not only disrupt his life if he has to be dragged out to assist the Regular forces. It will disrupt the economy as a whole.
When National Service was first introduced by the late Hore-Belisha just before the last war, I was an immediate convert to it and to the whole idea, or, rather, to the idea which had first been envisaged by Kipling, of dukes' sons and cooks' sons all mucking in together and learning to get to know each other, having the rough edges of both of them worn off. It seemed to me to be almost the nearest thing to that classless society which appeals to so many.
Somehow, after the war, something went wrong. It apparently began to have a disturbing and unsettling effect on the young soldier and officer. I imagine that the continued tedium and discipline compared ill with the freedom and the fortune which the transient National Service man had already thought out for himself when released into civilian life. I do not think we should let that experience disturb us now, because we know, as my hon.


Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey) reminded us, that there have been extensive increases in pay and gratuities, and there has been a very welcome—although not yet enough—extension of married quarters. I believe that that is very important, because the young, both in civil life and Service life, are marrying younger and, naturally, they want to live together. Therefore, married quarters are one of the things that would primarily attract Regular recruits, especially the younger Regular recruits.
I spent sixteen very happy years in the Regular Army, and I watch with fascinated interest and admiration the amazing transformation that has taken place in the Army. I am referring only to the Army because I have no personal knowledge of the Navy or the Royal Air Force. The development of the personality of the soldier has been made much more a feature of Army life. There is adventure training; in fact, so many things have improved since my day that I cannot understand why recruiting went down in 1963, and I hope that the Minister will explain that.
I am reaching the end of the time I have allotted for my speech, but before closing I should like to add my counsel, if the Minister will receive it, on one or two important matters. The first is in regard to the establishment of the three separate Ministries under one super Minister. It is only commonsense to avoid duplication of separate makes of vehicles and weapons calculated to do the same job, and of bathtubs and doorknobs and what not in different barracks. I would ask my right hon. Friend, however, not to push that integration too far, because there is just a risk, although perhaps a slight one, that we might possibly lessen that esprit de corps which second only to discipline is the most valuable asset in any of the three Services.
I shall not deal with the Navy or the Royal Air Force because a very comprehensive picture has been given in the White Paper of both their position today and what it is likely to be in the future.
As the hon. Member for Birmingham, Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins) indicated,

in the end our military strength must really depend on the success or failure of our foreign policy. We know what our foreign policy is, no matter what Government are in power. It is to establish and to ensure permanent peace throughout the world. The potential enemy threatening that peace is Russia and the Communist bloc—at least that is the common impression. That threat to peace, both on the West and East side of the world, is due, as I have mentioned before, to suspicion and fear.
If we could eliminate this suspicion and fear, it would be possible to make staggering cuts in our defence forces. If we are now set on grasping nettles, we would be well advised to grasp this one and to take Mr. Khrushchev at his word. He has many reasons for wanting peace, too. The whole of his people want peace. I was in Russia for some weeks only a few years ago, and it was the clamant cry of everyone from the highest to the lowest—peace, peace, peace. Therefore, if we take that risk and assume that Mr. Khrushchev is genuine in that he, too, wants peace, I believe that we shall have it. All I ask is that we now send a message to our own Foreign Secretary, to Mr. Dean Rusk and to Mr. Gromyko to back up this noble and sensible idea of having a bonfire of all these vicious and destructive weapons.

Mr. G. Brown: I apologise for interrupting, but I thought that since we were accused this afternoon of wanting to get rid of the V-bombers he might like to say what would happen as a result of his argument.

Sir T. Moore: I am only acting on the very sensible proposal made by Mr. Dean Rusk and supported by our own Foreign Secretary that we make a bonfire of all these destructive weapons, and so, at any rate, give some comfort to an anxious humanity.

7.8 p.m.

Mr. John Hynd: The last words of the hon. Member for Ayr (Sir T. Moore) were enlightening because it seems that the summing up by hon. Members opposite of the Government's policy is that they want to build more and more nuclear weapons so that they can have a bigger and bigger


bonfire. Although that may be a very admirable objective it is a very expensive one. I am not an expert on the quality or otherwise of particular weapons, but the political argument which has run through the debate, and which, I think, is not yet entirely exhausted, may be judged from some of the reactions of the other side of the House.
The Secretary of State for Air, in a rather polemical speech—in contrast to the useful and constructive speech made yesterday by the Minister of Defence, which was appreciated by the whole House, apart from the controversial sections of it—made great play with the need for debate on the key issue of the British nuclear independent weapon in order that the electorate may be clear about the facts involved. The right hon. Gentleman made that plea in a curious way, for he accused the Opposition, of all people, of obfuscating the position by being unclear where they stood on various issues.
We were recently challenged by the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey) as to why the Opposition could not make up their mind on the multinational force question but, as we have heard, the Government themselves are not clear on this matter, let alone the Opposition. Any challenge of that sort is merely a counter-challenge, because no one is completely clear and these sort of challenges cannot possibly help the electorate.
The Secretary of State also tried to throw a lot of mud about by implying that the 1951 defence budget of the Labour Government was almost as high as the present defence budget. He did not explain that the Korean war was going on at the time and that that had a bearing on defence expenditure. When we talk about the size of defence budgets, the effectiveness of our defence forces and other implications at the time of the Korean war, and when we make the same sort of comments about what happened at the time of Suez, we are discussing only an element of defence matters and we should, above all, not deliberately, in party interests, seek to mislead the electorate because we have a much more important rôle to play.
When it is said that the Labour Party's position over nuclear weapons is

only a form of unilateralism, hon. Members opposite must know that that is not true. The word "unilateralism" has a meaning of its own in the present political situation and it has nothing whatever to do with the Labour Party's views about nuclear weapons. To suggest that it has is only confusing the issue. Serious issues like this must on no account be used for party political purposes.
The Minister of Defence tended to shuffle off the significance of our nuclear contribution by saying that, after all, it represented only 5 per cent. of our total Budget. He must know that 5 per cent. of£2,000 million is£100 million. It has been suggested, on the other hand, that the figure should not be 5 per cent. but 10 per cent., in which case the total would be £200 million. Not long ago the Minister was making great play with promises that a Conservative Government, if elected—this was in 1951—would sot about saving£100 million of Government expenditure. One should keep these sums in balance and remember that 5 per cent. is 5 per cent. of a considerable amount of money.
When I intervened earlier on the question of whether if we abandon the bomb everyone else will follow us, my intervention was merely calculated to correct the impression that anyone had supported that idea. There may be this implication in the argument of the unilateralists, but I have never heard it suggested that other countries would follow automatically if we abandoned the bomb. However, that is not really the point. The Minister of Defence said about this yesterday that we should not imagine that if we abandoned our nuclear weapons anyone else would follow because, he said, they would not.
The stage of development of nuclear weapons in France has not yet reached the Blue Streak point. They may ultimately approach something like the degree of obsolescence which many of our projects have reached, but whether or not they will reach an effective state of nuclear defence which is independent is another question. Is not our insistence on having our own unilateral so-called independent weapon an encouragement or assistance to General de Gaulle?
Are we not encouraging him in his policy, which is not aimed at the


creation of a nuclear weapon which depends on an American warhead, but on a completely independent French nuclear weapon? If he should achieve that position, our semi-independent weapon will not ensure us a place at the top table if, as the Government appear to imagine, the top table will be reserved for those with the most powerful weapons.
We must not get the idea that General de Gaulle is the only man in France. He may often appear to be, but I can assure the House that powerful voices are being raised in France against his policy. One of the defences of his policy is precisely the fact that Britain insists on having her own independent weapon. It must be remembered that there is a strong challenge to General de Gaulle's policy in France and that we should be assisting the critics of his policy rather than making it more difficult for them.
Germany is not now the owner of nuclear weapons. It is bound, under the Treaty, not to produce or store any of her own. It is part of N.A.T.O. and is responsible for its part in the common defence of Europe; and that includes the establishment of nuclear weapons on German soil. Despite some of the statements that are made from time to time and which, I can assure hon. Members, have no basis in anything other than Communist propaganda, Germany is quite satisfield with its present position. There is no evidence to prove that there is any important or responsible voice in that country demanding that Germany should reach a position of independence in nuclear weapons.
If not only Britain but France, within the European Community, becomes an independent nuclear Power, will it be possible for Germany to maintain her present position, because at present the balance of forces in the European Community is a balance between France and Germany? If France will be the single dominating partner by being the only one with nuclear weapons, it will not be surprising if voices are raised in Germany insisting that Germany, equally, should sit at the top table.
It is interesting to note, in the present situation, that whereas France is the only country in the Community which

is developing an independent nuclear weapon, it is not France which leads the Community, but Germany. France may be in a position to try to dictate, or sometimes even effectively to dictate, the policy of the Community, but it is Germany to which the other members look for an effective lead against that domination. This shows that it is the German influence and example which is more copied in the Community than that of the country which is building up its own nuclear weapons.
The Minister of Defence said yesterday that we should not imagine that we could abandon our own nuclear weapons and get control of other people's weapons, for we could not. He explained that by the control of other people's weapons he meant a share in the policy decisions. That was a surprising statement, particularly in view of the remarks of the hon. Member for Ayr (Sir T. Moore) that we would be becoming a kind of second-rate subsidiary of a commercial enterprise.
Is N.A.T.O. an alliance or is it not? It has been said that we would be entirely dependent on the Americans and that we would not have a say in policy decisions. If N.A.T.O. is an effective alliance, then surely we must have a say, and insist on a say, in its policy. Hon. Members must agree that there is a considerable sharing of the making of policy decisions in N.A.T.O. about nuclear and other weapons. What disturbs me and most of my colleagues is the Government's insistence that the present nuclear deterrent of the West is entirely an American one. I think that it was the Minister of Aviation who said that the Labour Party accepted that the deterrent should be only an American one, but it is not just an American deterrent. It is also a N.A.T.O. deterrent, and, although much of it is reserved for American purposes, the N.A.T.O. deterrent is at the disposal of the N.A.T.O. Alliance, and each member of that alliance can and should, claim its own responsibility for decisions on the strategy of the weapon.
The Minister then asked whether, if we believed—as evidently he did not—that Great Britain will always have an ally to depend on, our prospective enemies believed that. In other words, he was asking whether, even if we in


Britain are foolish enough to have confidence in our allies, we can expect our enemies to believe that those allies will always be there. In saying that, as hon. Members opposite have said so often, is not the right hon. Gentleman putting into the minds of our prospective enemies, or confirming in them, the thought that the N.A.T.O. Alliance is divided, and that we, as a leading member of the alliance, do not have that confidence in it that we should be expressing on every occasion?
Hon. Members opposite often make the charge that the Labour Party and the Liberal Party tend to play down the country's defence policy, and to play down our country, but it is surely one of the most dangerous things to put in the minds of potential enemies, or into the minds of the country's potential aggressors, that we have no confidence in the N.A.T.O. Alliance. That alliance is, indeed, our only sure defence, and the only sure defence of the rest of the Western word.
Sufficient has been said of the prestige value of this weapon to make it unnecessary to say very much more, but, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) pointed out, never before has a British Prime Minister used the argument that we are piling up this so-called independent deterrent, and spending on it£100 million or£200 million—which might well be devoted to the greater efficiency of other branches of the Services—entirely because we want to ensure our prestige, and our place at the conference table.
I do not think that the Minister of Defence would suggest that Western Germany is without influence on American policy at present—indeed, the feeling is growing that Western Germany has greater influence on American policy than we have—but, far from having the independent deterrent, Western Germany neither has it, nor plans for having it.
At the time of the Suez affair, the fact that we had the knowledge to create a nuclear deterrent, and were developing one, did not prevent the Americans from telling us that they would not support us in that adventure. Hon. Members opposite, and particularly the Secretary of State for Air, may say that one of the main purposes of the deterrent is to prevent ourselves from being black-

mailed by a potential enemy in some other smell affair of that kind, but did not Mr. Khrushchev's threat over Suez have any effect? I am sure that hon. Members opposite will chorus, "No", but everyone knows that at that time we were deserted by most of our own allies and the Commonwealth, and threatened by a nuclear Power, so we called the thing off. It is, therefore, no use hon. Members opposite suggesting that the bomb is the thing that matters for prestige.
Much has been said in this debate that I and many of my hon. Friends will endorse about the valuable contribution to maintaining peace and saving democracy made by British conventional forces. Those forces are certainly playing a prominent part in that respect. But is not the most effective contribution we can make the fact that we are the only single country in the Western Alliance, outside the United States, that is capable of sending so many forces to so many parts of the world in such a short space of time? Can that be written off by anyone, including our own allies? Is not our ability to play this rôle the finest guarantee of our prestige in the alliance?
I suggest that we could play that rôle much better if we were not burdened by this idea that we can spend our resources on weapons that are 2 per cent.—or whatever may be the percentage—of the total nuclear deterrent of the West, but 2 per cent. of an already existing surplus. If it were 2 per cent. of what was necessary, that would be one thing but everyone knows that it is 2 per cent. of something that is already overwhelmingly in surplus.
I do not particularly want to develop arguments on Polaris and the multinational farce, because these are matters of great technical complication on which we have not yet had enough experience to form positive views. I myself am convinced that Polaris is positively the most effective deterrent that exists. If we have to play our part by providing the bases and the facilities for Polaris, and learning the "know-how", and all the rest of it, I am all for it, but I cannot see that we are doing anything particularly effective by seeking to have the Union Jack painted on five of the hulls. That, again, is merely a question


of confidence or no confidence in our allies.
The multi-national force is a very good experiment. It is a fine thing to bring the people of the Western Alliance —indeed, all peoples of the world—together on all possible occasions, and in the context of Western defence it is fine to see how it will work out. Whether it would work effectively is another matter. I am undecided about that, as I think most of my colleagues are, as well as hon. Members opposite and the Government themselves. However, I have nothing against it, and I am sure that most of my colleagues feel the same way about it.
I am more concerned about whether we are not taking on too much in Africa, the Far East, Cyprus, the Middle East and elsewhere. Are we not getting too far stretched? Some might suggest conscription at this stage, but that is not the answer. I do not think that people will stand for conscription in peace-time and in present conditions; they do not believe it to be essential for the defences of the Western world. To talk about the unilateral defence of the country without reference to the N.A.T.O. partnership is another matter, but what our people want, and what they are prepared to support, is the maximum contribution to our own defence and the common defence of the West that can be borne in the circumstances in which the country finds itself throughout the world.
Britannia no longer rules the waves —certainly not on her own. Once upon a time she did, and once upon a time it was desirable and necessary that the British Navy should be used, and that British troops should be landed and protected by the Royal Navy in places like the Persian Gulf, Aden and Singapore. There were many reasons for that. We first went to the Persian Gulf to suppress piracy. Later, we went there to protect the oil interests. Are we still there to protect that coast against piracy? If we are, I can only say that it is not the particular responsibility of this country, but the much wider responsibility of the West or of the United Nations.
If we are there to protect the oil wells, are we protecting them by being there? Are we not by our presence inciting a lot of revolts? We can suppress those revolts, but we in no way assist our oil interests, as we know from our experience in Persia, and Egypt, and from our experience of the Iraqi oil wells. When we had a Labour Government in power and there arose the question of Persia nationalising these interests, we did not send out gun boats, or use force to protect the oil interests. We withdrew and negotiated new agreements with the Persians and we are still getting the oil. The Persians are getting a better deal, our interests are entirely safe, and we are on better terms with them.
In the Suez affair we took the opposite course. We sent out our forces to try and protect our interests then we withdrew them and we made great enemies of the Egyptians. Are we doing the same kind of thing in the Persian Gulf? Are there places in the world about which we should consider whether we ought to be there at all?
Should we still be in Cyprus? It was necessary that we should go there in fulfilment of our part of the Treaty. What has happened since? Makarios and the Greek authorities in Cyprus have told us that we are sending too many troops. They are going to tell us how many should be there. They are going to control the troops. They have demanded a United Nations force, which cannot be provided. Cyprus will not accept a N.A.T.O. force, so we are "holding the baby" once again in an impossible situation, where we are attacked on all sides and are prevented from taking effective action to protect ourselves, let alone keep order in Cyprus.
Is it not time that we said to the Cyprus authorities that we are not "holding the baby" any longer, that conditions are impossible and, therefore, we are withdrawing and they should get on with it? Somebody else will then have to do something. I do not know, but it might be Turkey, but, certainly, the United Nations will have a responsibility which it must face. We must consider carefully whether we are not letting ourselves in for far too much in some of these circumstances.
To summarise, the position of the Labour Party has been made perfectly clear with regard to the deterrent, the Polaris submarine, the renegotiation of the Nassau Agreement, the argument about prestige, and the stand against the so-called independent deterrent because we do not want to give anyone any excuse for trying to follow us in the proliferation of this dangerous weapon. Our real rôle and the contribution that we can make is limited by our resources and our position in the world. We should have a complete review of defence equipment and capacities in that relation. If that were done we could play a more effective and positive part in the defence of peace and democracy through the N.A.T.O. Alliance.

7.33 p. m.

Sir John Eden: Quite properly, questions concerned with Britain's nuclear deterrent have dominated the debate. This and the associated issue of what should be Britain's foreign policy are the overriding issues with which we are concerned. Before one can answer questions about the deterrent, or what the deterrent policy should be, one must first try to answer the question about what we expect from Britain; what sort of rôle do we expect Britain to play in the world?
I have tried to summarise some of the points which I regard as being important in answering this question. The first is to protect British interests. The second is to support, strengthen and widen our alliances. The third is to help our friends when called upon to do so and to bring assistance when required, particularly to those with whom we have treaty obligations. The fourth is to contribute to the maintenance of world peace by resisting tyranny and upholding law and order. The fifth is to continue to play a leading part, justified by our native genius and by our experience as a world Power, in helping to solve major world problems.
These five important points which I expect to see as the objectives of British foreign policy have been very well lived up to over recent months and years. This has been particularly the case in the last few months when British Forces have been called upon in many instances to fulfil a major and

peace-keeping rôle in various parts of the world. I would emphasise to those who seek to further the alliance aspect of our rôle that it is British troops who have been called in in every case. It is British troops who have been called upon in East Africa. British troops are at present in Cyprus, in British Guiana, and in Malaysia. Throughout all these incidents British troops have been called upon to fulfil this particularly difficult rôle.
It is hoped, of course, that in days to come it will be automatic that others will be alongside us in many of these sorts of commitments. We are not dealing entirely with British dependent territories. We are also concerned in supporting independent nations, and they can call for assistance from whomsoever they please. The fact is that we are best equipped both mentally and physically to fulfil this rôle, but I hope, particularly in Cyprus, that the day will not be far removed when we shall have some evidence of other countries in active support of us there.
If British troops are to continue to do this sort of duty, which I believe they will be called upon to do for many years to come, two things are vital. The first is that they are equipped with the best possible equipment to discharge their duties.
This brings me to the whole question of hardware and the supply of various equipment for our. Armed Forces. Inevitably, it involves us in producing a very wide range of equipment. In the first place, to ensure a high degree of mobility, these forces have to be carried and they have to be supported by air transport and other means of transport. They have to be mobile in the local areas in which they are required to operate, which means helicopters as well as other forms of transport. In many instances, they will need further support from the sea, which requires carriers and so on. We therefore at once get into a very wide range of aircraft and different forms of defensive equipment to protect the aircraft themselves.
I was sorry to hear from my right hon. Friend the Minister of Defence that he was not able to achieve a common aircraft for the replacement of the Sea Vixen and the Hunter, but I am relieved


to know that the P.1154 is at least to go ahead, although, like others, I should like greater detail about how definite this decision really is. I could not help a wry smile when I heard my right hon. Friend yesterday mentioning that we are in the forefront in the development of vertical take-off. We have been in that position for a very long time. I know that it is terribly difficult to arrive at decisions on these highly complicated forms of equipment, but I hope that when we have some clear lead and some breakthrough, as we have had in this case, in developments in future we shall have some machinery to come to a more rapid decision so that at least we have the opportunity to take full advantage of the lead that we have gained.
I wonder why we were not able to find a common aircraft. My right hon. Friend referred to weight. I would not attempt to quarrel with any of the technical judgments involved here because I do not begin to know about them or understand them, but I wonder whether the actual requirements written by the Navy and the Air Force were too stringent or too far-reaching or whether, had each been satisfied with or prepared to accept something slightly simpler, we might have got it out of the frame of the P1154, or the 1127 as it now is.
I hope that we shall follow my right hon. Friend's indication yesterday that we are to go for slightly simpler operational requirements so that we may have quicker decisions and not have the sort of delay we have had in regard to VTOL and the question of the light helicopter for the Army. It is common knowledge that the Army has been waiting for the helicopter for a very long time, and I should have thought that it was not a very grave decision to take.
The Opposition have moved an Amendment in which they accuse the Government of having
failed to produce an adequate defence policy and provide forces to meet the nation's needs".
In fact, we have been doing rather more than meet the nation's needs. We have been providing forces to meet the needs of many other nations besides our own. The mere evidence of where British troops are currently engaged emphasises this. In addition, of course, we have

been providing forces to meet the needs of our North Atlantic Treaty Alliance as well as the South East Asia Treaty Organisation and CENTO.

Mr. Healey: indicated dissent.

Sir J. Eden: The hon. Gentleman shakes his head. It is not necessary just to have troops on the spot in Germany in order to fulfil our obligations to N.A.T.O. British troops in Cyprus are currently fulfilling our obligations to N.A.T.O. British troops in East Africa fill an obligation to N.A.T.O., as did our troops in the Persian Gulf and the Kuwait operation. These are all primary concerns of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. It is not just a coincidence, but there are major historical reasons why British troops, and British troops only or primarily, are engaged in peripheral operations of this sort which are of vital significance to the central organisations of the Western Alliance.
If British troops are engaged so widely over the world, it becomes even more important that they be absolutely assured of the defence of their base. When British troops are engaged in far-flung theatres of war, it is vital that they do not have constantly to look over their shoulder, being concerned about the security of the defences of these islands. This is why, most importantly, we need to continue an effective nuclear deterrent, for it is the possession of—[Laughter.] The hon. Member for Dudley (Mr. Wigg) gives his usual mocking laugh—

Mr. John Hall: Guffaw.

Sir J. Eden: —or guffaw, but British troops do not regard this in terms of ridicule as he does. They are very happy to know that, in the likelihood of any major threat against these islands, there is the potential here of being able to meet it. It is vital that we continue to possess an effective deterrent in this country, in British possession, for so long as we can envisage British troops being engaged in operations overseas. This is a prime military reason for possessing a nuclear deterrent, but, of course, there are also strong political grounds for doing so.
Hon. and right hon. Members opposite do not like references to the conference table. They do not like to be


reminded of, or to be asked to support, aspects of British prestige. I can quite understand that. The Labour Party has never exactly been in the forefront of upholding the prestige of Britain—

Mr. Wigg: Suez?

Sir J. Eden: —and, if they came to power, right hon. and hon. Members opposite would, no doubt, behave in the same way again in eroding some of this country's greatness. But the fact remains that, if we were today to remove from British possession the nuclear deterrent, gradually we should move to the position of not controlling our own foreign policy. It is not so much a military matter as a political matter that is at stake here. In a very short time, we should find the United States of America heeding our advice and opinions less and less and dominating the discussion more and more.

Mr. Wigg: Cuba?

Sir J. Eden: In the Cuba situation, as the hor. Gentleman should know, the United States was extremely grateful for the presence and alertness of the V-bomber force and for the contribution —[Laughter.]—that is absolutely true—

Mr. Wigg: Oh, dear.

Sir J. Eden: —which the British V-bomber force made at that time in effectively helping to talk down the Russians. This, of course, was a clear example of the need for continuing an effective deterrent policy. If hon. Members opposite do not give much credit to it, the Russians certainly did at that time, and they still do today.
If we were to get rid of the nuclear deterrent, as, apparently, the Opposition want to do, it would be the first step in a process of handing over the conduct of our foreign policy to other countries. This would be the obvious result, because the United States would have to have more bases in this country and would have to take over a greater rôle in the defence of this country, or, if it were not the United States which did it, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation or some other organisation or alliance to which we belonged would have to do it, and we should be involved in a process

of gradually diminishing the independence of our foreign policy.
This may come about in the course of events in any case. This is what we are striving for in due time. When we talk about the Atlantic Alliance or, in a more localised sphere, of European union, political union and so on, we are accepting a diminution in our independence and accepting the fact that, in course of time, we shall be handing over certain aspects of our independence to wider organisations and other bodies. But what seek to emphasise now is that this is not likely to come about today or tomorrow. It is not present reality.
The political union of Europe is still a very long way off, and the political union of the Atlantic Alliance is even further. Although we may wish and strive for it, while it is such a long way off we should be doing ourselves a great deal of harm if we were unilaterally to divest ourselves of elements of power which we now have. Not only should we be doing ourselves a great deal of harm and affecting others inasmuch as we should not be able to fulfil our obligations so well, but we should be working even against the interests of the Labour Party were the Opposition ever to come to power.
The right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) said today, as I understood him, that he wanted to see whether we could use Polaris or the British nuclear deterrent in order to secure a better position in the alliance, or words to that effect. He saw it as some kind of bargaining counter to improve our standing within the alliance, within the new organisation of defence in the Atlantic which, apparently, will come about overnight once he and his right hon. and hon. Friends come into power.
But the right hon. Gentleman has gone about this in the most extraordinary way. He declared his intention this afternoon of renegotiating the Polaris Agreement, but has made it perfectly clear to all of us that if when his party comes to power there is only one Polaris submarine built that is the end for the submarine programme and for the British nuclear deterrent. He and others have declared that they are not in favour of the British nuclear deterrent. Yet, if they come to power they


will use the deterrent forces, such as they find, to secure a better position in the alliance vis-à-vis the United States.
It is a most extraordinary way to start off a bargaining position by declaring that one does not believe in the thinking which one is trying to use as a bargaining counter. In industry, I have some association with a company which seeks to promote mergers and amalgamations. When companies seek to merge, it leads to a number of delicate situations, but if one company knows that in the end it will be virtually absorbed in a bigger organisation it does not start by chucking away all its assets at the negotiating table. This is what the right hon. Member for Belper and other leaders of the Labour Party are inviting us to do.

Mr. Wigg: rose—

Sir J. Eden: I will not give way to the hon. Gentleman.
I do not believe that hon. Members opposite know how important a step it is that they are proposing to take. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins) made a very interesting speech and gave us his views about the British deterrent. He, too, hoped that in due course we should find our way into alliances in Europe and elsewhere. But until we get into that position we must face the fact that we have to rely primarily on ourselves and our own equipment to defend this country.
Hon. Members opposite have sought to bait me with the cry of "Suez". I am glad that they reminded me of Suez, because one thing which is clear, as was said earlier, is that, in spite of the fact that we were a nuclear Power and were on very close terms with the United States, the support of the United States could not have been guaranteed at that time. It is important that, in circumstances as we can envisage them taking shape in future, we should prepare ourselves for every possible likelihood and eventuality.
Since Suez, both sides of the Atlantic have gone a very long way. There has been a great improvement in the machinery for defence organisation and planning and also in the unified approach of our foreign policy generally. I do not envisage a comparable

situation to the Suez episode arising again. But what I do see arising is the need for British forces to be effectively protected. That protection can be guaranteed only if they know that this country is secure in the likelihood of nuclear attack.

Mr. Healey: Surely what happened at Suez was a precise example of the falsity of the hon. Member's whole basic assumption. Although we had nuclear weapons then, when we were threatened by the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons, according to Mr. Robert Murphy, the British Prime Minister was frightened to death. But our American allies, although strongly disapproving of our local opertions, came in through General Gruenther to offer us the support of their whole nuclear force. I should be confident that that would be so on any other occasion and that a British Prime Minister who sought to rely solely on the British deterrent would be as weak-kneed as the British Prime Minister was at the time of Suez.

Sir J. Eden: The important thing to recognise is that the situation is a changing one. No one can foresee what the circumstances are likely to be in 10, 15 or 20 years' time in which British troops are likely to be engaged. The one thing which the Suez lesson should have taught us is the absolutely vital importance of guaranteeing the adequacy of the shore defences of these islands when British troops are engaged in other parts of the world. That is why we must have a most effective nuclear deterrent system today, and that is why it has been built up since the time of Suez.

Mr. John Hall: My hon. Friend is on an interesting point. When the Russians threatened to use nuclear weapons at the time of Suez, does my hon. Friend believe that, if we had been left without American support, either we should have been prepared to use them ourselves against Russia, or that Russia would have thought that we would be prepared to use them?

Sir J. Eden: It is difficult to live the past again. What I am saying is that, as a result of our experiences at the time of Suez, we have successfully built up a strong British nuclear deterrent to


the point where, if a similar situation were to arise again, it would be credible from the Russians' point of view that we had the means to retaliate effectively and to a damaging extent.

Mr. Wigg: Nonsense.

Sir Eden: It is not nonsense. That is the case today with the British V-bomber force, equipped as it is with the stand-off bomb, and as it will be later with the other weapons systems when they come into operation with Polaris.
I should like to say a few words about the multilateral force. It is clear that we have not committed ourselves one way or another on this and that we are discussing the best way of evolving a form of unified command among a number, if not all, European nations. I hope that we shall not exclude from our consideration the possibility of creating a unified command structure using the existing V-bomber force as a nucleus. This is a force committed to N.A.T.O. Already we have a joint nuclear command structure in N.A.T.O. Already we have joint planning at Omaha. This could well be the best way of bringing the other countries into the general planning and targeting arrangements of our nuclear force.
When one considers the general policy of the Labour Party, I think that one is bound to conclude that, if it were now responsible for the course of events, for the maintenance of our position in the world and for the equipping of our forces, it would not leave this country in the strongest position effectively to negotiate with friends and others in building up alliances. This is the aspect which I view with great concern, because not only is the possession of the nuclear weapon system by Britain vitally important from the military point of view, but it is also of very great significance in ensuring that we discharge effectively our obligations to other nations as well as to our own.
This we have been doing under the Conservative Government. We have very effective equipment, and we have more coming along. Of course, it is expensive and complicated, but we have produced a policy. We are discharging that policy most effectively, and I see no

justification for the Amendment. I shall certainly support my right hon. Friend tonight.

7.59 p.m.

Mr. John Morris: I hope to deal with some of the points raised by the hon. Member for Bournemouth, West (Sir J. Eden) in next week's debate on the Army Estimates. He is under some illusions. One of them concerns British prestige and his attacks on the Opposition, alleging that we denigrate this country from time to time and lower our prestige. One of the most important confessions that he made was that he did not envisage a situation comparable to Suez occurring again. The point made many times from both sides of the House in the inquest which we had following Cuba was that, despite the possession of nuclear capability by this country, there was not adequate consultation between the United States and ourselves. We had the weapon, but in the course of those crucial weeks we were merely informed by the United States and there was little consultation in fact. The hon. Member might care to refer to our debates on that occasion.

Mr. John Hall: On what ground is the hon. Member saying that there was evidence conclusively to show that there was no adequate consultation between America and this country? I cannot remember such evidence.

Mr. Morris: I invite the hon. Member to refer to our debate in the October following the Cuba crisis. There were attacks from many parts of the House concerning the lack of consultation. I do not propose to go into them now, but the hon. Member may take it from me that strong views were held in the House on that occasion.
I wish to follow the hon. Member for Bournemouth, West, on one point and I hope to deal almost exclusively with the question of the mixed-manned force. The Government have from time to time toyed with this idea. We are told that they are not entirely committed but are merely taking part in trials. I want to deal with the question of the multilateral force and how it fits into the Treaty of Moscow.
One of the major topics of discussion today and for many years has been the question of disarmament and, on a lesser scale, disengagement. Recently, the


Foreign Secretary has gone to Geneva to stiffen up the disarmament negotiations. It is vital for us to try to fit the suggestion of the multilateral force into the philosophy of disarmament as expressed from time to time by the Government, both at Geneva and in the signing of the Treaty of Moscow. That treaty was the practical fruition of the thoughts of many—in fact, all—of us, on both sides of the House, concerning disarmament.
I raised the question of the multilateral force in Paris, at the meeting of Western European Union, when there was a heated argument between delegates from many countries as to whether the proposals before the Western European Assembly concerning the multilateral force should be accepted. As it turned out, the proposal was rejected by a narrow majority, by, I believe, 32 votes to 27. Both sides of the House of Commons were represented at Paris and rejected the proposal which was before the Assembly, although I hasten to explain that there were different reasons for its rejection.
One of the things that I witnessed as a junior delegate at the Assembly was that the German Chairman of the Defence Committee tried to use every possible obstructive tactic to avoid a vote on that crucial issue. Every effort was made to avoid the Assembly coming to a decision. I will not comment further upon this, but it was noted by many of us and it would have been far better on that occasion for a decision to have been taken without those obstructive tactics, which left a sour taste in the mouths of many people.
We all regard the Moscow Treaty as an important step forward. The nuclear Powers realised how important it was for us to arrive at a modus vivendi to avoid the further pollution of the world. That was one of the main purposes of the treaty and it was the realisation by the great nuclear Powers that the mutual terror upon which we have depended for the peace of the world should be stabilised.
Despite the stabilisation arrived at by the Treaty of Moscow, far too many countries are still chasing butterflies and trying to create, develop, extend or buy off the shelf their own personal credible

deterrent and their own sort of personal blackmailing outfit in the nuclear world. The reason why some countries do this is that they are suffering from a number of hallucinations. They want their own status symbol. I will try to deal with the question of countries trying to get this status symbol as a ticket for the top table in nuclear conferences.
The Prime Minister believes that, and my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins) dealt with that argument very ably. The Cuba incident disposes of a great deal of the argument that the mere fact of possession of the nuclear weapons entitles us to full consultation. At the Western European Union Assembly, it was felt strongly by the other countries of Europe, N.A.T.O. Powers, that they were not consulted sufficiently before the Moscow Treaty was signed. The claim by ourselves that we should pursue the independent nuclear rôle is a positive invitation to other European countries to claim the same for themselves. If this is the reason why countries want this independent power, the doubt can be resolved immediately by the United States and Russia saying that there will be no future nuclear peace conference without the presence of the United Kingdom and other countries whether or not they have independent nuclear power. That would cut all the ground from under the Prime Minister's feet.
This is a strange argument. It can be compared with the suggestion that nobody would be entitled to attend a conference to ban cock fighting who did not possess a fighting cock or, similarly, that nobody could attend R.S.P.C.A. conferences who did not practise cruelty to animals. That is the kind of argument which is put forward as regards the suggestion that unless we have the independent nuclear power, we have no right to a seat at the top table.
The greater the number of countries which have a seat at the top table, the more the table must be extended, and in these circumstances the value of the ticket of admission might well be reduced. Ridiculous arguments are put forward for the retention of independent nuclear capacity.
Originally we were told that there might be a mixed-maimed force of submarines. Those of us who have been


to sea in a Polaris submarine know immediately how ridiculous would be a project to have a mixed-manned force in a Polaris submarine. Now, the Government are discussing an armada of surface vessels, the case for which is far from proved. I do not know what would be the result of this aquatic Tower of Babel or whether in the defence of the West this armada would be more effective than the Armada of Philip of Spain. One doubts whether such an idea adds any value to the defence of the West. There are vague hopes in Europe that this armada might be controlled by majority rule. That shows how divorced from reality some of the advocates of this kind of force are.
The two arguments which are being put forward for the multilateral force are that it would increase the credibility of the West and that it satisfies the needs of the West. That is a military argument. When, however, we consider the size of this force, if we add it to the British forces and to whatever forces the French may have, it would amount only to a mere 5 per cent. of the nuclear capability of the West. 95 per cent. the overwhelming bulk of the remainder, would remain in the hands of the United States. It would be a small and second strike force and it would be relatively inaccurate despite recent developments, and it would be used in the main against cities by way of retaliation.
Would this kind of force be sufficient to act alone as a deterrent to put a stop to any activity which would be contrary to our interests? There is obviously a danger, as we have been told in the past, of escalation. If we are first of all using the tactical nuclear weapons, there is the great danger of escalation into the use of the strategic weapon. Similarly I find it extremely difficult to imagine a situation when Britain would be using either her own independent nuclear deterrent or this multilateral force if we had control of it. I cannot conceive of a situation arising whereby we should use it without full consultation with the United States and without inevitably involving the United States and the whole of the rest of the deterrent in war.
We know the immense nuclear capability of the United States. We are told from time to time of the "overkill" which the United States has com-

pared with the forces of the East. Having regard to that "overkill", the question that many of us ask is: what, in military terms, would a multilateral force add to the credibility and value of the Western deterrent?
The real argument for the multilateral force is not a military one but a political one. We are told that it would satisfy, or go a long way to satisfy, the countries in the West which do not have their own nuclear force. But that argument is in direct contrast to the philosophy of the Moscow Treaty. The creation of this type of force would be a direct act of proliferation and contrary to the spirit and the letter of the Moscow Treaty.
As to control of the force, one wonders how far the countries which might participate have thought how effective their control would be in practice. The difficulty all the time is that there is a strange dichotomy between what would amount to possession of nuclear capability and participation in control. That is the difficulty which has not been solved by the West. Even with regard to this fore the possession of the warheads would remain in the hands of the United States. If there was any change, if the warheads themselves were handed to the countries of Europe, and if the control were handed over, that would be a further act contrary to the Moscow Treaty.
The confusion that has arisen is that between participation in control and possession. That is where the countries of the West have gone wrong, and it is at that that we should aim for our future policy—not at independent possession but rather at getting more effective participation in control of the whole of the Western deterrent. There are time factors which militate greatly against effective participation in control. There is the argument about how many fingers there are on the button, and the length of time that will be taken. The greater the number of people who participate, the less credible will it all be in the lime to come. Because of the need for consultation, it may become too late for anyone to take effective action. These are real difficulties, and we should try to solve them. We should aim in that direction. We should draw


up a number of contingencies in which the Western deterrent would be used. That would, of course, not be exhaustive or complete, and there would be residual power to control in the hands of only one participant—the United States. There does not seem to be any way out of that at the moment if the Western deterrent is to remain credible.
But if we aim in that direction and say that we do not really aim at acquiring possession because that would be obviously impracticable and would proliferate the weapon, and that we aim at participation in control instead, and draw up a list of causae belli, that would he a method of aiming at greater anticipation in the use and control of the Western deterrent.
Much more important would be far greater and wider expenditure on conventional troops. I pay tribute, and have done so previously, to what British troops have done in the rôles they have recently been asked to carry out. I am sure that we shall return to that issue in the debate next Thursday. The hon. Member for Bournemouth, West commented on the fact that it was British troops who were called out to the trouble spots. Of course they were British troops, because these were Commonwealth obligations. One hopes that the burden will not all the time fall on us but that we may share it, but it is natural for Commonwealth countries, even independent ones, to call on us first of all, and I take great pride in what British troops have been able to do.
The difficulty is that the part which British troops have been called upon to play has been one of policing duties. If they were asked to play a part in an outbreak of local war, even though I am sure they would do what they could and do it exceedingly effectively, obviously having regard to the fact that so many of them are strung out all over the globe, there would be a severe limit to how long they would be able to participate in any series of substantial local wars.
That is why I feel strongly that we should concentrate more and more on conventional weapons, a need which the West feels, and that there should be

far more and more effective conventional troops. In that way we should be meeting the needs of the West and have a far better chance to participate in the control of all the defences of the West. We should be providing something which is needed rather than something which is not needed having regard to the "overkill" capacity of the United States.

8.18 p.m.

Mr. Stanley R. McMaster: I should like to take up immediately the last remarks of the hon. Member for Aberavon (Mr. Morris). I listened with very great interest to his speech, as I have to all the speeches throughout the debate, particularly the speeches by the hon. Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey), the right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) and the hon. and learned Member for Northampton (Mr. Paget). I was very disappointed by the thoughts and philosophy expressed by the Opposition.
The hon. Member for Aberavon said that we should concentrate more on conventional arms. We are already spending £2,000 million per annum on defence, and less than 10 per cent. of that is spent on the nuclear deterrent, and that figure will, as the Minister of Defence said, fall during the next four or five years—because the heavy part of the equipment, the V-bombers and the Polaris submarines will have been acquired—to about 5 per cent. of our total defence expenditure.
This is a small figure when viewed against the gross national product. Our total defence expenditure is about one-fifth of the gross national product. The gross national product is £20,000 million, and our total public expenditure is £10,000 million a year. We are provided with our defence for about one-fifth of our total public expenditure. To be precise, the figure is between 7 and 8 per cent. of the gross national product, and no hon. Member on either side of the House has suggested that it be reduced in any way.
I hear a murmuring among hon. Members. I have been rounding up the figures to the nearest 10. The total gross national product is about£24,000 million. I have been rounding my figures up for the sake of intelligible comparisons. Defence expenditure is about 7 per cent. of the gross national product,


representing a fall since the Korean War and the end of the Labour Government, when it was about 9 per cent. of the G.N.P. It is less than is spent on defence in the Soviet Union and in many other countries. Our commitments are as great as those of any other country and are spread across the world, stretching from Borneo to Africa and to British Guiana. We are required to send troops to keep the peace in those far-flung parts of the world as well as keen a force in Europe in order to meet the threat there.
My reply to the hon. Member for Aberavon is that, if we did spend the small sum of£150 million to£200 million—now used for the nuclear force—on conventional arms instead, we would get little extra. Yet that small part of our defence budget provides, in my submission, more real defence than the other nine-tenths put together, because it is the nuclear deterrent which has kept the peace since the war. Right hon. and hon. Members opposite, including the right hon. Member for Belper admits that.

Mr. E. G. Willis: I am trying to relate the hon. Gentleman's remarks to what my right hon. Friend said about the nuclear deterrent. It is not the British nuclear deterrent that has kept the peace, but the Western deterrent, of which ours is a small part.

Mr. McMaster: The hon. Gentleman has not altered one bit of what I was saying. I said that it was the nuclear deterrent which had kept the peace. Right hon. and hon. Members opposite have made conflicting comments in the debate. They admit that the nuclear deterrent keeps the peace. They will not say that we should abandon our contribution to it. They do say that we should abandon our independent deterrent. Some of them also question whether our deterrent is truly independent, but that is beside the point.
I do not see logic in the Opposition's argument. If we are to make a contribution to the West's nuclear deterrent, but abandon that bit over which we feel we have independent control, while, at the same time, we spend about the same amount of money on a contribution to the West, what do we gain? There is

great illogicality and lack of frankness by hon. Members opposite on this issue.
From the constituency point of view, I am gravely concerned at the lack of precision by the Labour Party. It criticises the White Paper, but puts forward no alternative. We are within months of an election and many workers in my constituency, both at Harland and Wolff and at Short Brothers and Harland, are concerned with the details of the Labour defence programme. But we have not heard a word in the debate about that programme. The greater part of the time has been spent by hon. Members opposite on generalisations, which I have heard repeated time and again, about whether the nuclear deterrent should be independent or not.

Mr. Leslie Spriggs (St. Helens): Did not the hon. Gentleman hear the Minister of Defence tell us yesterday that the Government were ordering helicopters from a foreign Power? Is not he aware that he has in his constituency an aircraft firm with a first-class team of technical experts who would be able to provide us with all the helicopters we need—indeed, could have done so years ago if their firm, Short, Bros. and Harland, had been given the green light to serve the country with machines, which would also have saved valuable foreign currency?

Mr. McMaster: I do not think that any hon. Member would expect me to make a speech without referring to my constituency interest. But I do not think that that was a very intelligent interruption and it does not help us a great deal. I shall deal with that matter, but I prefer my speech to follow some kind of logical sequence. I hope that the hon. Member will forgive me if I do not deal with it at once.
The Defence White Paper recalls the decision, announced last year, to build a new aircraft carrier. I ask the Government to consider this decision again. I am confide ice that the Conservative Party will be returned to power and that, therefore, it will be our decision to make.
It has been decided to have one new carrier to replace the four rapidly ageing carriers in service and the one undergoing refit. That seems to be inadequate. It has already been pointed out


in the debate that we are losing our overseas bases. Perhaps we shall not have a base in the Mediterranean in five years time. If we do lose our overseas bases then we shall need floating bases to carry troops and aircraft to meet the danger of "brush fires". I believe that the minimum carrier replacement should be two new vessels so that we could have one at least in the Far East and another in home waters.
I have, of course, a constituency interest in this matter. Many of our aircraft carriers were built at Harland and Wolff. Many workers at the firm live in my constituency and have suffered severe redundancy during the past four or five years. They are particularly interested in this matter. It has not been mentioned by hon. Members opposite, however.

Mr. Spriggs: rose—

Mr. McMaster: I shall not give way. The last interruption by the hon. Gentleman was too long, and there are many other hon. Members who wish to speak.
I should like the defence budget to be used to help to develop a British nuclear engine. Perhaps one of the two new aircraft carriers which I suggest might be powered by such engines. At the moment, it is only the Polaris submarines being built here which are to be so powered, but the defence budget could be used to give Britain the "know-how" for building and installing nuclear power plants in surface vessels, something which has a wide civil as well as defence application. Many such vessels are already being built in the United States and elsewhere, including Russia.
I should like to take issue with my right hon. Friend. He said that this country must practise moderation in operational requirements and technical solutions. I feel very strongly that, with its small defence budget, this country can afford to have nothing but the best equipment. It is no use having second rate. We have a very small amount of money and a very small Army, less than 500,000, and it must have the best equipment, because if it comes to war, even a "brush fire", we might be facing enemies equipped by Russia, which has huge

sums of money to spend on the best equipment. It would be a waste to engage in any programme which accepted equipment which was not the most modern in the world.
Finally, I come to the question of the need for greater mobility. There has been a great deal of discussion during the debate of R.A.F. requirements, with which the Defence White Paper also dealt. I want to mention several aircraft of which the first is the HS681, which is a tactical transport aircraft. This stems from a decision taken a year ago. The Minister of Defence said that a substantial part of the work was to go to Short Brothers and Harland. Can some of the research and development work be done there? What does my right hon. Friend mean by a substantial part? Does he mean one-third or one-half of the construction of the plane? Unless a proportion such as one-third is given to Short Bros. and Harland, it will not be a viable and feasible proposition. To give less than one-quarter or one-fifth would make a nonsense of the whole suggestion. To make it worth while at least one-third or one-quarter of the work should be carried out in Belfast.
In the meantime, as there has been a delay in deciding which engine should power this plane, I draw my right hon. Friend's attention to the use of the Belfast freighter aircraft, which has just made its maiden flight, for this tactical rôle. Short Bros. and Harland has pointed out that the take-off and landing distances of this aircraft are very short and that it is capable of carrying bulky loads and meeting tactical as well as strategic requirements. In this way it meets Recommendation No. 5 of the Second Report of the Estimates Committee, which was:
Future plans for transport aircraft requirements for the R.A.F. should be based on the principle that as few aircraft types as possible should be in service at any time.
The use of an aircraft such as the Belfast freighter for two purposes, which it is perfectly capable of performing, would help to meet that recommendation.
I should also like my right hon. Friend to consider whether there is not a use for the turbo-prop Skyvan. This plane has been given the go-ahead


within the last week. It is a small aircraft which is capable of carrying troops and stores and equipment to forward areas and of meeting a definite Army need. There is a potential of civil orders for it, but a small defence requirement would help to sell the aircraft abroad to meet the military needs of this and other Commonwealth and foreign countries.
I want to say a few words about the Hiller helicopter. My right hon. Friend has stated that it is being considered and that he hopes to announce his decision early next week. I have carefully studied the specifications of the Hiller, the Bell and the Hughes helicopters—the last of which my right hon. Friend has said is not now being considered—and I notice that in range, performance and operational height the Hiller and the Bell are comparable. However, there are two or three considerations which I should like to bring to my right hon. Friend's attention. I will not go into details of performance, but I believe that they are similar aircraft in this respect.
The Bell Company has licensed European production to the Augusta Company in Italy, and Westlands has an association with that company. If the order was placed for the Bell helicopter it would presumably be assembled by Westlands for use by our Armed Forces. A licence fee might have to be paid to Augusta and some parts might have to be bought from it, and this would increase our import bill, which is already running rather high. Further, there would be no export potentiality.
As its chairman said recently, the Westland Company is doing a lot of work on helicopters, and it has a full labour force and labour programme. The Hiller helicopter is used slightly more extensively by the American Air Force and the American Navy. It is already being used by our Navy, and the Army is receiving training in it. It would, therefore, seem logical to order the Hiller. The Hiller is also capable of more stretch than is the Bell, and it can be adapted—as it has been by the Canadian Army—for use with a turbine engine.
I admit that I am now expressing a view which takes into account my constituents and their employment, and I

would expect other hon. Members to express an opposite view if they feel like it; but I ask my right hon. Friend to bear there important considerations in mind. The Hiller is capable of stretch, and with modifications it can provide three or four places in the cabin. It would be assembled on licence by Short Bros. not only for the Army but to meet any European, African or Commonwealth requirement. This aircraft is already widely used by America, both here and in the Far East. I am sure that before my right hon. Friend reaches a decision next week he will bear these points in mind.
Finally, I come to the question of the strategic transport requirement. Here again, I would refer my hon. and right hon. Friends to the second Report of the Estimates Commitee. In paragraph 40 the Report points out that the Treasury is often the nigger in the woodpile, but with some stringency it charges the Air Ministry with lack of proper advance planning. In the case of a heavy freighter aircraft, such as the Belfast, it takes at least four or five years after the placing of the original orders for the aircraft to come into production. If we carefully consider our requirements and think ahead we realise that the 10 Belfasts already on order will not be adequate to meet our needs in five, six or seven years' time.
It is impossible for this country to equal the United States military transport fleet figures, but it is relevant to point out that the Americans have many of these aircraft. They have the C124, the C130E, the C133, the C135 and the C141A. They have 594 of these aircraft available and over 200 large jet aircraft, with a 10 ft. by 9 ft. hold on order already. Our Transport Command has 172 aircraft, most of which are old and out-dated. We have 71 on order, making a total of 243 against the United States total of 834. The significant fact revealed by comparing the figures is the number of large transport aircraft which the United Slates already have, or have on order.
In view of the mobility requirements of the British forces in the years ahead, particularly at the end of this decade and the beginning of the next, I wonder whether we have been looking sufficiently


far ahead. The Belfast is capable of a great deal of stretch and would take an 18-ft. or 20-ft. propeller and a larger Tyne engine. The company have suggested a jet-engine version. By ordering more aircraft the cost per plane would go down. We have to put the entire development costs against the ten already on order. I suggest that my right hon. Friend considers carefully whether that is sufficient to meet the demands of Transport Command.
Against the cost of the Transport we must offset the fact that if modern equipment is conveyed by sea it is immobilised for weeks and sometimes months. It might well prove an economy to have a small fleet of transport aircraft which could carry almost every item of equipment to any part of the world within hours. This would enable our small defence forces to be sufficiently mobile to meet any demand.
The defence bill of £2,000 million represents a great deal of money. But besides providing vital defence for this country there is as a by-product a great deal of scientific know-how derived from its expenditure. Our communications have been improved and sub-orbital research is going ahead far faster. There are advantages in the sphere of nuclear physics and atomic energy which have resulted from our defence budget expenditure and Britain has been helped to remain in the lead in the scientific field. For these reasons I support the White Paper and disagree strongly with the policy of the party opposite which reveals a lack of ideas.

8.43 p.m.

Mr. Dick Taverne: Before getting to the part of his speech dealing with constituency interests, the hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. MacMaster) made a number of interesting points He asked what difference it would make if we handed over the nuclear deterrent to N.A.T.O. and suggested that this point had not been referred to. He could not have been in the Chamber when my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Stechford (Mr. Roy Jenkins) made his speech. My hon. Friend dealt with the fact extremely well. Our insistence on an independent deterrent makes the proper planning and reorganisation of N.A.T.O. very difficult.
The hon. Member then referred to the question of looking into the possibility of a British nuclear engine for certain ships. I am not sure to which ships he referred, or whether he meant aircraft carriers, but I agree that this is something which we should look into much more closely. For a moment I thought that he was about to deal with a very important and interesting topic which has not been dealt with in the debate—the sort of greater mobility we need.
The tragedy about the debate, perhaps because of the particular insistence of the Government in independent nuclear status, has been that the arguments have been concerned with the rôle of the deterrent and particular weapons. We should consider the question which goes much further—whether we are meeting our commitments in the right way and have the right resources. I want to look at the commitments we have east and south of Suez. We have commitments in the Persian Gulf and, one which is most often stressed, in Kuwait.
I doubt whether a "military umbrella" is the right way to approach the problem of Kuwait. I assume—this certainly applies to other parts of the Gulf—that we have an important commitment there. Also, we have commitments in Africa. The East African commitments which have arisen recently have come as something of a surprise, but I do not think that anyone can imagine it unlikely that that kind of situation will arise again. Quite apart from East Africa it seems probable that at some stage we may face commitments in Southern Africa which will be very serious indeed, particular those in the High Commission Territories.
We have commitments in Malaysia; we are the only major Power with commitments in that area. Our commitments are considerable, but there are weaknesses about the way in which our forces are deployed at present to meet them. A very vital rôle is played by Transport Command. That is our main instrument for getting forces quickly to trouble spots and it is necessary if part of the Strategic Reserve in this country is called on. Our present dependence on flying troops out from the United Kingdom is somewhat unsatisfactory because there is a definite insecurity about access routes.
The main route has been via Libya, Sudan and the Red Sea. During the last few days something has been made clear which should have been clear all along, that this is an extremely uncertain route. We may be faced—it seems we are being faced—with an Arab barrier against use of this route which has been treated as the main route along which Transport Command has operated. Apart from Libya, if there were a change of Government in the Sudan, or a change of attitude there—which is quite possible—that route would no longer be available to us.
There is also the route through Turkey and Persia. That route might be a sort of substitute, but it is not a particularly good one because of high mountains, difficulties of traffic control and the absence of accurate weather forecasts in the area. It is not a particularly safe route, either. There have been a number of accidents and it is quite unsuitable for unpressurised aircraft. There is a world of difference between regular routes where troops are flown out regularly and where a major act of policy would be needed to change the position and a route, such as that over Turkey and Persia, where we should need special permission on each occasion. It is much easier to refuse a request for permission to fly over such a route than to refuse it when it would involve departing from a regularly-established practice.
There have been refusals in the past such as that when the Americans refused permission for the Dutch to fly over a route. I am not criticising this decision, but if we depend on special permission to fly a particular route it is not very satisfactory. It may be that permission would be given if CENTO were involved, but whether it would be for a Far East mission is doubtful.
There is a third route. This is the route through Bathurst in Gambia to the Ascension Islands across Southern Africa. Quite apart from the long hops which this involves, nothing could be more unsatisfactory than having to depend on such a route. It means that we would have to depend on the good will of those countries —Portugal, South Africa and possibly Southern Rhodesia—with which we might well be in conflict if our troops were required in the area concerned. We would have to curry favour, or depend on good will, and perhaps modify our policy to maintain our access routes.
It is, therefore, an extremely unsatisfactory position that this very important area depends on access routes which may not be safe in the future. There are further weaknesses. There is the difficulty of acclimatisation if troops have to be flown out from the United Kingdom, as was shown at Kuwait. The Secretary of State for War at the time did not represent the picture very accurately when he minimised the effect which the sudden change of climate had on our efficiency, when about one-third of the troops from Britain and Germany had to report sick. Clearly, a sudden change in climate severely limits the effectiveness of troops flown straight out from Western Europe.
There is a more important objection. There is a very thin spread, in view of the commitments I have outlined, to cover a very wide area indeed. We have plans at the moment for a brigade group in the theatre reserves at Aden. There is also the brigade group in Malaysia. A question which arises is how far we can use the brigade group in Malaysia for activities which take place further to the West. It is true that we used it at the time of Kuwait. It is true that in Kuwait there was no proper air cover for the first seven days until the first aircraft carrier arrived. The whole Kuwait operation depended on forces coming from Malaysia or from the Far East station.
Can we do this again? The defence agreement with Malaya, which now applies to Malaysia as a whole, provides that the uses to which the forces there can he put are limited to the defence of Malaya or of the Commonwealth or the preservation of peace in South-East Asia. It is doubtful whether, in the future, we could use forces from the Malaysia area, which are based on Singapore, to deal with a crisis in the Middle East.
It is true that our position will be improved when the amphibious warfare squadron is brought up to date, when we have landing ship docks, when we have two Commando ships, perhaps supported by landing ships logistic at sea. Then we can be at sea longer, which means that we can hover round an area of crisis and stay there for perhaps 30 days or more. It means, also, that we will


be able to carry more troops by this amphibious warfare squadron. It means also that the new squadron will be able to move twice as fast as the present obsolete ships based on Aden.
Incidentally, if we have a modern amphibious warfare squadron which can stay at sea much longer and hover round the crisis point before any call for assistance is received, it raises the question of what sort of bases we need in the area, and the strategic necessity of Aden as a base becomes much more questionable. It is a better position for a base in that it is closer, but the important difference between Aden and the Seychelles and Mauritius would become much less important than it is now.
Even then, have we got enough? Is there enough in that area if we cannot depend on assistance from the Malaysia squadron? It should be remembered that our forces would have arrived in Kuwait too late if any serious action had been taken and if Kassem had been really determined to move on Kuwait, because we did not have really effective air cover in time. All we are at present able to provide is token forces. Have we not, in fact, got too little in that area? Should we not look at the whole reorganisation of the reserve and put rather less emphasis on the present Strategic Reserve in Britain and rather more emphasis on the theatre reserves east of Suez?
I suggest that, particularly in view of the unsatisfactory nature of the air corridors on which we are now dependent and the excessively great emphasis which now has to be placed on Transport Command, there is a strong case for putting more emphasis on the theatre reserves and for enforcing the amphibious warfare squadron and placing more emphasis on it. This is where I agree with part of what the hon. Member for Belfast, East said. I agree with him that the Navy should look much more at the question of nuclear propulsion for surface ships. If we did this and if we could provide nuclear-propelled tankers, for instance, it would enable the amphibious warfare squadron, or our forces in the area, to stay at sea longer and to move faster.
All these things could be done. But they have not been examined. There is no discussion on any of these questions anywhere in the White Paper. It is not perhaps surprising that, as a result, there has not been much discussion of them in this debate. There is a strong case for having stronger naval forces, for ensuring that we have naval forces which can stay at sea longer and move faster. If we did have such forces, we would be in a much better position to face the very widespread commitments which we have in that area.
At the moment, we are making a very vital contribution to the West, as has been pointed out by a number of speakers, but we are not making it in the best possible form. I hope that the Minister of Defence will deal with this point in reply. I hope that the Government will examine it. Of course, it will be more expensive if we are to have more landing troop docks and if we are to have nuclear propulsion for tankers. This is where the whole question of the amount of money which we are spending on the nuclear deterrent arises.
It may be a matter of only 8 per cent. of the total expenditure on defence, but this marginal 8 per cent. can make all the difference between having a really effective squadron in this area, being able to meet these commitments in a really effective way, and not being able to meet them at all, or at any rate not being able to meet them saisfactorily. After all, we have not really yet been tested.
I agree entirely with the point made yesterday by my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds. East (Mr. Healey) that this matter is not properly set out in the White Paper and there is not an argued case for the relation of particular weapons and particular forces to particular commitments. This is something we should have.
Lastly, we in the House do not have an adequate chance to discuss some of the detailed points of defence. We can offer the same old familiar remarks, as we have done endlessly in this debate, about having the independent deterrent or not having the independent deterrent. We do not consider some of the vital questions which we should consider, such as the ones which I have raised and


which, I suggest, are important. Perhaps the only way in which the House of Commons can make an adequate contribution to the discussion of the vital question of our defence is to have a standing Select Committee to consider the matter generally.

8.58 p.m.

Mr. Frederick Mulley: I am sure that all hon. Members listened with great interest to the speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Lincoln (Mr. Taverne), and I am equally sure that he realises that the necessary equipment to ensure the complete mobility of our forces is extremely expensive to provide; although it was right for my hon. Friend to underline the fact that the complacency shown by the Secretary of State for Air from time to time to this mobility is completely unjustified.
It is one thing to take forces to an area where there is an existing stock of equipment, but quite another to take them to a part of the world where equipment is not waiting for them. Heaven forbid that we should be forced to make landings against opposition, for I doubt whether Transport Command would he adequate if, as well as men, it had to transport the necessary equipment, armoured vehicles and so on which they would need. I hope that my hon. Friend will join in the Estimates debate, when we can pursue some of the points he raised in greater detail.
The debate was opened yesterday with a remarkable speech from the right hon. Gentleman the Minister of Defence. As he was speaking, I could not help asking myself why it was that his speech writer had not been employed to write the White Paper as well. I suspect that the right hon. Gentleman is his own speech writer. Certainly, the best speech he ever made was that which he delivered on one occasion after he had resigned office and at which time, of course, he could not have had Ministerial assistance. It would have been a great help if the White Paper, which is a shoddy one, had been of the quality of the right hon. Gentleman's speech.
It was an extraordinary speech in another sense, because it had three rather different parts. The first was wholly unobjectionable. While he was speaking, I said to myself, "This sounds wonder-

ful", because the right hon. Gentleman has the great capacity of saying things which everyone else has been saying for years as though they are original and novel ideas. The contrast between his speech and the 1957 and 1958 White Papers could not have been more marked. Indeed, he borrowed phrases which have frequently been used by my hon. Friends, even to referring to the fact that one cannot tie a label to a missile to distinguish between a tactical and strategic use.
The right hon. Gentleman readily conceded that, at least in this sphere of policy, none of the Government's current shortcomings could be blamed on the Opposition because, he said, in 1952–53, as a result of the policies of my right hon. Friend the Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), we were spending at current prices a higher sum than is now proposed in the Estimates before us.
In the second part of the right hon. Gentleman's speech, he was rather less comfortable. Even his own considerable histrionic abilities were not sufficient to convince the, House that the aircraft announcements he made were well considered and well thought out, although I will be saying something about that later. In the third part of his speech, he dealt with the question of the independent nuclear deterrent. This was a particularly interesting section of his remarks, because he brought forward, as I will try to show later, a third Government explanation for their policy in this matter.
While the right hon. Gentleman is without equal in the House as an erector of Aunt Sallys and of being able to knock them down, I thought that his aim was a little less accurate on this occasion than it normally is. The real insult of the Government's defence policy came in what I would call the appendix to the right hon. Gentleman's speech, when he was so unwise as to try to trip up my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East (Mr. Healey) and was shown up completely in the real policy which his eloquence had tried to disguise.
When one tears apart the coloured tinsel screen, as my hon. and right hon. Friends have done in this debate, a very sorry picture is revealed behind it. When


we deal with the facts of defence instead of the fantasies we find a completely different story to that told by the right hon. Gentleman, because the hard fact is that this Government, during the last 12 years, have spent more than£20,000 million and are not able to produce the defence the country needs.

Hon. Members: What about peace?

Mr. Mulley: Although hon. Members opposite shout "what about peace", it seems that, for internal debating purposes, they do not consider that we belong to the N.A.T.O. Alliance. [HON. MEMBERS: "Nonsense."] Hon. Members opposite may disagree with me, but it is significant that very little has been said by them on this topic during the debate.
We had what can only be called a cameo of complacency from the Under-Secretary of State for Air last Monday night when, replying to an Adjournment debate, he said:
Examine our contribution in four continents and consider whether it is not remarkable that the expenditure of 7 per cent. of this small island's resources should be producing such returns".—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 24th February, 1964; Vol. 690, c. 205.]
My only comment is "sic".
The hon. and gallant Member for Harrow, East (Commander Courtney) has said, if I quote him correctly, that our defences are "stretched taut as a bowstring round the world". Everyone who has given serious thought to our defence postures realises that we are facing a great number of very serious problems—

Commander Courtney: If the hon. Gentleman agrees that our defences are stretched taut as a bowstring round the the world, would he, perhaps, suggest that we ought to have more than 7 per cent. of the gross national product for defence?

Mr. Malley: I shall deal with that point, but the short answer would be that there ought to be a reconsideration of priorities and a reallocation of some of these expenses.
Before dealing with our manpower situation, I want to deal with a few points made by the right hon. Gentleman about the proposals for new aircraft.

As we are sometimes asked what a Labour Government will do in various situations, one thing that I can categorically promise is that a future Labour Government will not make decisions[HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."]—about aircraft between the issue of the White Paper and the holding of the defence debate, and we shall not consider the purchase of helicopters for the Army, the model of which is unknown to the Secretary of State for War.
The skill of the right hon. Gentleman was in trying to pretend either that these aircraft would soon be ready or that in some way or other they would be covered by the existing Estimates. It is quite clear that this is a bill that the right hon. Gentleman will present to the next Government for payment. There is nothing, or virtually nothing, in his statement that will be contained in the Estimates to come before the House this year.
The P1154 is a sorry example of Government delay. Three or four years ago we could proudly say that we led the world in the significant development of V.S.T.O.L. aircraft, but because of the Government's failure either adequately to back the P1154 or, more seriously, to support the Rolls-Royce system that is now being taken up by the French—and will, I suspect, be taken up in similar form by the Americans—we are in danger of not producing, as we should have done, the first V.S.T.O.L. fighter aircraft.
Incidentally, perhaps the right hon. Gentleman will correct what I think was a mistake. He spoke of the RB168, which I think is the Spey, as being the vertical lift engine, but I take it that he is continuing to support the Rolls-Royce RB162. It is important that we should have this correct.
Turning to the Phantom II, one can understand that for cost reasons the right hon. Gentleman prefers to buy foreign to meet the requirements, but he did not make it absolutely clear whether it is intended that the airframes should be made under licence here, or whether the British engines are being sent out to be assembled in America, and that very little of this order will come to our aircraft industry.
We welcome the decision to have the Medway engine as the engine for the


HS681, and I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will deal with the points raised on this subject by my hon. Friend the Member for Coventry, North (Mr. Edelman). He should also bear in mind that this question was first raised as long ago as 1960. After four years, the Government now announce a development contract, which means that it will be another four or five years before this aircraft is with us.
When it came to dealing with the helicopters, I thought it was extremely shoddily done, but one point worthy of note was that in this connection the right hon. Gentleman felt that he could take the House into his confidence about the numbers to be bought. He had not decided what to buy, but he could give us the numbers. However, when it came to the Phantom he flatly refused to say how many he would buy and at what cost, presumably on security grounds. Does the right hon. Gentleman think that the House of Commons, and through it the public, should be treated in this way? Will he come clean and tell us how many Phantoms there are to be and what is the estimated cost?
The other point in this general connection is that these are only a few of the requirements in terms of aircraft, without considering the other weapons which the Government have ordered—and the bill is being left to be paid in future. There are the TSR2 aircraft. We shall certainly need a Canberra replacement. We shall shortly need a Shackleton replacement. We have heard from the hon. Member for Belfast, East (Mr. McMaster) about the need for a bigger order for the Belfast. How much will all this cost? The House should be told what the right hon. Gentleman expects the cost of all this equipment will be over the next year and the following years if his policies are to be continued.
There was also a very serious error in the right hon. Gentleman's speech in that paragraph in which he quoted from Mr. McNamara's speech. The right hon. Gentleman said that Mr. McNamara said that there were 500 Minutemen, now increasing to 1,700 in 1956, but this is what Mr. McNamara told the 'United States Congress:
We had planned last year a total programme of 800 Minutemen I, plus a large number of the improved Minutemen II missiles. The

first 160 Minutemen should be in place at the end of the fiscal year 1963. By June this year we expect to have 600 in place and by June 1965, 800.
This is a very serious error on the right hon. Gentleman's part. I am sure that lie did not wish to mislead the House.
I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will correct it, because it seems to me that he was including in the figures not only the Minuteman but all the intercontinental missiles and the Polaris submarines that the United States possessed, although in the context the right hon. Gentleman went on to say that in addition to the se numbers there were all the Polaris figures. I hope that in reply tonight the right hon. Gentleman will put the matter straight.
The trouble is that the right hon. Gentleman quotes Mr. McNamara but he never reads him. He would be a much better informed Minister of Defence if he did so. He might then understand how much a Minister of Defence can tell Parliament and the public about the nation's defence policy with a view to getting their support for that policy.
I thought that the right hon. Gentleman was extremely complacent on the question of manpower. I agree with him that it is desirable to have professional forces, but to have a deficiency of 5 per cent., or of 8,000, is not a slight matter at all, particularly when one recognises that the actual number on which the deficiency is based is not one calculated to discharge the defence obligations of the country but one which was rut forward as the best figure that it was hoped to obtain by recruitment. We discovered later in the debate from the Secretary of State for War that the same principle now seems to operate on the strength of battalions, with the new strength of an infantry battalion at 660. Just as the total defence is defective, so individual battalions, although they are on active service, are seriously short on an establishment figure fixed to take account of reduced Army recruitment figures.
This is an extremely serious situation. It would more become the Minister if he were to be frank with the House. If he told the House that, having regard to the very serious demands on our manpower, we needed to call up reserves or


we needed to think of new ways of getting additional men, he would be received with great sympathy. We have never sought to take any party political points on this issue. Indeed, last month my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition offered to have talks to try to deal with the serious problems which now face us.
Among all the skeletons in the cupboards of Whitehall which we shall find when we take office, the biggest will be in the Ministry of Defence. We do not shrink from public debate about defence issues. The sincerity of the right hon. Gentleman in having public debate would be more conspicuous if he were prepared to give us more information on which a reasonable debate could be held.
As I have said, we have not been given the cost of the Phantom. Today, we were told by the Secretary of State for Air, no doubt on instructions, that we could not be told the cost of the V-bomber modifications, although Mr. McNamara has given Congress a detailed account of all the costs involved on his side. We just cannot take it that the cost is negligible unless we are told what the estimate is. Can figures of this kind possibly be a matter of security?
When it suits the right hon. Gentleman, he is prepared to be extremely precise. When talking about the cost of the nuclear part of the defence programme, he was prepared to tell us not about this year but about next year, 1965–66, that it would be 7·6 per cent. That is a very precise figure. If it has any relevance at all, he must have worked out what he expects the total cost of defence in that year to be. To have arrived at the total cost, he must have worked out how much of it is for new aircraft and so on. Will he tell the House tonight what the figures are? In an area which suits his argument, he has projected his estimates as far as the 1970s. What is the total sum on which he bases his estimate that the nuclear element will be less than 5 per cent. in the 1970s? It is exactly this sort of thing that we want to know and are entitled to know in judging the Government's policy.
In estimating the proportion for the nuclear element of defence, has the right hon. Gentleman included the TSR2 as part of it? I have heard it suggested that, although the TSR2 is regarded by his right hon. Friend the Minister of Aviation as an important nuclear contribution, in this estimate the TSR2 is not included at all. Is that the kind of ducks and drakes which the Minister is playing with the House? We want a serious reply from him tonight to these questions.
We know that the right hon. Gentleman has a taste for party polemics and he is competing with the Prime Minister for the rôle of chief nuclear flag-wagger of the party opposite, but he must understand that he is tonight asking the House to approve a detailed statement on defence. Moreover, he is asking, quite rightly and with the support of the Opposition, for supreme powers over the whole defence field. He must, therefore, be accountable for all the Services under his control. He is asking us tonight for£2,000 million. I hope that we shall have a serious answer to our questions.
We are very often asked what are the Labour Party's policies on defence. I think that it is a very fair answer to say that it would be impossible to give an answer before we had discussions with our allies on the nature, scope and cost involved. Until we have these discussions we cannot make up our minds.
When the Foreign Secretary, in the debate on the Queen's Speech, was asked to say what the Government's policy was about the multilateral force, a matter on which there had been active discussion for two years, he said. "Until we have these discussions we cannot make up our minds". My right hon. Friend the Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) and my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds, East have spelt out extremely patiently and clearly what our policy is in all these connections. We are not prepared to debate nuclear policy on the simple basis of, "Shall we keep the bomb or will you give it up?". This kind of dramatic simplicity is extremely dangerous in dealing with nuclear policy.
In an article in the Economist, which was on the whole favourable to the


Government's policy, it was stated in dealing with nuclear matters:
Dramatic simplicity is the last thing one wants.
We have no objection to debating these nuclear issues, but we would hope to do so on a rational and not an emotional basis.
We are getting very tired of this false allegation of patriotism. We had it today at Question Time. Apparently, to question the wisdom of a 5 per cent. Bank Rate today was undermining the confidence of the country. Had we said yesterday that it ought to be 5 per cent., that also would have been undermining the confidence of the country. We are getting to a situation in which any criticism of Government policy is said to be anti-patriotic. I do not know whether the Government, having adopted General de Gaulle's defence policy, also want to adopt his attitude to public discussion as well. We shall continue to discharge our public duty.
I remind the House of what the British Council of Churches said on this question:
In a matter of such profound human consequence, and one which involves such serious consideration of the rôle of Britain in the service of mankind, Christians can rightly ask the political parties to refrain from making unreal issues out of it, or exaggerating differences for party purposes, and can properly demand that the parties should together be as frank and objective as possible to enable the nation to reach a right choice.
It would help if the Government spoke with one voice on this matter.
I thought that it was extremely serious that, after the Foreign Secretary had made proposals at Geneva, his speech was made nonsense of by the Minister of Defence in his speech yesterday, when he said—and I ask the House to note the words—that in no circumstances would we
forgo the five Polaris submarines."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 26th February, 1964; Vol. 690, c. 481.]
when clearly President Johnson's proposal for a strategic nuclear freeze, which was properly endorsed by the Foreign Secretary on behalf of the Government at Geneva, would be quite absurd if our Polaris programme went through. I hope that tonight the right hon. Gentleman will retract that part of his speech of yesterday.
Then we get the third item in the chorus, the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, whom I am glad to see in his place, at least removed one ambiguity in his speech of 16th January when he made it clear that our withdrawal clause from N.A.T.O. was based only on the defence of this island. This immediately cut away all the kind of arguments, some of which have been used in this debate, about circumstances in which we would either use or threaten to use nuclear weapons outside the N.A.T.O. area.
The Primo Minister has also brought in the argument that we need to have nuclear weapons to participate in top-table discussions. I should like to ask, as did my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper this afternoon, whether we would have needed independent nuclear means to be at Geneva. I go further and ask what is the point of a Government like this being in those discussions when the Fcreign Secretary is denied in the House of Commons the very next day, when the Government's defence policy is sabotaging the efforts of those at Geneva who are trying to take another step on the road to disarmament.
It has already been abundantly established that the credibility of our so-called independent deterrent is in doubt. What we on this side want, and what we would certainly do, is to restore the credibility of a British diplomatic initiative. Although the Government have participated in the talks, we have nothing whatever to show from Government diplomacy over the last year.
The other point with which, I hope, the Minister of Defence will deal is why he stressed hat it would be unwise to give up our nuclear independence at this moment. Is he preparing, if the worst happens and the Government were to win the election, to abandon it if that serves their political purpose? The Ministry of Defence arguments are exactly the arguments of General de Gaulle, but they lack the logic of the General. Ai, least, he has a completely French force. How can ours be called independent and British when we rely upon the United States to provide the delivery means? Also, in a way that our deterrent does not, the General provides the technological work in France. One of the arguments in favour


of this kind of nuclear independence is that it gives work to our industry especially in these important sectors.
We tend, as we got from the Secretary of State for Air, to have passion as a substitute for argument. I hope that in his reply the Minister of Defence will produce more light and less heat. The Government have divided the alliance, are seeking to delude the electors and now seem to be in danger of deceiving themselves.
We have moved our Amendment and will divide the House upon what amounts to a Motion of censure because of the sorry state into which the Government have brought not only the country's defences, but our aircraft industry also. Despite an expenditure of£20,000 million in the last 12 years—and it is no good the Minister of Defence talking as though he joined the Government only yesterday, as he tended to do in his opening speech; he must bear responsibility for the whole of this sad story. Despite this expenditure, through procrastination, incompetence and political prejudice the Government, in the words of the Amendment, have
failed to produce an adequate defence policy and provide forces to meet the nation's needs".
The Government seem also determined to sabotage the Geneva disarmament talks. [HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] If instead of seeking these objectives—disarmament, the strengthening of the Western Alliance—the Government persist in the few weeks or months left to them in carrying out their declared policy of putting party political survival before the defence of the nation, they will deserve, and get, the condemnation of the electors when the time comes.

9.30 p.m.

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Peter Thorneycroft): I should like, by leave of the House, to reply to the debate. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why?"] I have, at least, I think, listened to more of the speeches throughout the two days than any other right hon. or hon. Gentleman.
We are reaching the conclusion of what is of necessity a controversial debate, because these matters are controversial, but what has also been a good-tempered debate. It was wound up by a

speech of characteristic ability, asking many pertinent questions, by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Park (Mr. Mulley).
I shall try to reply to as many of the points that were raised in the debate as I can. Nine-tenths of the debate was devoted to what really is one-tenth of the problem—namely, the nuclear side. Nevertheless, that was the main theme of speech after speech. It is, therefore, necessary and right that to begin with I should say something on that score.
I hope that no one will accuse me of questioning the patriotism of hon. Gentlemen opposite. That is not in my mind. I do not hold the view that because some people hold sincerely that they wish to abandon a weapon they are necessarily unpatriotic. Nor, I hope, do those who disagree with me accuse me merely of seeking to retain weapons for some jingoistic reasons. I hope that we can respect one another's sincerity.
want to say a few words about the main theme of the debate before coming to the actual points which were made. It seems to me that on the nuclear side there are two themes: one, the military; the other the political. I want to say a word, first, about the military theme. It can be put quite shortly. It is that today there is no conventional defence of this country that is possible; that is to say, no matter how we amass conventional forces, be they naval, air or a conscripted Army, the only defence of this country today is the certainty of retribution, the knowledge that if an attack is made it is certain that a wholly unacceptable degree of damage would be suffered by the aggressor. That is the situation in which we find ourselves. Because of that, what we decide to do about this is a grave matter.
As against that, it is said that an enemy would be always just as impressed by a deterrent that was perhaps 2,000 miles away, or which was under the ultimate control of another Government. If that is said—and it is a perfectly fair point to make—equally it can be said that a potential enemy might not be so impressed by a deterrent so distant and under someone else's control and, as one hon. Member opposite pointed out, what matters here is not what we think but what a potential


enemy thinks. It is no reflection on any ally to probe what we think might be in the mind of a potential enemy in the years to come.
Should we have, in these circumstances, a deterrent of our own, and independent? There are many who doubt the wisdom of abandoning it for the reason I have given, and because of that quite a lot of hon. Members change the argument from that of policy—which is, "Should we have it?" —to the argument of means—"Is it possible to have it?" They question the possibility whether one can have an independent deterrent. I am talking at the moment in purely military terms.
I say that, in purely military terms, what matters is not who makes the deterrent, but who controls it. That is the one thing that matters to the potential enemy. Therefore, in the case of these weapons—those we have now, those under construction and those planned—whatever views we hold, and whatever differences we have, we must admit that the control is fairly and squarely in our own hands. Everyone knows this. Every potential enemy knows it. It is a fact. These weapons are under the control of the British military and can only be fired under the authority of the British Prime Minister.
That is the military side. It is not the only side. Throughout the debate there has been another theme—the political theme—concerned with these weapons. There may come a point where the world may change, where national States as we know them may disappear, where it will be possible to concentrate things into centres—perhaps one centre in the East and one in the West, perhaps eventually into one centre alone.
Always I have thought that this growing together might start in Europe. I have never been ashamed to state that. I do not pretend that it is my own thought. It is shared by many right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House. But I am bound to admit that all our hopes in this have been somewhat disappointed. Some right hon. and hon. Members opposite, including the Leader of the Opposition, have, perhaps, been less ardent than others in that direction.
But the truth is that if we are to talk about concentration for national

survival, which is the greatest issue that mankind has to contemplate, we might have to go through some process of concentration in some lesser, or not so imaginative spheres, such as trade and commerce. But it might happen. It might happen in Europe. I do not think that we all remember as we should the very great speech by the late President Kennedy, at Frankfurt, the last time he was in Europe, envisaging the possibility of an Atlantic alliance. That may happen, too.
We must strive to see that these things do happen, because, on the achievement of them, Dr something like them, survival in the world may ultimately depend. But we must also ask ourselves whether the best way to achieve this is to start off by a one-sided—I shall not use the word "unilateral", which has a special connotation of its own—abandonment of the weapons that we possess.
To cast them away at this moment, as it seems to me—and I put my honest view about it and if hon. Members disagree with me they will respect my sincerity—is to be in danger of doing us some military damage, for weapons of this kind, whoever owns them, are the only kind of weapons which can offer a defence for this country at present. To abandon them will, at any rate, make it more difficult to achieve some of those wider aims about which right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the House have spoken.
That is the background to the debate as I see it. I am most grateful to the House for listening most patiently to me before I reply in a little detail to the points raised and for allowing me to say what I think the theme is and what my approach to it is.
The right hon. Member for Belper (Mr. G. Brown) was put up to defend the abolition of these weapons and, as always, he made a very able and fair speech. He said that it was rather a difficult speech to make, and I agree with him. He did not have an easy case to argue, but he did it with his accustomed skill. The right hon. Gentleman started by saying that he would see that Britain was defended. Let me say at once that I am absolutely satisfied that he fully intends to see


that Britain will be defended. I am not for a moment questioning that, but we are entitled to ask, "What with?". That is a fair question to pose and, if my diagnosis is right and the defence of these islands is not practicable with conventional weapons, then the only answer is that he has got to rely in the ultimate upon the deterrent for the defence of this country.
The right hon. Gentleman went on from there to say that that was all right, but that he was loyal to the alliance. But so are we. One is not being disloyal to an alliance to secure to oneself some means of striking back in one's own defence. It is not disloyalty to an alliance, but a perfectly proper and sensible thing for an ally to achieve. He said that he would seek a rôle which would give us greater influence in the world. Supposing that he had complete power tomorrow morning, does he honestly think that if he said, "I am now going to abandon the Polaris missiles and run down the V-bombers," that would give us a greater rôle in the world?

Mr. G. Brown: I did not say that.

Mr. Thorneycroft: If the right hon. Member will forgive me, if he did not say it that is what his leader said. [HON. MEMBERS: "Ah!"] The right hon. Member for Huyton (Mr. H. Wilson) said that the Labour Party would renegotiate or denegotiate the agreement to buy Polaris submarines from the United States. His inimitable phrase referring to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister, was, "Has he got it now?".
The last point which the right hon. Member for Belper put to me—and this is important—was that I was claiming something in flat contradiction to what the Foreign Secretary had been doing at Geneva. At one moment I thought that he held the view that the Foreign Secretary had somehow managed in Geneva so to freeze the situation that the Russians would have all the nuclear weapons that they possessed today, but that we would have no weapons ourselves. I say that the Foreign Secretary has not been engaged upon that at Geneva.
The facts are that on 21st January President Johnson proposed that the United States, the Soviet Union, and their respective allies should agree to explore a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. The United States Government are now working out their plans before discussing them with their N.A.T.O. allies, and they have given Her Majesty's Government an explicit assurance that nothing in the proposals would inhibit them from honouring their obligations under the Nassau Agreement to supply Polaris missiles. I hope that that is as complete an answer as hon. Members want.

Mr. Gordon Walker: Will the right hon. Gentleman address himself to the point that our own Foreign Secretary, in Geneva, said that he himself—whatever the President had said—was in favour of freezing all nuclear missiles?

Mr. Thorneycroft: The Foreign Secretary was supporting the proposal of President Johnson on the explicit assurance that America would preserve the supply—which they are obligated to give—of the Polaris missile. [HON. MEMBERS: "Read it."] I have read what he said. The right hon. Gentleman then went on—

Mr. G. Brown: It will be within the recollection of the House that the right hon. Gentleman has just said that I had attributed to the Foreign Secretary something which he had not said. Will he tell us what the Foreign Secretary did say?

Mr. Thorneycroft: I have not the whole of the Foreign Secretary's speech here, but I can say that he supported President Johnson's statement, and so do the whole Government. If the right hon. Gentleman thinks that he can get out of his political difficulties on the basis that the Foreign Secretary has somehow accidentally frozen Britain's nuclear strike power at nil while keeping the Russian one at its present value, he is completely mistaken.
The right hon. Gentleman went on to say, "What will we do?" He said, "Of course we will not abandon the existing system. We will keep the V-bombers, but we will spend no more


upon them, and we will not seek to extend them into the future." That is a terrifying way of dealing with a great weapons system. It is not the way to treat our Services. If we have weapons they must be kept up to date, and extended into the future. The right hon. Gentleman said that he would open negotiations to see how, in the light of existing circumstances, he could share the control with others. Whatever else he believes or disbelieves, he surely cannot believe that to announce that he will give up British missiles—[HON. MEMBERS: "He never said that."] Then what did he say, other than that? If he announced this, how could he hope to achieve control of somebody else's weapons?
There may be many other arguments for giving up the British deterrent, and many other points that can be put, but to enter this great debate and try to persuade this country, or the House of Commons, that somehow, by giving up our own weapons, we can achieve control of some one else's is to make the biggest error that has ever been made.

Mr. Healey: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for giving way. This is an interesting argument. The right hon. Gentleman has supported the Prime Minister in saying that the project for a multilateral force is well worth considering. Is not this precisely a project whose whole aim, as expressed by the Prime Minister, is to persuade countries to try to find an arrangement for sharing the control of weapons which they themselves do not possess?

Mr. Thorneycroft: No. That is just what it is not. I did deal with this rather fully in the speech which I made in opening the debate. I hope that the right hon. Gentleman will study the problem of the multilateral force which has a quite strong political construction. But no one has ever suggested, no one in the State Department, the Pentagon, or anywhere else that this gives in any sense effective control or use of this weapon to anyone except the United States. Unless the right hon. Gentleman understands these things he cannot address himself to them.
I turn to what I think was one of the most interesting and important speeches in this debate, that of my right hon.

Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. Aubrey Jones). He made an important contribution. What he really said was that the pace of technological advance was, in any event, putting a limit to the nation-state. I believe this to be true. It is the underlying argument for the European adventure. It always was; and I think that, in fact, everyone would agree with him in what he said.
But what my right hon. Friend said was rather missed by quite a number of right hon. and hon. Gentlemen opposite. He said:
If my argument has any cogency, we are then faced with the question: what shall this single centre of nuclear decision be? To my mind, it cannot be a United States national centre. Feeling in Europe has gone much too far for his. Political and economic resurgence in Europe has outrun this. If that is so, we are forced back upon only one thing. All that I wish to do today is to put this forward as an objective. We are forced back upon a single centre of joint decision by major allies.
I shall not discuss today how to achieve that objective."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 26th February, 1964; Vol. 690; c. 491.]
I do not believe that anyone would dissent from that. Of course, we all agree that it would be an admirable thing if the world, or the West, could achieve a single centre for decision.
May I say this to my right hon. Friend the Member for Belper. We are just a little way from the point at which the United States is prepared to give up its sovereignty in this matter. We are perhaps just a little way away from the point at which General de Gaulle is willing to give up the force de frappe to anybody else. I do not say that these great objectives may not be attainable. I certainly do not say that any of us should fail to strive for them. But I beg the House to try to look at the problems of the world in which we live and not a possible world which might come about eventually.
If I may say so to my right hon. Friend the Member for Hall Green—I hope that I seem fair in my comment on his speech —there is, I think, some danger in a misunderstanding of his argument. I think that he must have been as shocked as anybody else when he heard himself immediately followed by the hon, Member for Ashfield (Mr. Warbey), who delivered the speech


thereafter from the benches opposite, and who took his speech as an argument for scrapping the lot right away. I hope that I have done my right hon. Friend a service in dissociating him from some of his supporters.
My hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Sir A. V. Harvey)—I thank him for his commendation of my own remarks— asked a very pertinent question. He said that if the Opposition believe in reliance upon the American deterrent may we have an absolute assurance that the party opposite is solid in its support of the American Polaris base? Now, can we have it?—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."] The head drummer is away.
The whole of this argument, which has gone on for two days, is rendered absolutely meaningless by the Opposition's failure to answer this question. It is one thing to say that one is a loyal member of an alliance and that what is wanted is absolute faith in one's allies, but it is another thing to flinch from allowing them to have bases from which that defence would have to be conducted on one's soil. I shall not press hon. Members opposite for anything more. It is an embarrassment which is too painful, too acute. [Interruption.] The right hon. Member for Belper begs me to move on to something else. [Interruption.] I take up the right hon. Member for Easington (Mr. Shinwell), who, as always, made an interesting contribution to our discussion.

Mr. G. Brown: This is cheating.

Mr. Thorneycroft: The right hon. Member for Easington said today that he had not had all the information on nuclear weapons from us that he would have wished to have, but, to be truthful, he did not get all the information from Lord Attlee that he would have wished. He asked me, could we not get all the N.A.T.O. countries together and somehow get the strike decisions made there? N.A.T.O. is a great conception and a great alliance, but it is not a sovereign Power. Does the right hon. Member think that it is possible, at this moment in time—I do not say what may be possible, but at this time—so to reorganise that alliance that we can get people together and have the sort of single centre which my right hon. Friend the Member for Hall Green spoke about? That would not be facing the realities of the situation as it is today.
I have sought to cover as much of the debate—[HON. MEMBERS: "Oh."]— as I have been permitted to cover. The debate, as most others, has been about power. I say this to right hon. Members opposite. In all their desire to get rid of British weapons it seems that what they are flinching from is power. They should not be afraid of power. Power is not an evil thing. The right thing to do with power is to use it wisely and sensibly and in the cause of peace, which is the policy of the Government.

Question put, That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question: —

The House divided: Ayes 337, Noes 238.

Division No. 32.]
AYES
[10.0 p.m.


Agnew, Sir Peter
Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel
Carr, Compton (Barons Court)


Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.)
Bishop, Sir Patrick
Carr, Rt. Hon. Robert (Mitcham)


Allason, James
Black, Sir Cyril
Cary, Sir Robert


Amery, Rt. Hon. Julian
Bossom, Hon. Clive
Channon, H. P. G.


Anderson, D. C.
Bourne-Arton, A.
Chataway, Christopher


Arbuthnot, Sir John
Box, Donald
Clark, Henry (Antrim, N.)


Ashton, Sir Hubert
Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. John
Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)


Atkins, Humphrey
Boyle, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward
Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmih, W.)


Awdry, Daniel (Chippenham)
Braine, Bernard
Cleaver, Leonard


Balniel, Lord
Brewis, John
Cole, Norman


Barber, Anthony
Bromley-Davenport, Lt. -Col. Sir Walter
Cooke, Robert


Barlow, Sir John
Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry
Cooper, A. E.


Barter, John
Brown, Alan (Tottenham)
Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.


Batsford, Brian
Browne, Percy (Torrington)
Cordie, John


Bell, Ronald
Bryan, Paul
Corfield, F. V.


Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)
Buck, Antony
Costain, A. P.


Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Gos &amp; Fhm)
Bullard, Denys
Coulson, Michael


Bevins, Rt. Hon. Reginald
Bullus, Wing Commander Eric
Courtney, Cdr. Anthony


Bidgood, John C.
Burden, F. A.
Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)


Biffen, John
Butcher, Sir Herbert
Crawley, Aldan


Biggs-Davison, John
Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (Saffron Walden)
Critchley, Julian


Bingham, R. M.
Campbell, Gordon (Moray &amp; Nairn)
Croathwalte-Eyre, Col. Sir Oliver




Crowder, F. P.
Hulbert, Sir Norman
Page, Graham (Crosby)


Cunningham, Knox
Hurd, Sir Anthony
Page, John (Harrow, West)


Curran, Charles
Hutchison, Michael Clark
Pannell, Norman (Kirkdale)


Currie, G. B. H.
Iremonger, T. L.
Partridge, E.


Dalkeith, Earl of
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)
Pearson, Frank (Clitheroe)


Dance, James
Jackson, John
Peel, John


d'Avigdor-Gofdsmid, Sir Henry
James, David
Percival, Ian


Deedes, Rt. Hon. W. F.
Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)
Peyton, John


de Ferranti, Basil
Jennings, J. C.
Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth


Digby, Simon Wingfield
Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)
Pike, Miss Mervyn


Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. M.
Johnson, Eric (Blackley)
Pitman, Sir James


Doughty, Charles
Johnson Smith, Geoffrey
Pitt, Dame Edith


Douglas-Rome, Rt. Hon. Sir Alec
Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.)
Pounder, Rafton


Drayson, G. B.
Jones, Rt. Hn. Aubrey (Hall Green)
Powell, Rt. Hon. J. Enoch


du Cann, Edward
Joseph, Rt. Hon. Sir Keith
Price, David (Eastleigh)


Duncan, Sir James
Kaberry, Sir Donald
Price, H. A. (Lewisham, W.)


Duthie, Sir William (Banff)
Kerans, Cdr. J. S.
Prior, J. M. L.


Eden, Sir John
Kerby, Capt. Henry
Proudfoot, Wilfred


Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Kerr, Sir Hamilton
Pym, Francis


Elliott, R. W. (Newc'tle-upon-Tyne, N.)
Kershaw, Anthony
Quennell, Miss J. M.


Emery, Peter
Kimball, Marcus
Ramsden, James


Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn
Kirk, Peter
Rawlinson, Rt. Hon. Sir Peter


Errington, Sir Eric
Kitson, Timothy
Redmayne, Rt. Hon. Martin


Erroll, Rt. Hon. F. J.
Lagden, Godfrey
Rees, Hugh (Swansea, W.)


Farey-Jones, F. W.
Lambton, Viscount
Rees-Davies, W. R. (Isle of Thanet)


Farr, John
Lancaster, Col. C. G.
Renton, Rt. Hon. David


Fletcher-Cooke, Charles
Langford-Holt, Sir John
Ridley, Hon. Nicholas


Forrest, George
Leavey, J. A.
Ridsdale, Julian


Foster, Sir John
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry
Rippon, Rt. Hon. Geoffrey


Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (Stafford&amp;Stone)
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)


Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)
Lilley, F. J. P.
Robertson, Sir D. (C'thn's &amp; S'th'ld)


Freeth, Denzil
Lindsay, Sir Martin
Robson Brown, Sir William


Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.
Linstead, Sir Hugh
Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)


Gammans, Lady
Litchfield, Capt. John
Roots, William


Gardner, Edward
Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'nC'dfield)
Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard


George, Sir John (Pollok)
Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)
Royle, Anthony (Richmond, Surrey)


Gibson-Watt, David
Longbottom, Charles
Russell, Sir Ronald


Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, Central)
Longden, Gilbert
Sandys, Rt. Hon. Duncan


Gilmour, Sir John (East Fife)
Loveys, Walter H.
Scott-Hopkins, James


Glover, Sir Douglas
Lucas, Sir Jocelyn
Seymour, Leslie


Glyn, Dr. Alan (Clapham)
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh
Shaw, M.


Godber, Rt. Hon. J. B.
McAdden, Sir Stephen
Shepherd, William


Goodhart, Philip
MacArthur, Ian
Skeet, T. H. H.


Goodhew, Victor
McLaren, Martin
Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'd &amp; Chiswick)


Gough, Frederick
McLaughlin, Mrs. Patricia
Smyth, Rt. Hon. Brig. Sir John


Gower, Raymond
Maclay, Rt. Hon. John
Spearman, Sir Alexander


Grant-Ferris, R.
Maclean, Sir Fitzroy (Bute&amp;N. Ayrs)
Speir, Rupert


Green, Alan
McLean, Neil (Inverness)
Stainton, Keith


Gresham Cooke, R.
Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)
Stanley, Hon. Richard


Grosvenor, Lord Robert
McMaster, Stanley R.
Stevens, Geoffrey


Gurden, Harold
Macmillan, Rt. Hn. Harold (Bromley)
Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)


Hall, John (Wycombe)
Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)
Stodart, J. A.


Hamilton, Michael (Wellingborough)
Maddan, Martin
Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm


Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N. W.)
Maginnis, John E.
Storey, Sir Samuel


Harris, Reader (Heston)
Maitland, Sir John
Studholme, Sir Henry


Harrison, Brian (Maldon)
Markham, Major Sir Frank
Summers, Sir Spencer


Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
Marlowe, Anthony
Talbot, John E.


Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)
Marples, Rt. Hon. Ernest
Tapsell, Peter


Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)
Marshall, Sir Douglas
Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)


Harvie Anderson, Miss
Marten, Neil
Taylor, Edwin (Bolton, E.)


Hastings, Stephen
Mathew, Robert (Honiton)
Taylor, Frank (M'ch'st'r, Moss Side)


Hay, John
Matthews, Gordon (Meriden)
Taylor, Sir William (Bradford, N.)


Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel
Maudling, Rt. Hon. Reginald
Teeling, Sir William


Heath, Rt. Hon. Edward
Mawby, Ray
Temple, John M.


Henderson, John (Cathcart)
Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.
Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret


Hendry, Forbes
Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. S. L. C.
Thomas, Sir Leslie (Canterbury)


Hicks Beach, Maj. W.
Mills, Stratton
Thomas, Peter (Conway)


Hiley, Joseph
Miscampbell, Norman
Thompson, Sir Kenneth (Walton)


Hill, Mrs. Eveline (Wythenshawe)
Montgomery, Fergus
Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon, S.)


Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk)
Moore, Sir Thomas (Ayr)
Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. Peter


Hirst, Geoffrey
More, Jasper (Ludlow)
Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin


Hobson, Rt. Hon. Sir John
Morgan, William
Tiley, Arthur (Bradford, W.)


Hooking, Philip N.
Morrison, John
Tilney, John (Wavertree)


Hogg, Rt. Hon. Quintin
Mott-Radclyffe, Sir Charles
Touche, Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon


Holland, Philip
Neave, Airey
Turner, Colin


Hollingworth, John
Nicholls, Sir Harmar
Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.


Hope, Rt. Hon. Lord John
Nicholson, Sir Godfrey
Tweedsmuir, Lady


Hopkins, Alan
Noble, Rt. Hon. Michael
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Hornby, R. P.
Nugent, Rt. Hon. Sir Richard
Vane, W. M. F.


Hornsby-Smith, Rt. Hon. Dame P.
Oakshott, Sir Hendrie
Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hon. Sir John


Howard, Hon, G. R. (St. Ives)
Orr, Capt. L. P. S.
Vickers, Miss Joan


Howard, John (Southampton, Test)
Orr-Ewing, Sir Charles
Vosper, Rt. Hon. Dennis


Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admiral John
Osborn, John (Hallam)
Walder, David


Hughes-Young, Michael
Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)
Walker, Peter







Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Sir Derek
Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)
Woollam, John


Wall, Patrick
Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)
Worsley, Marcus


Ward, Dame Irene
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)
Yates, William (The Wrekin)


Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold
Wise, A. R.



Webster, David
Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Wells, John (Maidstone)
Wood, Rt. Hon. Richard
Mr. Chichester-Clark and Mr. Finlay.


Whitelaw, William
Woodhouse, C. M.



Williams, Dudley (Exeter)
Woodnutt, Mark





NOES


Abse, Leo
Grey, Charles
Mellish, R. J.


Ainsley, William
Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)
Mendelson, J. J.


Albu, Austen
Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)
Millan, Bruce


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Griffiths, W. (Exchange)
Milne, Edward


Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)
Grimond, Rt. Hon. J.
Mitchison, C. R.


Bacon, Miss Alice
Gunter, Ray
Monslow, Walter


Barnett, Guy
Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)
Moody, A. S.


Baxter, William (Stirlingshire, W.)
Hamilton, William (West Fife)
Morris, Charles (Openshaw)


Beaney, Alan
Hannan, William
Morris, John


Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.
Harper, Joseph
Moyle, Arthur


Bence, Cyril
Hart, Mrs. Judith
Mulley, Frederick


Benn, Anthony Wedgwood
Hayman, F. H.
Neat, Harold


Bennett, J. (Glasgow, Bridgeton)
Healey, Dens
Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)


Benson, Sir George
Hendereon, Rt. Hn. Arthur (RwlyRegis)
Oliver, G. H.


Blackburn, F.
Herbison, Miss Margaret
O'Malley, B. K.


Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. C.
Hill, J. (Midlothian)
Oram, A. E.


Bowden, Rt. Hn. H. W. (Leics, S. W.)
Hilton, A. V.
Oswald, Thomas


Bowles, Frank
Holman, Percy
Owen, Will


Boyden, James
Holt, Arthur
Padley, W. E.


Braddock, Mrs. E. M.
Hooson, H. E.
Paget, R. T.


Bradley, Tom
Houghton, Douglas
Panned, Charles (Leeds, W.)


Bray, Dr. Jeremy
Howell, Charles A. (Perry Barr)
Pargiter, G. A.


Brockway, A. Fenner
Howell, Denis (Small Heath)
Parker, John


Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Howie, W.
Parkin, B. T.


Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)
Hoy, James H.
Pavitt, Laurence


Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)
Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)
Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)


Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)
Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)
Peart, Frederick


Callaghan, James
Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)
Pentland, Norman


Carmichael, Neil
Hunter, A. E.
Popplewell, Ernest


Castle, Mrs. Barbara
Hynd, H. (Accrington)
Prentice, R. E.


Chapman, Donald
Hynd, John (Attercliffe)
Probert, Arthur


Cliffe, Michael
Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)
Proctor, W. T.


Collick, Percy
Irving, Sydney (Dartford)
Pursey, Cmdr. Harry


Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Janner, Sir Barnett
Randall, Harry


Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)
Jay, Rt. Hon. Douglas
Rankin, John


Cronin, John
Jeger, George
Rees, Merlyn (Leeds, S.)


Crosland, Anthony
Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)
Reid, William


Crossman, R. H. S.
Jones, Rt. Hn. A. Creech (Wakefield)
Reynolds, G. W.


Dalyell, Tam
Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Rhodes, H.


Darling, George
Jones, Elwyn (Westham, S.)
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)


Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)
Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)
Roberts, Goronwy (Caernarvon)


Davies, Harold (Leek)
Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)
Robertson, John (Paisley)


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Kelley, Richard
Robinson, Kenneth (St. Panoras, N.)


Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)
Kenyon, Clifford
Rodgers, W. T. (Stockton)


Deer, George
King, Dr. Horace
Ross, William


Delargy, Hugh
Lawson, George
Royle, Charles (Salford, West)


Dempsey, James
Ledger, Ron
Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.


Diamond, John
Lee, Frederick (Newton)
Silkin, John


Dodds, Norman
Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)
Silverman, Julius (Aston)


Doig, Peter
Lever, Harold (Cheetham)
Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)


Donnelly, Desmond
Lever, L. M. (Ardwick)
Skeffington, Arthur


Driberg, Tom
Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)
Slater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.)


Duffy, A. E. P. (Colne Valley)
Lipton, Marcus
Slater, Joseph (Sedgefieid)


Ede, Rt. Hon. C.
Lubbock, Eric
Small, William


Edelman, Maurice
Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)


Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)
McBride, N.
Snow, Julian


Edwards, Robert (Bilston)
McCann, John
Sorensen, R. W.


Edwards, Walter (Stepney)
MacColl, James
Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank


Evans, Albert
MacDermot, Niall
Spriggs, Leslie


Fernyhough, E.
Molnnes, James
Steele, Thomas


Finch, Harold
McKay, John (Wallsend)
Stewart, Michael (Fulham)


Fitch, Alan
Mackie, John (Enfield, East)
Stonehouse, John


Fletcher, Eric
McLeavy, Frank
Stones, William


Foley, Maurice
MacMillan, Malcolm (Western Isles)
Strauss, Rt. Hn. C. R. (Vauxhall)


Foot, Dingle (Ipswich)
MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)
Stross, Sir Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)


Forman, J. C.
Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)
Swain, Thomas


Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)
Mallalieu, J.P.W. (Huddersfield, E.)
Swingler, Stephen


Galperm, Sir Myer
Manuel, Archie
Symonds, J. B.


George, Lady MeganLloyd (Crmrthn)
Mapp, Charles
Taverne, D.


Ginsburg, David
Marsh, Richard
Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)


Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.
Mason, Roy
Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W)


Gourlay, Harry
Mayhew, Christopher
Thompson, Dr. Alan (Dunfermline)


Greenwood, Anthony

Thomson, G. M. (Dundee, E.)







Thornton, Ernest
White, Mrs. Eirene
Woof, Robert


Thorpe, Jeremy
Whitlock, William
Wyatt, Woodrow


Tomney, Frank
Wigg, George
Yates, Victor (Ladywood)


Wade, Donald
Wilkins, W. A.
Zilliacus, K.


Wainwright, Edwin
Willey, Frederick



Warbey, William
Williams, W. T. (Warrington)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Weitzman, David
Willis, E. G. (Edinburgh, E.)
Mr. G. H. R. Rogers and Mr. Redhead.


Wells, William (Walsall, N.)
Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.

Main Question Put:—

The House divided: Ayes 335, Noes 237.

Division No. 33.]
AYES
[10.13 p.m.


Agnew, Sir Peter
Curran, Charles
Hirst, Geoffrey


Allan, Robert (Paddington, S.)
Currie, G. B. H.
Hobson, Rt. Hon. Sir John


Allason, James
Dalkeith, Earl of
Hocking, Philip N.


Amery, Rt. Hon. Julian
Dance, James
Hogg, Rt. Hon. Quintin


Anderson, D. C.
d'Avigdor-Gokfemid, Sir Henry
Holland, Philip


Arbuthnot, Sir John
Deedee, Rt. Hon. W. F.
Hollingworth, John


Ashton, Sir Hubert
de Ferranti, Basil
Hope, Rt. Hon. Lord John


Atkins, Humphrey
Digby, Simon Wingfield
Hopkins, Alan


Awdry, Daniel (Chippenham)
Donaldson, Cmdr. C. E. M.
Hornby, R. P.


Balniel, Lord
Doughty, Charles
Homsby-Smlth, Rt. Hon. Dame P,


Barber, Anthony
Douglas-Home, Rt. Hon. Sir Alec
Howard, Hon. G. R. (St. Ives)


Barlow, Sir John
Drayson, G. B.
Howard, John (Southampton, Test)


Barter, John
du Cam, Edward
Hughes Hallett, Vice-Admlral John


Batsford, Brian
Duncan, Sir James
Hughes-Young, Michael


Bell, Ronald
Duthie, Sir William (Banff)
Hulbert, Sir Norman


Bennett, F. M. (Torquay)
Eden, Sir John
Hurd, Sir Anthony


Bennett, Dr. Reginald (Cos &amp; Fhm)
Elliot, Capt. Walter (Carshalton)
Hutchison, Michael Clark


Bevins, Rt. Hon. Reginald
Elliott, R.W.(Newcastle-upon-Tyne, N.)
Iremonger, T. L.


Bidgood, Join C.
Emery, Peter
Irvine, Bryant Godman (Rye)


Biffen, John
Emmet, Hon. Mrs. Evelyn
James, David


Biggs-Davison, John
Errington, Sir Eric
Jenkins, Robert (Dulwich)


Bingham, R. M.
Erroll, Rt. Hon. F. J.
Jennings, J. C.


Birch, Rt. Hon. Nigel
Farey-Jones, F. W.
Johnson, Dr. Donald (Carlisle)


Bishop, Sir Patrick
Farr, John
Johnson, Eric (Blackley)


Black, Sir Cyril
Fletcher-Cooke, Charles
Johnson Smith, Geoffrey


Bossom, Hon. Clive
Forrest, George
Jones, Arthur (Northants, S.)


Bourne-Arton, A.
Foster, Sir John
Jones, Rt. Hn. Aubrey (Hall Green)


Box, Donald
Fraser, Rt. Hn. Hugh (Stafford &amp; Stone)
Joseph, Rt. Hon. Sir Keith


Boyd-Carpenter, Rt. Hon. John
Fraser, Ian (Plymouth, Sutton)
Kaberry, Sir Donald


Boyle, Rt. Hon. Sir Edward
Freeth, Denzil
Kerans, Cdr. J. S.


Braine, Bernard
Galbraith, Hon. T. G. D.
Kerby, Capt. Henry


Brewis, John
Gammans, Lady
Kerr, Sir Hamilton


Bromley-Davenport, Lt. -Col. Sir Walter
Gardner, Edward
Kershaw, Anthony


Brooke, Rt. Hon. Henry
George, Sir John (Pollok)
Kimball, Marcus


Brown, Alan (Tottenham)
Gibson-Watt, David
Kirk, Peter


Browne, Percy (Torrington)
Gilmour, Ian (Norfolk, Central)
Kitson, Timothy


Bryan, Paul
Gilmour, Sir John (East Fife)
Lagden, Godfrey


Buck, Antony
Glover, Sir Douglas
Lambton, Viscount


Bullard, Denys
Glyn, Dr. Alan (Clapham)
Lancaster, Col. C. G.


Bullus, Wing Commander Eric
Godber, Rt. Hon. J. B.
Langford-Holt, Sir John


Burden, F. A.
Goodhart, Philip
Leavey, J. A.


Butcher, Sir Herbert
Goodhew, Victor
Legge-Bourke, Sir Harry


Butler, Rt. Hn. R. A. (SaffronWalden)
Gougn, Frederick
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)


Campbell, Gordon (Moray &amp; Nairn)
Cower, Raymond
Lindsay, Sir Martin


Carr, Compton (Barons Court)
Grant-Ferris, R.
Linstead, Sir Hugh


Carr, Rt. Hon. Robert
Green, Alan
Litchfield, Capt. John


Cary, Sir Robert
Gresham Cooke, R.
Lloyd, Rt. Hn. Geoffrey (Sut'nC'dfield)


Channon, H, P. G.
Grosvenor, Lord Robert
Lloyd, Rt. Hon. Selwyn (Wirral)


Chataway, Christopher
Gurden, Harold
Longbottom, Charles


Clark, Henry (Antrim, N.)
Hall, John (Wycombe)
Longden, Gilbert


Clark, William (Nottingham, S.)
Hamilton, Michael (Wellingborough)
Loveys, Walter H.


Clarke, Brig. Terence (Portsmth, W.)
Harris, Frederic (Croydon, N. W.)
Lucas, Sir Jocelyn


Cleaver, Leonard
Harris, Reader (Heston)
Lucas-Tooth, Sir Hugh


Cole, Norman
Harrison, Brian (Maldon)
McAdden, Sir Stephen


Cooke, Robert
Harrison, Col. Sir Harwood (Eye)
MacArthur, Ian


Cooper, A. E.
Harvey, Sir Arthur Vere (Macclesf'd)
McLaren, Martin


Cordeaux, Lt.-Col. J. K.
Harvey, John (Walthamstow, E.)
McLaughlin, Mrs. Patricia


Cordle, John
Harvie Anderson, Miss
Maclay, Rt. Hon. John


Corfield, F. V.
Hastings, Stephen
Maclean, Sir Fitzroy (Bute&amp;N. Ayrs)


Costain, A. P.
Hay, John
McLean, Neil (Inverness)


Coulson, Michael
Heald, Rt. Hon. Sir Lionel
Macleod, Rt. Hn. Iain (Enfield, W.)


Courtney, Cdr. Anthony
Heath, Rt. Hon. Edward
McMaster, Stanley R.


Craddock, Sir Beresford (Spelthorne)
Henderson, John (Cathcart)
Macmillan, Rt. Hn. Harokd ( Bromley)


Crawley, Aldan
Hendry, Forbes
Macmillan, Maurice (Halifax)


Critchley, Julian
Hicks Beach, Maj. W.
Maddan, Martin


Crosthwalte-Eyre, Col. Sir Oliver
Hiley, Joseph
Maginnis, John E.


Crowder, F. P.
Hill, Mrs. Eveline (Wythenshawe)
Maitland, Sir John


Cunningham, Knox
Hill, J. E. B. (S. Norfolk)
Markham, Major Sir Frank




Marlowe, Anthony
Proudfoot, Wilfred
Teeling, Sir William


Marples, Rt. Hon. Ernest
Pym, Francis
Temple, John M.


Marshall, Sir Douglas
Quennell, Miss J. M.
Thatcher, Mrs. Margaret


Marten, Neil
Ramsden, James
Thomas, Sir Leslie (Canterbury)


Mathew, Robert (Honiton)
Rawlinson, Rt. Hon. Sir Peter
Thomas, Peter (Conway)


Matthews, Gordon (Meriden)
Redmayne, Rt. Hon. Martin
Thompson, Sir Kenneth (Walton)


Maudling, Rt. Hon. Reginald
Rees, Hugh (Swansea, W.)
Thompson, Sir Richard (Croydon, S.)


Mawby, Ray
Rees-Davies, W. R. (Isle of Thanet)
Thorneycroft, Rt. Hon. Peter


Maxwell-Hyslop, R. J.
Ronton, Rt. Hon. David
Thornton-Kemsley, Sir Colin


Maydon, Lt.-Cmdr. s. L. c.
Ridley, Hon. Nicholas
Tiley, Arthur (Bradford, W.)


Mills, Stratton
Ridsdale, Julian
Tilney, John (Wavertree)


Miscampbell, Norman
Rippon, Rt. Hon. Geoffrey
Touche, Rt. Hon. Sir Gordon


Montgomery, Fergus
Roberts, Sir Peter (Heeley)
Turner, Colin


Moore, Sir Thomas (Ayr)
Robertson, Sir D. (C'thn's &amp; S'th'ld)
Turton, Rt. Hon. R. H.


More, Jasper (Ludlow)
Robeon Brown, Sir William
Tweedsmuir, Lady


Morgan, William
Rodgers, John (Sevenoaks)
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Morrison, John
Roots, William
Vane, W. M. F.


Mott-Radolyffe, Sir Charles
Ropner, Col. Sir Leonard
Vaughan-Morgan, Rt. Hon, Sir John


Neave, Airey
Royle, Anthony (Richmond, Surrey)
Vickers, Miss Joan


Nicholls, Sir Harmar
Russell, Sir Ronald
Vosper, Rt. Hon. Dennis


Nicholson, Sir Godfrey
Sandys Rt. Hon. Duncan
Walder, David


Noble, Rt. Hon. Michael
Scott-Hopkins, James
Walker, Peter


Nugent, Rt. Hon. Sir Richard
Seymour, Leslie
Walker-Smith, Rt. Hon. Sir Derek


Oakshott, Sir Hendrie
Shaw, M.
Wall, Patrick


Orr, Capt. L. P. S.
Shepherd, William
Ward, Dame Irene


Orr-Ewing, Sir Charles
Skeet, T. H. H.
Watkinson, Rt. Hon. Harold


Osborn, John (Hallam)
Smith, Dudley (Br'ntf'd &amp; Chiswick)
Webster, David


Osborne, Sir Cyril (Louth)
Smyth, Rt. Hon. Brig. Sir John
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Page, Graham (Crosby)
Spearman, Sir Alexander
Whitelaw, William


Page, John (Harrow, West)
Speir, Rupert
Williams, Dudley (Exeter)


Pannell, Norman (Kirkdale)
Stainton, Keith
Williams, Paul (Sunderland, S.)


Partridge, E.
Stanley, Hon. Richard
Wills, Sir Gerald (Bridgwater)


Pearson, Frank (Clitheroe)
Stevens, Geoffrey
Wilson, Geoffrey (Truro)


Peel, John
Steward, Harold (Stockport, S.)
Wise, A. R.


Percival, Ian
Stodart, J. A.
Wolrige-Gordon, Patrick


Peyton, John
Stoddart-Scott, Col. Sir Malcolm
Wood, Rt. Hon. Richard


Pickthorn, Sir Kenneth
Storey, Sir Samuel
Woodhouse, C. M.


Pike, Miss Mervyn
Studholme, Sir Henry
Woodnutt, Mark


Pitman, Sir James
Summers, Sir Spencer
Woollam, John


Pitt, Dame Edith
Talbot, John E.
Worsley, Marcus


Pounder, Rafton
Tapseil, Peter
Yates, William (The Wrekin)


Powell, Rt. Hon. J. Enoch
Taylor, Sir Charles (Eastbourne)



Price, David (Eastleigh)
Taylor, Edwin (Bolton, E.)
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Price, H. A. (Lewisham, W.)
Taylor, Frank (M'ch'st'r, Moss Side)
Mr. Chichester-Clark and Mr. Finlay.


Prior, J. M. L.
Taylor, Sir William (Bradford, N.)





NOES


Abse. Leo
Crosland, Anthony
Greenwood, Anthony


Ainsley, William
Crossman, R. H. S.
Grey, Charles


Albu, Austen
Dalyell, Tam
Griffiths, David (Rother Valley)


Allaun, Frank (Salford, E.)
Darling, George
Griffiths, Rt. Hon. James (Llanelly)


Allen, Scholefield (Crewe)
Davies, G. Elfed (Rhondda, E.)
Griffiths, W. (Exchange)


Bacon, Miss Alice
Davies, Harold (Leek)
Grimond, Rt. Hon. J.


Barnett, Guy
Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Gunter, Ray


Baxter, William (Stirlingshire, W.)
Davies, S. O. (Merthyr)
Hale, Leslie (Oldham, W.)


Beaney, Alan
Deer, George
Hamilton, William (West Fife)


Bellenger, Rt. Hon. F. J.
Delargy, Hugh
Hannan, William


Bence, Cyril
Dempsey, James
Harper, Joseph


Benn, Anthony Wedgwood
Diamond, John
Hart, Mrs. Judith


Bennett, J. (Glasgow, Bridgeton)
Dodds, Norman
Hayman, F. H.


Benson, Sir George
Doig, Peter
Healey, Denis


Blackburn, F.
Donnelly, Desmond
Henderson, Rt. Hn. Arthur (Rwly Regis)


Bottomley, Rt. Hon. A. G.
Driberg, Tom
Herbison, Miss Margaret


Bowden, Rt. Hn. H. W. (Leics, S. W.)
Duffy, A. E. P. (Colne Valley)
Hilt, J. (Midlothian)


Bowles, Frank
Ede, Rt. Hon. C.
Hilton, A. V.


Boyden, James
Edelman, Maurice
Holman, Percy


Braddock, Mrs. E. M.
Edwards, Rt. Hon. Ness (Caerphilly)
Holt, Arthur


Bradley, Tom
Edwards, Robert (Bilston)
Hooson, H. E.


Bray, Dr. Jeremy
Edwards, Walter (Stepney)
Houghton, Douglas


Brockway, A. Fenner
Evans, Albert
Howell, Charles A. (Perry Barr)


Broughton, Dr. A. D. D.
Fernyhough, E.
Howell, Denis (Small Heath)


Brown, Rt. Hon. George (Belper)
Finch, Harold
Howie, W.


Butler, Herbert (Hackney, C.)
Fitch, Alan
Hoy, James H.


Butler, Mrs. Joyce (Wood Green)
Fletcher, Eric
Hughes, Cledwyn (Anglesey)


Callaghan, James
Foley, Maurice
Hughes, Emrys (S. Ayrshire)


Carmichael, Neil
Foot, Dingle (Ipswich)
Hughes, Hector (Aberdeen, N.)


Castle, Mrs. Barbara
Forman, J. C.
Hunter, A. E.


Chapman, Donald
Fraser, Thomas (Hamilton)
Hynd, H. (Accrington)


Cliffe, Michael
Galpern, Sir Myer
Hynd, John (Attercliffe)


Collick, Percy
George, Lady MeganLloyd (Crmrthn)
Irvine, A. J. (Edge Hill)


Corbet, Mrs. Freda
Ginsburg, David
Irving, Sydney (Dartford)


Craddock, George (Bradford, S.)
Gordon Walker, Rt. Hon. P. C.
Janner, Sir Barnett


Cronin, John
Gourlay, Harry
Jay, Rt. Hon. Douglas







Jeger, George
Morris, John
Small, William


Jenkins, Roy (Stechford)
Moyle, Arthur
Smith, Ellis (Stoke, S.)


Jones, Rt. Hn A. Creech (Wakefield)
Mulley, Frederick
Snow, Julian


Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Neal, Harold
Sorensen, R. W.


Jones, Elwyn (West Ham, S.)
Noel-Baker, Francis (Swindon)
Soskice, Rt. Hon. Sir Frank


Jones, J. Idwal (Wrexham)
Oliver, G. H.
Spriggs, Leslie


Jones, T. W. (Merioneth)
O'Malley, B. K.
Steele, Thomas


Kelley, Richard
Oram, A. E.
Stewart, Michael (Fulham)


Kenyon, Clifford
Oswald, Thomas
Stonehouse, John


King, Dr. Horace
Owen, Will
Stones, William


Lawson, George
Padley, W. E.
Strauss, Rt. Hn. G. R. (Vauxhall)


Ledger, Ron
Paget, R. T.
Stross, Sir Barnett (Stoke-on-Trent, C.)


Lee, Frederick (Newton)
Pannell, Charles (Leeds, W.)
Swain, Thomas


Lee, Miss Jennie (Cannock)
Pargiter, G. A.
Swingler, Stephen


Lever, Harold (Cheetham)
Parker, John
Symonds, J. B.


Lever, L. M. (Ardwick)
Parkin, B. T.
Taverne, D.


Lewis, Arthur (West Ham, N.)
Pavitt, Laurence
Taylor, Bernard (Mansfield)


Lipton, Marcus
Pearson, Arthur (Pontypridd)
Thomas, Iorwerth (Rhondda, W.)


Lubbock, Eric
Peart, Frederick
Thompson, Dr. Alan (Dunfermline)


Mabon, Dr. J. Dickson
Pentland, Norman
Thomson, G. M. (Dundee, E.)


McBride, N.
Popplewell, Ernest
Thornton, Ernest


McCann, John
Prentice, R. E.
Thorpe, Jeremy


MacColl, James
Probert, Arthur
Tomney, Frank


MacDermot, Niall
Proctor, W. T.
Wade, Donald


McInnes, James
Pursey, Cmdr. Harry
Wainwright, Edwin


McKay, John (Wallsend)
Randall, Harry
Warbey, William


Mackie, John (Enfield, East)
Rankin, John
Weitzman, David


McLeavy, Frank
Rees Merlyn (Leeds, S.)
Wells, William (Walsall, N.)


MacMillan, Malcolm (Western Isles)
Reid, William
White, Mrs. Eirene


MacPherson, Malcolm (Stirling)
Reynolds, G. W.
Whitlock, William


Mallalieu, E. L. (Brigg)
Rhodes, H.
Wigg, George


Mallalieu, J. P. W. (Huddersfield, E.)
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)
Wilkins, W. A.


Manuel, Archie
Roberts, Coronwy (Caernarvon)
Willey, Frederick


Mapp, Charles
Robertson, John (Paisley)
Williams, W. T. (Warrington)


Marsh, Richard
Robinson, Kenneth (St. Pancras, N.)
Willis, E. G. (Edinburgh, E.)


Mason, Roy
Rodgere, W. T. (Stockton)
Woodburn, Rt. Hon. A.


Mayhew, Christopher
Ross, William
Woof, Robert


Mellish, R. J.
Royle, Charles (Salford, West)
Wyatt, Woodrow


Mendelson, J. J.
Shinwell, Rt. Hon. E.
Yates, Victor (Ladywood)


Millan, Bruce
Silkin, John
Zilliacus, K.


Milne, Edward
Silverman, Julian (Aston)



Mitchison, G. R.
Silverman, Sydney (Nelson)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Monslow, Walter
Skeffington, Arthur
Mr. G. H. R. Rogers and Mr. Redhead.


Moody, A. S.
Slater, Mrs. Harriet (Stoke, N.)



Morris, Charles (Openshaw)
Slater, Joseph (Sedgefield)

Resolved,
That this House approves the Statement on Defence. 1964, contained in Command Paper No. 2270.

Orders of the Day — PROCEDURE

Select Committee appointed to consider any matters which may be referred to them by the House relating to the procedure in the public Business of the House:

Sir John Arbuthnot, Mr. Blackburn, Mr. George Brown, Sir Lionel Heald, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, Mr. Gilbert Longden, Sir Hugh Lucas-Tooth, Sir Kenneth Pick-thorn, Mr. Redhead, Sir Samuel Storey, Mr. Donald Wade, and Mr. George Wigg:

Power to send for persons, papers and records:

Power to report from time to time:

Five to be the Quorum.—[Mr. Selwyn Lloyd.]

Orders of the Day — DIVISION No. 33

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. MacArthur.]

10.27 p.m.

Mr. William Yates: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Having regard to the Division which has just taken place on a matter of confidence concerning the Government, you will recall that the Leader of the Opposition, in July last year, asked whether the Government had a statement to make, and, in view of the vote tonight—

Mr. Speaker: I do not observe a point of order in what the hon. Gentleman says, and this time is sacrosanct to the hon. and gallant Member whose Adjournment debate it is. Lieut.-Colonel Cordeaux.

Mr. Yates: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. Before you called my hon. and gallant Friend, I raised a point of order concerning the Division which has taken


place. In view of the result of the voting, I am asking whether you will call upon the Leader of the House or the Leader of the Opposition to make a statement on what has occurred in the Division just completed.

Mr. Speaker: I am unable to understand the hon. Gentleman. Otherwise,

I should imagine that there was some abuse of the rules of the House. Lieut.-Colonel Cordeaux.

Mr. Yates: Further to my point of Order, Mr. Speaker. I will explain once again—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I do not think that the House desires it.

Orders of the Day — GAS AND ELECTRICITY. PREPAYMENT METERS

10.28 p.m.

Lieut.-Colonel J. K. Cordeaux: The last speaker in the defence debate just concluded urged us all not to flinch from power or be afraid of power. This evening, I certainly do not intend to flinch from the Ministry of Power in the case which I wish to make. Indeed, I am quite sure that when my hon. Friend has heard the case which I wish to urge he will agree with the suggestions I shall make.
I am extremely glad to have this opportunity to discuss in rather more detail the case which I raised recently in Parliamentary Questions with my hon. Friend concerning the matter of money stolen from gas meters and electricity meters and the fact that householders concerned were required to repay the money. On that occasion, I asked my hon. Friend whether he would give a general directive to the Gas Council and the Central Electricity Authority that repayment should not be demanded from the householders unless it could be proved that the householders themselves were guilty of the theft or, perhaps, had been so culpably negligent that they were in some way responsible for it.
I am sorry to say that I received a rather dusty answer to my questions and my hon. Friend said that it was very much better to leave the matter to the discretion of the boards concerned. However, I think it is a very great injustice that the householder should be required to repay the money unless he has stolen it or is culpably negligible.
Never having possessed a cash electricity or gas meter, I was unaware of this regulation which requires householders to repay the money until a case was brought to my notice of a constituent who found herself in that position. She was a widow aged 72, and her house had been broken into forcibly twice during the last year. On the first occasion the house had been broken into and the thieves had stolen property valued at£19 10s. belonging to the lady and a lodger and also broken open the

gas and electricity meters and stolen from them£5 16s. On the second occasion they had broken into the house forcibly again and stolen from the electricity meter £7 1s. and a very small sum in cash from the lady.
On both occasions the police were immediately informed by the lady herself. They made full investigations. They found that on the first occasion the house had been entered through a defective grating in the cellar and on the second occasion by forcing and breaking open the back door. They were, unfortunately, unable to identify the thieves.
Shortly afterwards the lady was called on by the representatives of the electricity board and required to repay the whole sum that had been stolen on these two occasions from the electricity meter, which amounted to about £11. She made some protest about it, but eventually she agreed to repay the money with £1 cash down and 10s. per week after that.
She then appealed to her Member of Parliament. The matter was first handled by a colleague of mine—I was away from duty at the time—my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham, West (Mr. Tapsell), and later by myself. As a result, the electricity board then agreed to forgo the whole debt and repaid to the lady the money she had already repaid to it. But how many other hundreds or thousands 'of cases must have been going on at very much the same time where the person concerned did not appeal to his Member of Parliament but simply paid up the money?
Another case of this sort occurred recently in Nottingham also, and I know that my colleague the hon. Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Whitlock) will be very pleased to tell the House about it if he is fortunate enough to be called in this debate.
I know there are thousands of these cases going on all the time. I would ask my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary to give, if he can, the actual figures of the number of cases of these meter thefts where the meter has actually been broken into that have occurred during the last year and the proportion of such cases in which the householder has been


required to repay the money although it has not been proved that the householder committed the theft.
I have time to quote only one other of the many cases that have been brought to my notice. I quote it for a specific reason which I will explain when I have done so. I quote a report in the Daily Telegraph on 13th January this year:
An inquiry is being sought into the case of a widow an old-age pensioner who had to pay her electricity bill twice. Mrs. Kate Young, 66 Malvern Road, Luton, had to repay£19 stolen from her meter and pay 5s. 6d. for a new lock. She said yesterday 'I explained I could not afford it. On my pension I can only just manage to put a few shillings in the meter each week. After I talked to a lot of officials they let me pay it back at 5s. a week.' An Electricity Consultative Council official said yesterday 'The Electricity Board told us they had no idea of Mrs. Young's age or circumstances when the bill was sent. We are asking the board to say exactly what the legal position is in regard to people whose meters are robbed.'
That last point is the one that I wish to emphasise. The electricity board has said that it had no idea what this lady's age and circumstances were when it sent her the bill.
I understand the position to be that each case is considered on what the boards call its "merits". One merit, apparently, is the circumstances of the person concerned. I maintain that this is utterly wrong in principle. If the householder has himself robbed the meter then he should have to repay the money quite apart from any other penalty the law may inflict and whether he is rich or poor. But if he has not robbed the meter himself he should not be asked to repay the money.
It is also unfair that the onus should be placed on the boards—which really means their inspectors—to decide whether the householder is rich or poor, or maybe is under such suspicion, and should be required to repay the money.
I have very strong support for my view from the Birmingham Council of Social Service, and I shall quote a letter from the Council, a copy of which was sent to my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Dame Edith Pitt), who was asked for her support. The letter, written by the general secretary, said:

We were sorry to see that the suggestion, made by the M.P. for Nottingham Central, that the Ministry of Power should give directives to gas and electricity councils regarding the repayment by householders of money stolen from meters had been rejected by the Ministry.
The Birmingham Council of Social Service has numerous applications each year for grants to help householders repay bills caused by theft, and make considerable payments to help where this is causing severe hardship, particularly to Old Age Pensioners. Because the gas and electricity councils have no policy directive it is necessary for our social workers to spend time negotiating afresh with them on behalf of every new applicant. As each case is treated separately by the councils, decisions are made which appear to the public to be unjust.
A Ministry directive would be of great value to organisations such as ourselves who must deal with the problems created by these thefts.
I maintain that when the money has been placed in the meter by the person concerned it is as much the responsibility of the gas or electricity boards as a letter is that of the Post Office once it has been placed in a pillar box. I maintain that the boards are responsible for the safe custody of that money.
After all, the householder has no say in the theft-resisting properties of the meters and none as to the frequency of collection. It might well be that when a fair amount of money has accumulated he would prefer to take it out and bank it or put it in some other safe place, but, of course, he must not do so. He would be committing an offence if he did.
In connection with these two points, I want to quote another letter, from a householder in Birmingham. He said:
I was very interested in your speech in regard to pre-payment meters, and although I had not myself suffered any loss…I thought you may be interested in my recent experience.
My meter was emptied by an official of the West Midlands Gas Board on January 20th last. I was amazed to learn it contained the sum of£29 1s. This was accounted for by the fact that the meter had not been emptied since January 9th last year, more than 12 months ago.
This coin box is secured by a frail brass padlock which a child could open with ease. It would cause one great distress if I were called upon to replace this money…I am now retired and living on a small pension and it is only on rare occasions that my wife and I are absent from home at the same time so it is unlikely that we would be out when the collector called.
I hope my hon. Friend will look at this again. He may say that when a householder signs an application for gas


or electricity he signs under a clause which says that he will be responsible for the money when it is placed in the meter until it has been collected. If he does say that, then I hope that he will also tell us just what say the householder has in the negotiation of his agreement. As I see it, gas and electricity being monopolies in this country, he has absolutely no say at all.
I hope that my hon. Friend will undertake to consider this matter again. I am sure that if he does he will come to the conclusion that the present position is most unjust, and that this injustice should not be perpetuated merely to save the gas and electricity councils—and therefore the whole of the consuming public—a certain amount of money.

10.41 p.m.

Mr. William Whitlock: I am grateful to the hon. and gallant Member for Nottingham, Central (Lieut.-Colonel Cordeaux) for cutting short his remarks in order that I may support him. I can best do so by telling the House what happened to a constituent of mine, whose prepayment meter was broken open. When the gas board officials called and found that about £16 was missing from the meter and it was realised that my constituent could not meet the account, her gas supply was immediately cut off—at a point when she was in the midst of the preparation of a meal for her four children. Representations were made to the gas board by other residents in the area, but they were told that in no circumstances could the gas supply be restored until the payment of a deposit of £20 had been made. This poor, unfortunate woman spent more than two days endeavouring to raise this £20 deposit in order to have her gas supply restored.
This seems to be extremely harsh treatment. I am aware that this action was taken in accordance with the provisions of the Gas Act, 1948, and that even before nationalisation deposits were required by local gas undertakings in circumstances like this, but it seems quite wrong that a householder who is robbed in this way should be required to pay twice, in effect, for the gas she has had, and it is surely monstrously unjust that someone with such a small

income as that of my constituent should be required to find a deposit as a kind of insurance for the gas board against future theft.
Like the hon. and gallant Member for Nottingham, Central, I urge the Parliamentary Secretary to examine this matter in order to see whether hardship in cases like this can be alleviated in the future.

10.43 p.m.

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Power (Mr. John Peyton): The last impression that I would wish to give is that either the Ministry of Power or the gas and electricity boards take a harsh and unsympathetic view of cases where undoubted hardship is involved. On the other hand, I very much hope that my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Nottingham, Central (Lieut.-Colonel Cordeaux) and the hon. Member for Nottingham, North (Mr. Whitlock) will realise that there is a dilemma and a genuine difficulty here. I am sorry that my hon. and gallant Friend thought that I gave him a dusty answer the other day. I had not intended to be anything other than frank.
I have no doubt that the details of the cases mentioned both by my hon. and gallant Friend and the hon. Member will be noticed and remarked by the boards responsible. I observe, however, that in the case mentioned by my hon. and gallant Friend the board eventually agreed to forego the whole debt. Parliament, in its wisdom, in passing both the Gas and the Electricity Acts, set up fairly elaborate consultative council machinery to which consumers can and should go in cases where they feel that they have been unjustly and harshly treated. I should like to pay tribute to the value of the work done by these councils. I hope that people who feel that they have been hardly done by will make use of this machinery. I note the point my hon. and gallant Friend made about the great delay in a particular case in emptying the meter. I shall see that that point is passed on He suggested that it was wrong for boards to judge individual cases on their merits. On that I join issue with him and disagree. It seems very wrong indeed that boards should not be free to use discretion in waiving their rights particularly in cases of hardship. I cannot promise. although of


course I have sympathy with individual cases he may have in mind, that I shall reconsider the whole position. I have no doubt, however, that gas and electricity boards all over the country will take note of the remarks which my hon. and gallant Friend made and the hon. Member for Nottingham, North echoed.
It might help if I give the House a few of the facts which are the background to this position. There are 2 million electricity pre-payment meters and 7 million gas pre-payment meters in the country. When a coin is put into such a meter it becomes the property of the board, but most of the boards require the customer to accept responsibility for the safe custody of the money until it is collected. These meters are expensive items of equipment. Despite what my hon. and gallant Friend said, they involve more meter reading and necessarily an additional charge. I stress the point that if the boards were given a choice they would prefer customers to accept a credit basis. To help customers, some boards have introduced a stamp payments scheme.
The pre-payment system is designed not as a convenience for the board, but as a convenience for the customer. Arrangements between the boards and their customers are commercial matters in which it would be wholly wrong for any Government Department to intervene. This is why I was obliged to give my hon. and gallant Friend what he thought was a dusty answer the other day and to refuse to give a direction to either of these industries that they should reverse their policies. My right hon. Friend is not in a position to adjudicate on individual cases. Nor do I think he should attempt to dictate commercial policy to any board which must have liberty and freedom to negotiate terms with its customers.
Neither the Gas Act nor the Electricity Act gives ground for Ministerial intervention except through the statutory procedures laid down and in particular through the consultative councils to which I have referred. The legal position is slightly obscure. In the view of the boards, they are legally entitled to require from their customers an undertaking of responsibility for the cash which may at any time reside in the meter. There have been two decisions in the Scottish courts and they are

apparently in some conflict. It is not my business to comment on them. On the merits of the case I should remind the House and my hon. and gallant Friend—I do not wish to give him any sort of "brush off"—of the inescapable fact that any board is responsible to all its customers. If it is to give relief to one, or to many, it will have to be at the expense of the rest, and that fact has to be faced. If a board were to accept automatic responsibility were any meter to be broken into, it would be jeopardising the interests of the majority of its customers to an unjustifiable extent.
My hon. and gallant Friend has adduced evidence that all boards are willing, despite the legal position on which they feel they can rely, to look at all the circumstances of any case, particularly where hardship is involved, and I think that it is perfectly right that they should take account of hardship. My hon and gallant Friend has said that the same rule should be applied to all, but I feel, and I think that most boards feel, that that would, perhaps, be an unduly harsh rule to implement. Certainly, where someone outside the household has been convicted of the theft of the money, I think it inconceivable that any board would contemplate taking proceedings to recover the money due from the householder—

Lieut.-Colonel Cordeaux: Would not my hon. Friend agree that if, as he says, when it is proved that some outside person has stolen the money the householder should not be required to repay it, the same thing should apply if the police had, at least, established the fact that the householder was not responsible?

Mr. Peyton: If the police established the fact that a third person, someone outside the household, was responsible, I have no doubt whatever that the board concerned would take very great cognisance of that. I cannot say now what it would do, but I am certain that it would take that fact into very careful consideration. If my hon. and gallant Friend ever has such a set of circumstances brought to his attention, I hope that he will either write directly to the board or bring it to my notice.
If Parliament were to take a second look at what it had previously decided


and, in reviewing its previous decision, were to say that the boards were for the future to be unable to recover the money due to them unless they were themselves able to prove the guilt of the householder, or someone resident in the house, that would be to place the boards in a very invidious position, indeed, and to make the performance of their statutory duty rather more onerous and difficult than it should be. The right to recover payment should not depend on the ability of a board to secure a conviction for theft.
I would remind the House—and I stress the point—that the provision of pre-payment meters is not a matter for the convenience of the boards; they are provided for the convenience of the customers. There are, admittedly, certain advantages that go with that—the additional charge, perhaps—but there is also the risk of theft. To expose the board and the remainder of its customers to the consequences would be wrong.
It might be convenient if I give the House some figures, although I apologise for them being only estimates. The gas industry derives an income of about £90 million a year through pre-payment meters. There are, it is estimated, during every year about 100,000 thefts involving about £350,000. The figures are rather less for the electricity industry, but about 30,000 thefts take place involving about £150,000. These figures show that a considerable sum of money is involved and that it would be wrong to expose boards to the risk which would be involved if one made it perfectly clear that they were automatically

responsible for what happens and that if money were stolen from a meter they would simply have to replace it at the expense of the remainder of their customers. That would be wrong and difficult to justify.
I acknowledge the dilemma which my hon. and gallant Friend and the hon. Member opposite have put to me with considerable restraint. I am certain that the chairmen and members of area boards will take note of what has been said, but clearly it would be wholly wrong for any Minister to tell boards how they should conduct their relationships with their customers and on what terms those relationships should be based. It would, I do not doubt, land my Department in a very false position of dictating to boards how they should carry on their business, and I would find that quite unacceptable.
I wish to stress that boards are very willing indeed to look at any element of hardship that may be involved in these case; and that the whole of the consultative council machinery—and I have had a certain amount of contact with it—is there to deal with these sort of things. Where customers feel that they have been wrongly or harshly treated, it is only right that—

The Question having been proposed after Ten o'clock and the debate having continued for half an hour, Mr. DEPUTY-SPEAKER adjourned the House without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order.

Adjourned at three minutes to Eleven o'clock.